A DYNAMIC PARTICIPATION DECISION MODEL APPLIED TO THE CONSERVATION SECURITY PROGRAM FOR NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES DAIRY FARMS by Shultz, Joseph
 
 
A DYNAMIC PARTICIPATION DECISION MODEL  
APPLIED TO THE CONSERVATION SECURITY PROGRAM FOR  







Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 




















© 2007 Joseph Anthony Shultz  ABSTRACT
The Conservation Security Program was authorized in the 2002 Farm Bill and 
is hailed by many observers as the first true “green payments” program for working 
lands in the United States. Previous analysis and anecdotal evidence for similar 
conservation programs show that premature termination of contracts is a persistent 
issue. This type of producer behavior is not easily explained using the standard 
assumptions of profit-maximization under perfect information and perfect rationality. 
Rather, this unexpected termination behavior demonstrates the need for analyses that 
take into account biophysical complexities and alternative decision-making 
assumptions. An alternative set of behavioral assumptions is explored in this research 
that employ descriptive rather than normative participation decision rules. 
The objective of this research is to explore the impact of alternative behavioral 
assumptions and dynamic biophysical effects of conservation practices on the 
participation and termination decisions of New York dairy producers. A simulation 
model is constructed to represent the effects of selected biophysical processes on farm 
profitability, producers’ ability to gather and utilize this information, and finally their 
decisions to participate in the program. The results of this simulation model provide 
insights concerning observed termination behavior and suggestions for policy design 
and implementation. 
The results of the dynamic participation decision model indicate that premature 
termination of CSP contracts is possible and even probable under certain conditions. 
These conditions include the complex biophysical effects of conservation practices, 
behavioral characteristics of decision makers, and payment schedules of the 
Conservation Security Program. These are all significant factors affecting if and when 
producers decide to termination CSP contracts. Termination decisions, in this model, 
are a result of learning processes, that is, the producer’s realization of new information concerning the profitability, or net revenue from participating in the Conservation 
Security Program. 
Behavioral characteristics play a significant role in shaping producers’ learning 
processes and the formation of expectations of net revenue from the CSP contract. 
Most important for determining participation is the magnitude of the producer’s initial 
estimation error as well as delays in updating their perceptions and expectations of net 
revenue. These delays determine a producer’s adjustment times for perceiving new 
information and the incorporation of that learning into new expectations about net 
revenue. This expectation formation process can further encourage farmers to 
terminate their CSP contracts by creating greater amounts of volatility in expectations. 
The type of decision rule used by the farmer is also of significance when determining 
if or when a farmer might terminate participation in CSP. This analysis examines ten 
alternative decision rules. 
This analysis presents several implications for pragmatic policy solutions to 
the problem of premature termination of CSP contracts. Foremost, policy makers 
should look beyond typical cost/benefit models of decision-making when designing 
inventive structures for conservation programs. Taking into account alternative 
decision-making behavior, this research recommends an alternative payment schedule 
to what was implemented in the 2005 CSP sign-up. A more robust policy would be to 
vary the payment rates to compensate for the expected downturn in farmer perceptions 
and expectations. Evaluation of several dynamic payment schedules indicated that 
there are a variety of possible schedules that can increase initial sign-up rates, decrease 
termination rates, and decrease government expenditures simultaneously. The policy 
“fix,” suggested by this analysis, is robust over variations in behavioral characteristics 
and for multiple decision rules. With this approach, it is possible to simultaneously 
decrease government expenditure and decrease cumulative termination rates.
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There are numerous interactions between agricultural production and the 
environment, many of which are negative. One of the most pressing issues in the 
United States surrounds water quality. National water quality assessments strongly 
suggest that agriculture is the largest single contributor to the remaining water quality 
problems in the United States (Claassen, et al. 2001). Soil erosion, although 
decreasing from 3.1 billion tons per year in 1982 to 1.9 billion tons per year in 1997, 
continues to be a major problem (Claassen, et al. 2001). The Environmental Protection 
Agency (1996) identifies sediment as the leading pollution problem in rivers and 
streams across the country. In addition, nitrogen used as fertilizer on U.S. farms is the 
leading cause of eutrophication in coastal areas including a large hypoxic zone in the 
Gulf of Mexico (Claassen, et al. 2001).  
Production agriculture creates positive externalities as well, albeit somewhat 
less quantifiable. Many commonly-mentioned positive externalities include: assurance 
of available food, sustaining rural landscapes, supporting agrarian heritage, and 
creation of open space (Abler, 2003). Several environmental externalities can be 
positive or negative, depending on the specific management practices of a given 
agricultural operation. Properly managed agricultural systems can provide flood 
control, wildlife habitat, groundwater recharge, and increased biodiversity. However 
these effects can all be negated through improper management of agricultural 
production. Thus, agricultural operations have the potential to produce several positive 
and negative externalities (Abler, 2003).  
This conceptual framework undergirds the notion of the multifunctionality of 
 1  agriculture: an idea that the production of agricultural commodities generates multiple 
outputs beyond the commodity itself. Often these additional outputs do not have 
efficient markets and thus can be considered externalities. There continues to be a 
growing acceptance of the multifunctional nature of agriculture, however identifying 
which externalities are in legitimate need of government intervention, (e.g. rural 
landscapes, cultural heritage, and environmental degradation) is subject to debate. 
Agri-environmental policy in the United States generally addresses the 
multifunctionality of agriculture by encouraging farmers to adopt environmentally 
sound production practices (Claassen et al, 2001.) 
The multifunctionality of agriculture seems to fit the classic environmental 
economic model of environmental externalities that need government intervention in 
order to provide the socially optimal incentives for agricultural production. Otherwise, 
agricultural producers will oversupply commodities with net negative externalities and 
undersupply commodities with net positive externalities relative to the social optimum 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). However, simply taxing or subsidizing commodity outputs 
will not typically be effective due to several complex interactions between agriculture 
and the environment (Brendal et al, 2004). An example is the production of a negative 
externality of agriculture, such as nitrogen runoff. Although certain agricultural 
cropping practices reduce runoff, the relationship between these practices and the 
bushels per acre of grain produced is largely unrelated. Thus, it can be deduced that 
simple Pigovian taxes reducing the price of the grain per bushel would be an 
inefficient policy mechanism to achieve the socially optimal level of nitrogen loadings 
in rivers and streams. An ideal alternative would be to measure the environmental 
outputs of agricultural production directly and tax or subsidize their production 
appropriately. However, for many agri-environmental systems, actual environmental 
outcomes are difficult to attribute to an individual producer’s behavior because of 
 2  complex spatial, temporal, and unpredictable factors such as weather (Brendal et al, 
2004). 
Despite these inherent difficulties, the federal government has implemented 
several policies designed to mitigate agriculture’s impact on the environment. The 
inability to directly measure environmental outcomes has contributed to the 
development of agri-environmental policies focused on providing incentives for 
producers to retire environmentally sensitive land or to use environmentally friendly 
management practices on land remaining in production. The most notable federal agri-
environmental programs include: the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which 
funds voluntary retirement of highly erodible land; the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP), which provides federal cost-sharing for several 
conservation management practices; and environmental cross-compliance 
requirements, which are mandatory for producers who want to remain eligible for 
traditional farm commodity payments (NRCS website, 2005—
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/farmbill/2002/pdf/ProgSum.pdf). Although the 
majority of USDA agri-environmental programs are voluntary, some policies under 
the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency are mandatory—for example 
regulations pertaining to the Clean Water Act (Claassen, et al. 2001).  
In 2002, Congress wrote legislation that created another agri-environmental 
program focused on providing financial incentives to individual agricultural producers 
for exemplary environmental stewardship. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) 
was legislated by the 2002 Farm Bill, rolled out in autumn of 2004, and has grown in 
scope in 2005. This new program can be conceptualized as “green payments” or 
financial incentives for agricultural producers to act as environmental stewards. CSP 
provides multiple layers of incentives and cost-sharing for ranchers and farmers to 
undertake changes in on-farm conservation structures or management practices in 
 3  order to enhance the environmental impacts of their agricultural operation. In the 
words of the USDA, CSP is designed to “reward the best and motivate the rest.” The 
voluntary program uses five- or ten-year individualized contracts that focus on 
environmental issues such as improving water quality, reducing soil erosion, 
improving air quality, and addressing wildlife issues (NRCS website, 2005—
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/cspqa5905.pdf).  
The Conservation Security Program is unique among the USDA’s cadre of 
agri-environmental policies for several reasons. First and foremost, CSP follows the 
trend of the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in departing from the 
USDA’s attempts environmental improvement through large-scale land retirement 
such as Conservation Reserve Program and Wetland Reserve Program. CSP, like 
EQIP, focuses on changing management practices on lands that continue to be used in 
production, termed “working lands” by USDA. Secondly, CSP, unlike EQIP, requires 
participants to take a whole-farm approach to conservation and environmental 
management and provides contracts only to producers willing to address several, if not 
all of the environmental concerns on their operations. CSP contracts are customized to 
each agricultural operation allowing for flexibility in identifying and addressing the 
unique environmental challenges faced by each participant. Given the heterogeneous 
characteristics of individual agri-environmental systems, this flexibility is crucial for 
providing public environmental benefits in an efficient manner. Thirdly, CSP contracts 
have multiple layers of payments, including an annual payment based upon the past 
environmental performance of an operation—for example the historical change in 
cropland soil organic matter. Addressing past performance is essential for rewarding 
“good actors” who have demonstrated good stewardship practices prior to enrollment. 
CSP also goes beyond the EQIP partial cost-sharing model by providing 100% cost-
 4  sharing for designated conservation practices that enhance the environmental impact 
of the operation.  
The CSP incentive structure, which attempts to merge both targeted and 
holistic environmental outcomes, presents challenges as CSP contracts are lengthy, 
complex, and require a much greater level of planning, management, and commitment 
from agricultural producers than previous agri-environmental programs. The 
additional effort required might be offset by larger potential financial benefits for 
participating producers, which can also exceed previous levels. However, with little 
empirical data on the participation rates, the program’s complex incentives provide a 
basis for many research questions. The effectiveness of CSP has not yet been 
analyzed, but its unique place in federal agri-environmental policy makes it deserving 
of additional analysis. 
  Designing effective federal conservation programs, such as CSP, is 
challenging due to the diversity of farm types, crops, farming practices, and 
environmental concerns. Environmental effectiveness and implementation costs can 
vary significantly from farm to farm and implementation is difficult to monitor. In 
general, it is difficult to accurately predict which producers will participate and what 
land and practices they will offer in response to a given set of participation incentives. 
A USDA review of conservation program design on working lands stated: “because of 
the complexity of farm household decision-making and the non-point source and site 
specific nature of agri-environmental problems, forecasting the benefits of agri-
environmental conservation programs is data-demanding and technically challenging 
(Cattaneo et al., 2005).” 
Effective program design is additionally hindered due to the lack of models 
that can accurately predict participation behavior. This difficulty is most clearly seen 
in the NRCS CSP Benefit-Cost Assessment (BCA). The CSP BCA utilizes a 
 5  simulation model to predict aggregation participation rates based on profitability, 
demographic characteristics, and historical participation in conservation programs 
(USDA, CSP Benefit-Cost Assessment, 2005). However, this model is poorly suited 
for predicting the participation of an individual agricultural producer because it does 
not address the complex processes of farmer decision-making or the dynamic 
biophysical effects of individual conservation practices over heterogeneous farm 
types. 
It is not to say, however, that the lack of an effective predictive model 
represents a deficiency of research on understanding the participation decision, or the 
closely related decision to adopt new technologies such as conservation practices. To 
the contrary, there is a sizable literature of ex post empirical studies, which analyze the 
decisions of farmers either to adopt conservation practices or to participate in 
conservation programs. These studies commonly frame the decision as a dichotomous 
choice problem and examine the demographic or physical factors that influence the 
decision to adopt conservation practices or equivalently to participate in conservation 
programs. Most studies include factors such as farmer characteristics, natural features 
of the farm, or the financial attributes of the agricultural operation. However, many 
studies lack cost data for conservation practices, which makes them relatively 
unsuitable for setting practice payment rates. In general, the existing literature 
provides little guidance to policy-makers on how to design programs and incentive 
structures to in order to achieve the desired level of participation.  
Participation in government programs has often been included in simulation 
models examining optimal behavior of decision-makers. For example, Perry et al. 
(1989) uses a linear programming model to analysis the whole-farm planning 
decisions associated with crop mix decisions and participation in government 
programs such as commodity deficiency payments and CRP. Due to the heterogeneous 
 6  characteristics of farms implementing conservation practices, simulating the 
biophysical effects simultaneously with the economic effects is helpful for greater 
understanding of the conservation program performance. Integrated biophysical and 
economic models can shed light upon both the environmental impact of conservation 
programs and the on-site biophysical effects (Tanaka and Wu, 2004; Westra et al, 
2002; Dobbs and Streff, 2005).  
Although there are significant research efforts focused on integrated 
biophysical and economic simulation modeling, there is far less focus on the complex 
processes of participation decisions in conservation programs. Little is known about 
these processes as pointed out in Cattaneo (2005). However, neoclassical economic 
theory presents normative theories as to how a farmer should make a participation 
decision. These normative theories, which are the base for most ex ante research, are 
often based on a dichotomous choice model, focusing on the “event” of the decision-
making rather than the “process.” Johnson (1987) argues that the concept of expected 
utility has been emphasized to the neglect of other aspects of decision-making such as 
problem definition, learning, analysis, and other decision-making rules. These 
alternative behavioral assumptions have not played a significant role in participation 
or technology adoption literature. Nowak (1992) points out: “Unless we begin to 
spend more time and effort trying to understand all of the complex reasons why 
farmers are unable or unwilling to adopt new production techniques, out aspirations 
for wide scale adoption of residue management are destined to fail.” 
 
Specific Problem   
In the absence of significant empirical evidence concerning participation in the 
Conservation Security Program, it is appropriate for an ex ante analysis of program 
effectiveness. Of particular interest is the complexity of the participation decision-
 7  making process due to the biophysical effects of conservation practices, unique 
incentives, and dynamic information gathering processes of agricultural producers. 
The relevance of this type of evaluation is demonstrated by the unexpectedly high 
percentage of contract cancellations made by agricultural producers in the EQIP 
program during the late 1990’s (Cattaneo, 2003). Contract termination rates were 
higher than 20% for certain high-cost management practices. Contract cancellations 
occurred more frequently in the first few years of the contract period, perhaps 
indicating “learning” by the producer. This type of producer behavior is not easily 
explained using the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory of profit-
maximization under perfect information and perfect rationality. In addition, due to a 
lack of appropriate data, approaching the participation question using multivariate 
regression analysis techniques, such as binary choice models seem inadequate for 
supplying a satisfactory answer.  
Instead, more realistic behavioral assumptions are required to support a 
descriptive rather than normative model of participation decision-making. This model 
should explore the impact of alternative behavioral assumptions and dynamic 
biophysical effects of conservation practices on the participation and termination 
decisions of agricultural producers. Such a model is needed to understand the 
complexities of biophysical processes on farm profitability, producers’ ability to 
gather and utilize this information, and finally their decisions to participate in the 
program. Variations from neoclassical economic assumptions such as “anchoring and 
adjustment” and other descriptive theories found in the behavioral economics 
literature provide an opportunity to explore this participation behavior (Plous, 1993). 
These deviations from neoclassical theory can be explicitly modeled using techniques 
commonly used in the field of system dynamics. The results of such models can 
supply answers to important questions concerning unexpected participation behavior 
 8  and provide pragmatic insight into policy design and implementation for policy-
makers. 
Additional consideration for alternative behavioral assumptions and non-
traditional modeling techniques is prompted by the unique incentive structure and 
biophysical effects of conservation practices embedded in a CSP contract. These 
distinct characteristics might have unintended effects on the initial and continuing 
participation decisions of individual agricultural producers. Although described in 
detail in a subsequent section of this thesis, specific examples of these unique 
characteristics of participation in CSP include a no-penalty clause for breach of 
contract and multiple layers of payments provided to a participant. Producers 
attempting to understand the structure and actual effect of the incentive payments will 
have no small task considering that each CSP “contract” is actually a bundle of several 
legal agreements covering management practices or conservation structures on 
individual tracts of land on the farm. In addition, a producer, even with the assistance 
of technical support, cannot usually predict the biophysical effects of planned changes 
in management practices. This difficulty in accurately analyzing the complex dynamic 
biophysical effects of CSP participation compounds the traditional market 
uncertainties faced by agricultural producers.  
Considered together, these attributes of participation in CSP lead to several 
important questions. Most importantly, what factors will influence producers’ 
decisions to sign-up for CSP but subsequently not fulfill the entire length and breadth 
of their contract? More specifically, how do the dynamic biophysical processes of the 
conservation practices affect profitability over the course of a ten-year contract? 
Furthermore, how will this change in profitability affect producers’ learning and 
decision-making processes? To approach these questions, this analysis will start with 
the traditional assumptions that producers have perfect information and use the 
 9  calculations of net present value as a decision rule, and then examine the effects of 
alternative behavioral assumptions. Doing so acknowledges the complex process by 
which producers gather, process, and make use of information in order to make 
decisions related to participation in agri-environmental programs. Therefore, it is 
useful to ask the little-studied question: what role does learning and expectation 
formation play in influencing participation decisions? Additionally, what management 
decision processes, beyond the assumptions of perfect information and rationality, will 
contribute to the participation decision making process of the producer? Answers to 
these questions will naturally lead to pragmatic policy questions related to the design 
of structure, mechanisms, and incentives of CSP to decrease the likelihood of 
cancellation of contracts. 
Unexpected cancellation behavior in a recent federal conservation program has 
demonstrated the need for analyses that take into account biophysical complexities and 
alternative decision-making assumptions. A descriptive rather than normative model is 
useful for understanding the complexities of farmers’ decision-making processes. 
Such a model can then be applied to dairy farmers in the Northeastern region of the 
United States, who face a unique set of challenges related to both profitability and to 
environmental concerns, such as nutrient management issues. A focus on this subset of 
agricultural producers is also motivated by a perception that previous federal 
agricultural programs have been less beneficial to Northeastern farmers relative to 
other regions of the United States. The application of these questions to a specific farm 
type and region will allow for much more realistic and applicable answers to important 
policy questions. 
 
 10  Objectives 
    The general objective of this research is to model, ex ante, the CSP 
participation and termination decisions of a representative NY dairy farmer in order to 
gain insight and understanding for program design and implementation. Specific 
objectives include:  
1.  Summarize the available information on the dynamic biophysical effects of 
four conservation practices likely to be used on NY dairy farms and their 
subsequent impacts on net revenue over the course of a ten-year CSP contract. 
2.  Describe alternatives to behavioral assumptions that assume profit-
maximization under perfect information and rationality for producers. These 
alternatives will include assumptions regarding initial estimation error, 
learning processes, expectation formation, and a range of participation 
decision-making rules.  
3.  Construct a dynamic simulation model for an individual representative farmer 
in order to explore the impacts of the interactions between biophysical 
dynamics, incentive structure, and alternative behavioral assumptions on 
participation decisions, particularly focusing on the decision to terminate 
participation. 
4.  Analyze the impacts of specific policy alternatives, such as timing and amount 
of incentives, education of producers, and implementation procedures, on the 
decision to terminate participation in CSP.  
 
Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides a 
summary of the Conservation Security Program and places it in the context of recent 
U.S. Agri-Environmental policy. This chapter also explicitly describes the 
 11  requirements, procedures, and implementation of CSP including determination of 
eligibility and payments. The methods for this research endeavor are discussed in 
Chapter Three, paying particular attention to the modeling paradigm of system 
dynamics, its notation, and how it complements traditional applied economic policy 
analysis. Chapter Four presents the formal dynamic participation model and provides 
justification for model structure, parameter estimates, and various simulation runs to 
be used for policy analysis. This model is described in three distinct sectors: 
conservation practices and payments, information and management processes, and 
participation decision rules. These sectors are derived directly from the defined 
problem and stated objectives. Chapter Five presents the results and findings of the 
dynamic participation decision model and provide an evaluation of the model. Finally, 
Chapter Six provides further discussion of results, limitations of the model, 
implications for policy design, and suggestions for future research.   
 
 12  CHAPTER TWO 
CONSERVATION SECURITY PROGRAM 
 
Introduction 
The Conservation Security Program (CSP), legislated in 2002 and partially 
implemented in 2004, is the subject of this ex ante policy analysis. The CSP is a 
voluntary program which provides financial and technical assistance to agricultural 
producers in order to promote the conservation and improvement of soil, water, air, 
energy, plant and animal life on Tribal and private working lands. It is administered by 
the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS). The CSP adds a distinctly new dimension to the United 
States approach to environmental concerns on farms and ranches. The CSP’s unique 
objectives, complex incentive structure, and potential for impact can be better 
understood and appreciated when put into a context of all federal agri-environmental 
programs. The development of agri-environmental programs and the current status of 
these policies are summarized below. Additionally, the details of the program, 
including eligibility, payment structure, and participation rules, are examined in order 
to develop the simulation model found later in this study. 
 
Agri-Environmental Policy Context 
  Existing agri-environmental policy has its origins in farm crisis of the 1930’s. 
Soil conservation and farmer financial assistance became a justifiable public 
expenditure, as the devastation of the Dust Bowl was brought into the spotlight as in 
the novels of John Steinbeck and the music of Woody Guthrie. The 1936 farm bill, 
The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, “provided for the protection of 
land resources against soil erosion and for other purposes.” These “other purposes” 
 13  included the transfer of revenue to American farmers (Cain and Lovejoy, 2004). Thus, 
the dual objectives of agri-environmental policy were present at conception: a 
dichotomy of increasing farmer income and protecting natural resources. Early efforts 
at conservation could accomplish the dual policy goals without conflict. The financial 
assistance program in the 1936 Act, called the Agricultural Conservation Program, 
paid farmers to replace seven soil-depleting crops with other crops thought to be soil-
conserving such as grasses, legumes, or cover crops. Subsequently, Congress provided 
incentive payments for several more conservation practices, which reduced resource 
problems on farms (Helms, 2003). However, public concern began to grow in the 
early 1980’s about the sometimes deleterious nature of intensive agricultural 
production. These concerns led to a policy shift that began to address environmental 
issues that had off-farm consequences as well as an effect on farm revenue (Zinn, 
2005). The 1985 Farm Bill was the first Farm Bill to have a specific title devoted to 
conservation issues and included groundbreaking new conservation programs: 
Sodbuster, Swampbuster, conservation cross-compliance, and the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP). The 1985 farm bill ushered in a new era of agri-
environmental policy initiatives from which the Conservation Security Program has 
evolved (Helms, 2003). From 1985 through the present, USDA administered agri-
environmental programs can be divided into three distinct categories: conservation 
compliance mechanisms, land retirement programs, and working land payment 
programs. Additionally, significant expenditures have been made for producer 
education and technical assistance, which is, linked to the implementation of most 
conservation programs including conservation cross-compliance. Although the 
implementation details, funding levels, and relative prominence of each type of policy 
has waxed and waned with each successive Farm Bill, each of the three remain 
important to understanding the overall framework of federal agri-environmental 
 14  policy. Though USDA agri-environmental policy operates in concert with the 
regulatory requirements and initiatives of other federal agencies, this summary will 
focus its attention on the voluntary and incentive-based programs administered by the 
USDA. 
Compliance mechanisms enacted in the 1985 Farm Bill made protection of 
highly erodible soil and wetlands a prerequisite for receiving federal monies through 
other farm payment programs. These mechanisms include the Conservation 
Compliance, Sodbuster, and Swampbuster provisions. Under these provisions, farmers 
can only remain eligible for farm program payments, including CRP, disaster 
payments, and Federal Crop Insurance, when they comply with certain environmental 
practices. Conservation Compliance requires those who farm highly erodible lands to 
implement conservation plans to reduce soil erosion. The Sodbuster provision requires 
producers to apply strict conservation systems to any new highly erodible lands that 
they bring into production. The Swampbuster provision excludes farmers from farm 
program payments if they drain wetlands in order to bring land into agricultural 
production.  
These provisions were enacted in order to remove the incentive, magnified by 
commodity price supports, to expand crop production onto environmentally sensitive 
land. However, the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms is limited to addressing 
the environmental concerns on farms that already receive other forms of federal farm 
payments. Nonetheless, between 1982 and 1987, erosion fell on highly erodible land 
by 331 million tons annually (Claassen et al, 2004). From a policy design perspective, 
conservation compliance mechanisms are a more cost efficient mechanism than 
incentive-based policies at achieving environmental benefits. Although compliance 
mechanisms do not make direct payments to farmers and ranchers, there is a 
significant cost to the federal government for the monitoring and enforcement 
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implement these provisions (Claassen et al, 2004). These educational and information 
services, officially called Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA), amounted to 
$742 million in the 2004 USDA budget and have been provided to farmers and 
ranchers in some form since 1935 (USDA website, 2005—
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2006/FY06budsum.htm). 
Regulatory requirements are mostly used as agri-environmental policy tools by 
agencies other than the USDA. Although a comprehensive overview of federal 
regulations affecting agriculture and the environmental is beyond the scope of this 
study, a few notable policies are summarized below. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) carries out the most prominent regulatory action, which affects 
agricultural producers. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, commonly 
referred to as the Clean Water Act, focuses on reducing the water quality impact of 
point sources of pollution such as factory discharge and municipal sewage. In recent 
years, the focus of the Clean Water Act has turned to non-point sources including 
runoff from agricultural operations (Claassen, 2001). In addition, agricultural point 
source pollution from confined animal feedlot operations (CAFO’s) is regulated. As of 
2001, over 6,000 livestock operations were large enough to be classified as CAFO’s 
under the Clean Water Act (Claassen, 2001). This designation requires CAFO’s to 
obtain a permit to discharge of manure and nutrients. The Coastal Zone Act 
Reauthorization Amendments (CZARA) of 1990 is a federally mandated program 
requiring specific measures to deal with agricultural non-point source pollution in 
order to restore and protect coastal waters. The program requires each of the twenty-
nine states with approved coastal zone management plans to utilize voluntary 
incentives to encourage farmers to adopt measures that control non-point source 
pollution. If voluntary measures fail, however, then states must enforce adoption 
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endangered or threatened species and their ecosystems. Under this law, farmers are 
prohibited from “taking” a member of a species determined to be endangered or 
extinct. And in some cases, habitat destruction, cropping practices or the use of certain 
pesticides can be prohibited. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) of 1947 regulates the use farm chemicals. Certain chemicals can be banned if 
they pose unacceptable risks to human health or the environment (Claassen, 2001).  
Land retirement programs have long dominated federal spending on agri-
environmental programs (Claassen, 2001). The current iterations of land-idling 
programs include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Wetland Reserve 
Program (WRP), and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). Each 
program offers annual payments and cost-sharing to take environmentally sensitive 
land out of production and establish long-term cover (Cattaneo, 2005). The CRP, the 
largest of the three policies, was initiated in the 1985 Farm Bill and provides annual 
rental payments on land enrolled in ten to fifteen-year contracts. Between $1.5 and $2 
billion has been spent annually on land retirement through CRP. More than 36 million 
acres, approximately 10% of U.S. cropland, is currently enrolled. (ERS website—
2005, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ConservationAndEnvironment/Questions/consenvcp
3.htm)  In addition to the environmental benefits stemming from reduced soil erosion 
and increased wildlife habitat, land retirement programs have received broad-based 
political support as they reduce the supply of commodities thus boosting prices, and 
provide reliable stream of income to farmers and ranchers who receive annual 
payments (Cain and Lovejoy, 2004).  
Agricultural land preservation programs also address land-use issues, although 
designed with different objectives than land retirement programs. Such programs 
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Program (GRP). FRPP is a voluntary program that is designed to help agricultural 
producers keep their land in agricultural use. The FRPP provides matching funds to 
State and Local governments or non-governmental organizations in order to purchase 
conservation easements or other interests in land. The GRP preserves native-grass 
grazing land by restricting cropping practices through long-term contracts and 
easements (Cattaneo, 2005). 
Although land retirement programs have been the mainstay of federal agri-
environmental policy since 1985, in many instances payment programs directed to 
working lands can achieve environmental benefits at a lower cost per acre. This is due 
to the fact that when agricultural land remains in production, farmers are willing to 
accept a smaller payment for simply changing management practices compared to 
taking the land out of production entirely (Cattaneo, 2005). This approach of 
providing incentive payments or cost-sharing to lands remaining in production has 
become the focus of several conservation programs in the late 1990’s. Incentive 
payments and cost-sharing provide direct payments to farmers and ranchers to 
implement environmentally beneficial practices. Cost-share policies typically pay 50 
to 75 percent of the adoption costs depending on the program, although it is important 
to note that many of the conservation practices have positive biophysical effects for 
agricultural production and can thus increase net revenue to farmers. This is 
particularly true of soil conservation measures, which offer both on-farm revenue 
enhancement as well as off-farm environmental benefits. The Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP) was established in the 1996 Farm Bill in order to 
consolidate many previous cost-share programs and to better target their benefits. The 
objective of EQIP, like its predecessors, is to encourage farmers to adopt practices that 
reduce environmental and resource problems by providing education, technical 
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management practices or installing on-farm structures (NRCS website—2005, 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/eqip/). Over half of its funds are dedicated to 
livestock operations to specifically address manure and nutrient management systems. 
The EQIP budget has grown rapidly from yearly expenditures of roughly $200 million 
in 1996 to just over $1 billion in the FY 2005 (USDA website, 2005—
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2006/FY06budsum.htm). The 
Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP), created in 1996, provides cost-sharing 
assistance for farmers who develop wildlife habitat and protect threatened and 
endangered species. Participants with assistance from NRCS district offices develop 
plans for installing and maintaining wildlife habitat development practices. (Claassen, 
2001). In general, federal agri-environmental policy funding has been shifting towards 
working land payment programs, which includes the Conservation Security Program. 
Although annual budgets will ultimately dictate expenditures, the 2002 Farm Bill 
projected working land payment programs to receive an $11 billion increase in 
funding over 10 years, compared with an increase of $3 billion for land retirement 
programs over the same time period (ERS website-2005, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/analysis/conservationoverview.htm).  
The Conservation Security Program is an extension and broadening of 
previous working land payment programs. However, its development was significantly 
nurtured by current circumstances in the arena of international agricultural trade. 
Global trade agreements, particularly the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA) have complicated the farm policy debate and have played a key role in the 
development of the CSP and related agri-environmental policies (Johnson, 2004). 
Under the URAA, signatory countries agreed to reduce domestic commodity price 
support and export subsidies. All farm support was categorized into “boxes” based on 
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production-distorting measures of support such as government support of prices. 
These subsidies were expressed in terms of a total Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS), and then placed on a reduction schedule. Green Box subsidies, which were 
termed minimally trade-distorting, were free from reduction commitments and could 
be increased without penalty (Ingco and Croome, 2004). The United States met its 
commitment to limit farm commodity support, or AMS, to no more than $23.1 billion 
in 1995 and 19.1 billion in 2000 (Claassen, 2001). However, many U.S. farm 
programs do not count against the AMS such as “decoupled” direct payments or 
payments off-setting the cost of environmentally beneficial management practices. For 
direct payments to be considered “decoupled,” they must not be linked to current 
production and must be provided even if there is no agricultural production (Ingco and 
Croome, 2004). This is the conceptual underpinning of U.S. Direct Payments, which 
are calculated according to a base year. All federal agri-environmental payments, 
including CRP, EQIP, and CSP are given green box status and thus unrestricted 
according to the WTO. This “Green Box” status, which could have income-enhancing 
characteristics depending on payment levels, makes CSP attractive to legislators who 
want to provide farm income support while continuing to meet the amber box 
commitments of the URAA.  
Two pending agricultural trade issues could affect the future design, funding, 
and implementation of CSP or related agri-environmental policies. The first concerns 
the current Doha Round of WTO talks, where the further reduction of agricultural 
subsidies has emerged as a key issue. One facet of this problem has been the use of 
trade-distorting measures to affect multifunctionality of agriculture. An argument has 
been made by several countries that some trade-distorting production subsidies, which 
provide multifunctional benefits, should be moved to the green box and not be subject 
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that many of the countries advocating this position are becoming close to hitting the 
ceilings of their own amber box commitments (Vanzetti and Wynen, 2004). Allowing 
trade-distorting payments providing multifunctional benefits could lead to the 
inevitable messy debate over which benefits are worthy of trade distortion. 
The second important development regards the 2004 WTO ruling on the cotton 
case brought against the United States by Brazil. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 
ruled that the U.S. cotton Step-2 payments to exporters are prohibited export subsides 
and Step-2 payments to domestic users are prohibited import subsidies. Additionally, 
the panel found that domestic support to U.S. cotton producers did not qualify for 
exemption under the now expired Peace Clause due to the finding that production 
flexibility contracts and direct payments were not fully decoupled within the definition 
of the WTO. The Panel went on to find price contingent U.S. cotton measures to have 
an adverse effect on world prices through significant price suppression and therefore 
causing “serious prejudice” to Brazil (Cook, 2005). This ruling could have 
implications for U.S. direct payments and counter-cyclical payments for all 
commodities as authorized under the 2002 Farm Bill.  It is possible that future WTO 
cases could reclassify all Direct Payments “Amber Box,” due to required planting 
restrictions. Regardless of the eligibility status of Direct Payments, some have 
suggested that the tightening of agricultural payments definitions and the possibility of 
reaching the AMS ceiling will give greater prominence to programs such as CSP that 
can provide farm income support payments within the “minimally trade distorting” 
rules of the green box (Claassen, 2001). 
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Since 1985, the primary target of USDA agri-environmental program dollars 
has been financial incentives for retiring environmentally sensitive land. Cost-sharing 
programs on working lands retain a significant, yet smaller share, of federal program 
dollars. Congress enacted the Conservation Security Program in the 2002 Farm Bill to 
specifically address the perceived need for more conservation incentive payments on 
working lands. The background issue of green box compatibility was cited by farmers’ 
groups as a potential benefit of the program (Johnson, 2004). The Conservation 
Security Program is authorized under the provisions of Title II, Subtitle A, of the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Public Law 107-171, commonly known as 
the 2002 Farm Bill. As designed by Congress, CSP fits the traditional role of 
providing incentives for conservation practices on working lands, similar to its 
companion program EQIP; however it also goes beyond traditional cost-sharing in 
three unique ways. First, CSP provides rewards producers for prior environmental 
performance. Second, CSP encourages participants to address all resource concerns on 
their entire agricultural operation. And finally, it has the potential to provide 
significant incentives, through its enhancement payments, for agricultural producers to 
go beyond meeting the minimum standards of conservation and provide environmental 
benefits such as those mentioned by proponents of multifunctionality (Dobbs and 
Pretty, 2004).  
Implementing a new nationwide conservation program, however, is easier said 
than done. Indeed, implementation has proven difficult as the design, funding, and 
rollout of the program has been convoluted and controversial. Uniquely, Congress 
designated CSP as an entitlement program, which gave it an unlimited spending cap 
and guaranteed it for all agricultural producers. This provided it a status unlike any of 
the other NRCS agri-environmental programs focused on working lands. After 
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program grew from 2.0 billion over ten years in 2002 to 6.8 billion in 2003, and finally 
8.9 billion over ten years in 2004 (Johnson, 2004). With CBO spending projections 
seemingly untenable, appropriators prohibited funding in FY2003, and then budgeted 
only $41.4 million in FY2004 and $202 million in FY2005. The under-funding of CSP 
is also viewed as partially a result of the political considerations of a Republican 
controlled Congress and White House that wanted to stifle legislation proposed by a 
Democratic Senator, namely Tom Harkin of Iowa (Hoefner, 2005). These annual 
budget caps make CSP enrollment effectively competitive, contrary to the original 
designation of CSP as an entitlement program. NRCS issued a draft rule that generated 
more than 10,000 comments, then issued a final interim rule on June 21, 2004, and 
finally issued an amended final interim rule on March 18, 2005 (Johnson, 2004). 
NRCS states that it plans to issue a final rule after collecting data from the full-scale 
sign-up in 2005. In a separate action that will affect future CSP funding, Congress 
capped total funding for CSP over the next ten years at $6.0 billion in order to transfer 
$2.9 billion in funds to pay for disaster assistance during October 2004 (Johnson, 
2004). 
Funding limitations led the NRCS to implement CSP in only eighteen selected 
watersheds during the FY2004 sign-up and 202 watersheds in FY2005. These 
watersheds are based on 8-digit hydrological codes and average 450,000 acres in size 
(NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). These particular watersheds 
were selected on a complicated, and somewhat opaque, ranking system based on 
environmental concerns, the NRCS capacity to implement the program in those 
watersheds, and regional distribution. NRCS states that all 2,119 watersheds in the 
United States will be eligible for CSP contracts within 8 years; however this would 
mean an increase to 264 watersheds a year which would require an increase in the CSP 
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technical assistance imposed by Congress. This cap assures that 85% of CSP funds are 
used solely for payments; however it has been cited by NRCS as a major constraint on 
the rollout of the program (Johnson, 2004). 
 
Eligibility 
To be eligible for CSP, an applicant must be in compliance with the highly 
erodible land (Sodbuster) and wetland conversion (Swampbuster) provisions of the 
1985 Farm Bill. CSP contracts can be awarded to landowners, tenants, sharecroppers, 
or renters. CSP provides for the fair treatment for tenants, allowing a tenant to receive 
CSP contracts as long as the tenant provides NCRS with written evidence of control of 
land from the landowner. The applicant must have an active interest in the agricultural 
operation and share in the risk of producing a crop or livestock and be entitled to a 
share in the crop or livestock marketed from the operation. Therefore, landlords and 
owners are ineligible to submit an application for exclusively cash rented agricultural 
operations. Only one active CSP contract is allowed per participant.  Finally, the 
applicant must complete a benchmark resource inventory for land being enrolled in the 
program (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005).  
To be eligible for CSP, the land in question must be privately owned land or 
Tribal land, the majority of which must be located within the selected watershed. 
Other lands designated by NRCS are eligible for CSP payments such as forested land 
that is an incidental part of an agricultural operation. These incidental forested lands 
must be less than 10-acre individual parcels and a total of less than 10% of the total 
acres under contract. Other incidental parcels determined by NRCS, such as small 
adjacent areas center pivot corners, field borders, turn rows, or riparian areas, are also 
eligible. Additionally, NRCS can designate areas outside of the boundary of the 
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farmsteads, barnyards, feedlots, equipment storage areas, etc. However, any land 
brought into crop production after May 13, 2002 or devoted to crop production for less 
than four out of the six years preceding May 13, 2002, is ineligible for CSP contracts. 
This provision is an attempt to prevent CSP from becoming an incentive for producers 
to put more land in production. However, this provision will only be effective if 
agricultural producers have the expectation that base year of 2002 will be maintained 
throughout the life of the program. Land enrolled in CRP, WRP, or the Grassland 
Reserve Program is also ineligible for payments; however these lands can be counted 
in the benchmark inventory as contributing to addressing resource concerns on the 
entire operation. Specifically excluded from program payments are animal waste 
practices or other structural improvements relating to nutrient or manure management. 
The EQIP program has specifically addressed these environmental needs through cost-
sharing programs (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005).  
Applications that meet the minimum requirements will be placed in enrollment 
categories to determine funding priority. Although no eligible producers were denied 
funding in the FY2004 sign-up, there exists the possibility that limited funding will 
create a situation in which enrollment categories will be used. These categories are 
based on an operation’s initial benchmark assessment of resource concerns, past 
conservation practices, and willingness to implement additional conservation 
practices. Category placement will determine funding priority if all applications within 
a given watershed cannot be funded. For agricultural operation composed primarily of 
cropland, the categories will be based on a producer’s willingness to adopt new 
conservation practices and the Soil Conditioning Index, a model that predicts the 
consequences of cropping systems and tillage practices on the status of soil organic 
matter in a field (NRCS website—2005, http://soils.usda.gov/sqi/assessment/sci.html). 
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process could create incentives for producers to sign-up for conservation practices, 
which have either uncertain or marginally profitable outcomes. Limited resource 
operations, as defined by USDA, will be given first priority in funding in each their 
respective funding categories (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). 
 
Payments 
Agricultural producers enrolled in the Conservation Security Program are 
entitled to receive payments for several aspects of their conservation efforts. The total 
Conservation Stewardship Contract payment is the sum of four distinct payments, 
each with different purposes and requirements. These components include the 
Stewardship payment (base payment), the Existing Practice payment, the New 
Practice payment, and the Enhancement payment. Each of these payments is unique to 
specific tracts of land where resource conditions are similar and conservation practices 
both past and planned are compatible. Thus, agricultural operations are divided into 
tracts of land each with multiple agreements. Anecdotal evidence shows that overall 
contracts can become quite complex with dozens of separate agreements for any single 
agricultural operation. The sheer volume of information contained within so many 
agreements makes understanding and analyzing the impact of the entire CSP contract 
a daunting task for a participating producer. 
Delineation of the agricultural operation is a significant concept in the payment 
structure of CSP due to the program’s focus on whole farm planning and requirement 
of addressing all resource concerns on an operation. The NRCS has developed a 
specific criteria by which an agricultural operation is delineated for the purposes of 
CSP: “the applicant will delineate the agricultural operation to include all agricultural 
lands…under the control of the participant and constituting a cohesive management 
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is substantially separate from any other land (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim 
Final Rule, 2005).” If the applicant chooses to use USDA farm boundaries, then the 
entire farm must be included, however, an applicant can offer one farm or aggregate 
farms into one agricultural operation for purposes of the program (NRCS, CSP 
Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). 
All CSP contracts will be placed into one of three tiers of participation. An 
applicant’s tier is determined by the benchmark inventory conducted in the sign-up 
period. Tier designation considers only the majority land type on the agricultural 
operation. For example, a 100-acre farm with 45 acres of pasture and 55 acres of 
cropland will placed in a tier based only on the cropland indicators. The tier of 
participation will have an impact on two of the four CSP payments and most of the 
contract limitations. The tier system is used to reward producers for their level and 
scope of conservation practices prior to sign-up. In addition, the tier system is 
designed to provide incentives producers to increase their conservation efforts in order 
to move up to a higher tier. Tier I participants are limited to five-year CSP contracts, 
whereas tier II and tier III participants can have up to ten-year CSP contracts. Specific 
tier requirements are summarized below. 
Applicants participating in Tier I must address the soil and water quality 
resource concerns on part of their agricultural operation prior to sign-up. These 
nationally significant resource concerns are reflected in the applicant’s benchmark 
inventory for cropland revealing a score of 0.0 or better on the Soil Conditioning 
Index (SCI). The SCI provides an overall indication of the trend and quality of a soil 
resource. The SCI can predict the consequences of cropping systems and tillage 
practices on the trend of soil organic matter. Organic matter is a primary indicator of 
soil quality and an important factor in carbon sequestration and is also an indicator for 
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website—2005, http://soils.usda.gov/sqi/assessment/sci.html). Meeting the minimum 
quality criteria for water quality requires addressing the risks that nutrients, pesticides, 
sediment, and salinity present to water quality. If the SCI rating is positive, the system 
is predicted to have increasing soil organic matter (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim 
Final Rule, 2005). Rangeland and pasture have different determinants for tier 
participation including: a forage-animal balance, proper livestock distribution, timing 
of use, and managing livestock access to watercourses.  
Applicants meeting the requirements for tier II participation must address the 
resource concerns of soil and water quality, but on their entire agricultural operation. 
Tier II participants must also agree to address one additional resource concern, such as 
soil condition, water quantity, or wildlife habitat, by the end of the contract period. 
  Applicants participating in tier III must address all resource concerns on their 
entire operation. This includes meeting the above requirements for tier I and II and 
adds the additional requirement of addressing all other significant applicable resource 
concerns such as wildlife habitat, and water quantity, and protection of riparian 
corridors to the minimum quality level as established by the NRCS Field Office 
Technical Guide (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). Tier III 
participants must also agree to conduct additional practices and activities. CSP 
participants are permitted to move to a higher tier of participation during the contract 
period. Upon transition to a higher tier, NRCS will recalculate all payments. 
Participants will not be eligible for higher payments until they have participated a 
period of at least twelve months in their current tier.  
Also notable for the purposes of this study is the lack of disincentive for the 
cancellation of contracts by participants. Specifically, a “participant may voluntarily 
terminate a contract, without penalty or repayment, if the State Conservationist 
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before termination of the contract” (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 
2005).  
An annual stewardship, or base payment, will be awarded on a per acre basis. 
It is calculated separately for each land use type in the agricultural operation: 
cropland, irrigated cropland, pastureland, irrigated pastureland, or rangeland. 
Incidental land, such as fence rows, grass waterways, and forest land adjacent to the 
above mentioned land types will be included in the overall acres receiving the 
stewardship payment. The annual stewardship payment will be based on stewardship 
payment rates (rental rates) multiplied by two tier specific reduction factors. The 
stewardship payment rate is the estimated 2001 land rental rates calculated as a flat 
rate for the entire watershed. NRCS will initially calculate the average 2001 rates 
using the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) Land Value 
Survey, the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) land rental data, and 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) rental rates. Where typical rental rates for a 
given land use vary widely within a State or between adjacent States, NRCS will 
adjust the county-level rates to ensure local and regional consistency and equity 
(NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). 
   This stewardship payment is multiplied by a tier factor (0.05 for tier I, 0.10 for 
tier II, and .15 for tier III.) and a reduction factor (0.25 for tier I, 0.50 for tier II, and 
.75 for tier III). Combining these reduction factors produces a rate of 1.25% for tier I, 
5% for tier II, and 11.25% for tier III, to be multiplied by the stewardship rate (rental 
rate) of the watershed (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). These 
reduction factors are expected to remain constant throughout the life of the program. It 
can be seen that the tier of participation and the stewardship rate (rental rate) will have 
a significant impact on the total contract payment particularly for agricultural 
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payment will be made to subsidize the maintenance of conservation practices existing 
prior to sign-up. However, there is no determination of actual costs of existing 
conservation practices, therefore this payment will be calculated as a flat rate of 25% 
of the stewardship payment for all participants (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim 
Final Rule, 2005).   
The third type of annual payments under CSP is designated for the 
implementation or installation of new conservation practices. These payments will be 
made based on each individual practice and will not be more than 50% of the cost-
share rate and limited to a total of $10,000 over the life of the contract. These cost-
sharing payments are thus very similar to the existing EQIP program and in fact CSP 
participants are encouraged to take advantage of such programs as opposed to getting 
the cost-sharing through CSP. As a result, the 2004 sign-up showed a very small 
percentage of the total payments being made through new practices (USDA, 2005). 
The final and most significant annual payments are called enhancement 
payments. These are made for exceptional conservation efforts and “additional 
conservation practices or activities that provide increased resource benefits beyond the 
prescribed level” (NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). The payment 
rates for each enhancement will be based primarily on expected environmental 
benefits and secondarily on the producer’s cost to implement the enhancement. Each 
watershed will have a specific list of available enhancements with fixed payments 
from which participants can choose. Examples of enhancements that will receive 
payment in the 2005 sign-up period include: increasing the SCI of cropland, 
implementing energy management practices, and installing structures beneficial to 
wildlife. Some payment rates for enhancements will be set at the federal level, such as 
increasing SCI, while others will set for each watershed individually.  
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take a variable payment rate for all enhancements. This rate begins at 150% of the 
enhancement payment in year one, then dropping each year to 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 
10%, and 0% respectively, for the remainder of the contract (NRCS, FY2005 CSP 
Sign-Up Announcement, 2005). The rationale for this variable payment rate, cited by 
NRCS, is to provide contract capacity to add additional enhancements in the out-years 
and to encourage participants to make continuous improvements to their operation by 
adding additional enhancements throughout the life of the contract. All additional 
enhancements after the initial sign-up will be paid at a flat rate of 100%. Also 
available is the advancing of enhancement payments into the first-year payment and 
deducting those payments from following years’ payments (NRCS, FY2005 CSP 
Sign-Up Announcement, 2005). Data from the FY 2004 sign-up shows that the 
enhancement payments make up the largest portion of the total CSP payment for most 
participants (NRCS website—2005, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/).  
Several contract limitations have been imposed on the CSP payments. The 
stewardship component of a CSP contract cannot exceed $5,000 per year for tier I, 
$10,500 for tier II, and $13,500 for tier III. Annual enhancement payments will be 
capped at $13,750 for tier I, $21,875 for tier II, and $28,125 for tier III participants 
(NRCS, CSP Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). It is difficult a priori to 
calculate the effect of the enhancement cap on actual participation behavior; however 
it is interesting to note that when assuming a $75 per acre rental rate, a tier III 
participant would reach the stewardship cap at 1,600 acres of cropland. This implicit 
acreage cap is considerably higher for tiers II and I at 2,800 and 5,333 acres 
respectively. Assuming a lower rental rate would increase the implicit acreage cap 
while a higher rental rate would decrease the cap. Total annual maximum contract 
payments cannot exceed $20,000 for tier I, $35,000 for tier II, and $45,000 for tier III 
 31  participants. This payment cap is redundant however, because the capped stewardship 
payment multiplied by the automatic payment for existing practices, plus the cap for 
enhancements is equal to the total maximum contract payment. The CSP tier and 
payment structure is summarized in Table 2.1.  
Although only 18 watersheds participated in the 2004 CSP sign-up, there is 
still information to be gleaned about participation and implementation issues. In 2004, 
a total of 2,188 CSP contracts were approved (all farms that applied were accepted) 
covering 1,885,400 acres in 18 watersheds at a cost of $35 million. Of the 27,300 
farms in the 18 watersheds, only 8% of farms applied and received contracts, 
comprising 14% of the 14 million eligible acres (Cain and Lovejoy, 2004).
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Tier Level     TIER  ONE  TIER TWO  TIER THREE 
Tier 
Determination 
Soil Quality must have a minimum score of 
0.0 on the SCI; Water Quality must meet 
the minimum quality criteria for nutrients, 
sediments, pesticides, and salinity. 
Soil Quality must have a minimum score of 
0.0 on the SCI; Water Quality must meet 
the minimum quality criteria for nutrients, 
sediments, pesticides, and salinity. 
All applicable resource concerns must be 
addressed to a minimum level, as well as a 
soil quality minimum score of 0.0 on the 


















1.25% x (the watershed rental rate) x (total 
acres) 
5% x (the watershed rental rate) x (total 
acres) 




$5,000 per year  $10,500 per year  $13,500 per year 
Existing Practice 
Payment 
25% of Stewardship Payment  25% of Stewardship Payment  25% of Stewardship Payment 
New Practice 
Payment 
Less than 50% cost-share and limited to 
$10,00 over the life of the contract 
Less than 50% cost-share and limited to 
$10,00 over the life of the contract 
Less than 50% cost-share and limited to 




Producer can pick from watershed specific 
practices* 
Producer can pick from watershed specific 
practices* 




$13,750 per year  $21,875 per year  $28,125 per year 
Total Payment 
Cap 
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CSP Summary 
Designed to fulfill a specific niche in the current cadre of agri-environmental 
programs, CSP has been shaped by past programs, concurrent programs, and issues 
surrounding international trade agreements. CSP has several unique design features 
worthy of analysis due to their originality and their previously unobserved 
consequences. Participation in CSP is not limited by commodity or land type, with the 
exception of confined animal feeding operations. However, participation is limited to 
those producers who have already addressed resource concerns to a minimal extent on 
their agricultural operation. “Good actors” are further rewarded with higher levels of 
stewardship payments as they move up to the second and third tiers. Finally, prior 
efforts will place applicants higher on the funding priority ladder if a given watershed 
does not have sufficient funding. The emphasis placed on previous environmental 
performance is unique among the field of federal agri-environmental programs.  
Furthermore, the prominence of incentives promoting whole-farm planning, 
with regard to the NRCS designated environmental concerns, is significant. Most 
notable is the requirement to address all natural resource issues in order to reach tier II 
or III, thereby receiving higher stewardship payments and larger payment caps. 
However, this bold payment design, composing multiple program objectives, has 
created an incentive structure, which is highly complex. It is possible that this 
complexity of payments, paired with the biophysical uncertainties inherent in 
conservation practices, might lead to difficulties for participants understanding the 
nuanced economic impacts of the program. This lack of perfect information and 
understanding could generate unintended participation behavior, such as termination 
of CSP contracts, which this study explores. 
 CHAPTER THREE 
METHODS FOR EX ANTE ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC  
CSP PARTICIPATION DECISIONS 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the methods utilized to assess dynamic 
participation decisions related to the Conservation Security Program. It begins with a 
description of the unique characteristics of this research problem, which are relevant 
for selecting an appropriate analytical method. It then briefly describes methods that 
which have been used to analyze participation decisions in the past. A succinct 
justification is made for the application of system dynamics to this particular research 
question. Lastly, this chapter provides an introduction to system dynamics as a method 
including both the technical modeling conventions of system dynamics and its broader 
principles of systems thinking. There is a discussion of the use of simplifying 
assumptions, data and sources, and the types of results that can be expected from a 
research endeavor that utilizes a system dynamics as a method for examining dynamic 
CSP participation behavior. 
 
Research Problem 
Among the many questions regarding the design and implementation of the 
CSP is that some farmers have withdrawn or chosen not to implement some of the 
planned practices in similar agri-environmental programs in the past. From 1997-
2000, farmers enrolled in the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
withdrew almost 3,700, or five percent of their contracts in entirety. On 6,800 other 
contracts, or eight percent of the entirety, farmers opted not to implement one or more 
practices (Cattaneo, 2001). For the effective design and implementation of CSP, it is 
important to answer the question of why farmers are making these decisions to 
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behavior.  
An analytical method must adequately address a number of key characteristics 
of the research problem. First and foremost is the dynamic complexity that exists in 
the biophysical and decision-making processes. Delays in the updating of perceptions 
and expectations can lead to outcomes not predicted under the assumptions usually 
used to determine optimal decision-making. A model of participation decision-making 
must also consider the effects of imperfect information. This occurs in this particular 
decision-making process through the inclusion of a possible bias created by a farmer’s 
uncertainty of the biophysical effects of conservation practices and the delays in a 
farmers’ formation of perceptions and expectations. There also exists considerably 
uncertainty, in most instances, concerning the actual decision rules used by farmers to 
participate and subsequently withdrawal from the program. Most importantly, in order 
to answer these research questions to be more useful for policy-makers, the methods 
should employ assumptions regarding farmer decision-making in a descriptive rather 
than normative sense. 
 
Alternative Methods 
There are several methods by which economists have analyzed producer 
participation decisions in conservation programs. These methods can be placed into 
two general categories: empirical ex post studies and a broader set of ex ante analyses 
based on simulation. At base, most empirical studies utilize a dichotomous choice 
model of decision-making. Most program participation models are structured similarly 
to technology adoption models and thus the literature reveals significant overlap in 
techniques and approaches. According to Besley and Case (1993), who conducted a 
review of adoption decision-making, there are three basic empirical ex post 
 36   approaches to understanding the adoption or participation decision. 
The first empirical approach to the analysis of technology adoption or program 
participation involves time-series studies. Much of the current knowledge of aggregate 
adoption trends comes from these types of studies. In these studies, one observes only 
an aggregate measure of adoption at each date. The classic study of adoption of hybrid 
corn technology by Griliches (1957) is an early example of this work. Griliches found 
that the S-shaped trend of adoption could be explained by differences in availability 
and profitability of hybrid corn varieties.  In general, these studies attempt to capture 
the rate of diffusion process and determine the shape of a diffusion curve. Most studies 
use a logistic-shaped function over time. While these studies can be disaggregated by 
region to investigate the effects of regional differences on adoption, the main purpose 
is usually to estimate the base rate of adoption. A key limitation however, is the 
inability of this approach to explain the underlying causal dynamic processes at work 
(Besley and Case, 1993). More recent work however, has attempted to use a more 
causal approach to adoption diffusion by applying dynamic simulation models to 
understanding the underlying structure of aggregate adoption rates (Fisher, et al., 
2000). 
A second empirical approach to studying the adoption decision is through the 
use of cross-sectional data. This approach constitutes the majority of studies 
addressing farmers’ decisions concerning adoption of conservation practices and 
participation in conservation programs (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Force and Bills, 1983; 
Gauthier et al., 2005; Konyar and Osborn, 1990; Soule et al., 2000; Zbinden, 2003; 
Hua et al., 2004). These econometric analyses make use of historical cross-sectional 
data to statistically estimate correlations between variables, which, when used in 
conjunction with appropriate theoretical constructs, result in causal inference. Previous 
econometric studies of participation decisions in conservation programs have been 
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analyses use a binary decision model influenced by two general types of variables, 
program and demographic. The model assumes that the decision maker maximizes 
utility or profit using each of these vectors of variables. It is then possible to use 
various regression techniques to show which variables were significant in making the 
participation decision. The vector of program variables is considered exogenous to the 
decision and is not usually estimated (Zbinden, 2002). However, by calculating costs 
and revenues from participation, some studies estimate the effect of payment levels on 
the participation decision. 
A seminal study in the area is Ervin and Ervin (1982). This was one of the first 
studies to develop an integrated behavioral model that includes physical, economic, 
personal, and programmatic factors. They hypothesized a three-stage decision process: 
identifying erosion as a problem, deciding whether to adopt conservation tillage 
practices, and determining the level of effort when implementing the conservation 
practices. They used multiple regression analysis to understand the impact of each of 
their hypothesized factors. Among the many factors analyzed, Ervin and Ervin (1982) 
found that education was positively correlated with identifying erosion as a problem 
and the decision to adopt. In addition, they found that risk orientation, that is, the 
willingness to take chances, and an attitude of stewardship were positively correlated 
with the adoption of conservation practices.  
Soule et al., (2000) explored the relationship between tenure and adoption of 
conservation practices. The base model included farmer attributes, attributes of the 
farm, variables specific to the field, regional attributes and a dummy variable for 
tenure. Findings of the study suggested that land tenure, timing of benefits, and land 
erodibility were influential factors in a farmer’s decision to adopt conservation 
practices. Konyar and Osborn (1990) develop a linear random utility model to 
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expected utility of participation is greater than the expected utility of not participating, 
then the farmer participates.” Utilizing a logit function they estimated the effects of 
land value, land tenure, farm size, age, and erosion characteristics of the land in 
question. Using regional data, they found that the probability of participation 
decreases with higher land value, larger farm size, and age. Hua et al. (2004) explored 
the relationship between farm programs, watershed groups, and conservation decisions 
through survey data. Their results indicated that conservation tillage decisions are 
mainly influenced by age, education, conservation compliance requirements and 
attitudes. Cooper and Keim (1996) used observations of farmer adoption of water 
quality protection practices. They estimated farmers’ “willingness to adopt” values, 
that is, the additional dollars per acre that farmers were willing to take in order to 
change management practices. 
The intention of this method is to measure the effect of the physical and 
demographic characteristics on the adoption decision. However, this can be 
problematic, if as a time-series analysis suggests, there is some dynamic structure to 
the adoption or participation decision. The cross-sectional study therefore provides 
only a snapshot of adoption. This confounds the interpretation of the coefficients 
(Moser and Barrett, 2003). “The dynamics of technology diffusion confound most 
cross-sectional analyses of adoption patterns, at a minimum rendering coefficient 
estimates difficult to interpret and usually causing them to be biased and inconsistent 
(Moser and Barrett, 2003) Thus, cross-sectional econometric studies of this kind may 
be able to provide insight into the demographic or physical farm characteristics 
significantly associated with participation in a new government program, but the data 
are of limited use in understanding the adoption or participation process itself (Besley 
and Case, 1993). In addition, the assumptions used in these analyses are often poorly 
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payments, biophysical characteristics, and information limitations on the participation 
decision in agri-environmental programs. This limits their applicability to questions of 
policy design. 
Utilizing panel data, a third ex post empirical method, can meet some of the 
objections to each of the previous two methods. The dynamic component can be well 
represented, however specification of dynamic discrete choice can be difficult because 
it requires an answer to the question of how these models relate to the underlying 
choice problem that individual farmers face (Besley and Case, 1993). Fuglie and 
Kascak (2001) used panel data gathered through the use of recall, asking respondents 
when they had adopted a given technology. Despite potential biases in recall data, they 
found that adoption of natural resource conserving technologies has been slow, 
relative to expected adoption rates, due to differences in land quality, farm size, farmer 
education, and regional factors. This study suggests that factors such as these can 
cumulatively impart lags, as much as one or two decades, on the adoption of resource-
conserving technologies. 
 Standard neoclassical economic theory, which buttresses these econometric 
models, makes the assumption that decision-makers have perfect information and are 
perfectly rational. Therefore, econometric methods can sometimes ignore the 
dynamics and delays that are present in the biophysical and expectation formation 
processes of the participation decision. For at least 20 years, economists within the 
USDA have recognized the limitations of neoclassical assumptions for modeling 
farmer decision-making. Baum (1983) suggests that traditional comparative statics 
does not address non-linear negative feedback, target planning, “satisficing” behavior, 
and the imperfect information available to decision makers. In addition, Baum states 
that the typical assumptions are of limited usefulness in explaining observed (and 
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econometric approach to understanding CSP participation behavior is severely limited 
by the lack of numerical data on the full “lifetime” of a CSP contract. After only the 
first two-years of a limited CSP sign-up, few contract terminations are likely to have 
been observed. In addition, the data needed to address the behavioral processes 
assumed important for an analysis of contract termination have not been collected, and 
primary data collection is beyond the scope of this study. In sum, econometric 
techniques seem both infeasible and inappropriate at this time for examining the 
processes underlying participation termination decisions in the CSP. 
Ex ante simulation models are used by NRCS to understand the effects of 
policy design changes on participation rates. These models are often framed in terms 
of an aggregate benefit cost analysis, that is, a program’s total expected cost in 
government expenditures or loss of tax revenue minus an estimate of the expected gain 
in monetized public benefits. Other ex ante simulation models have made progress in 
integrating economic and biophysical models to take into account the important 
biophysical effects of conservation practices. However, in each of these models, 
significant challenges remain in accurately simulating a producer’s willingness to 
participate, that is, the amount of money required to induce participation. This is 
difficult due to heterogeneous farm characteristics, multiple decision variables, and 
little understood farm household decision-making processes (Cattaneo, et al. 2005).  
The most comprehensive assessment of participation in CSP is found in the 
NRCS Benefit-Cost Assessment (BCA). The CSP BCA model is designed to simulate 
a producers’ willingness to participate in CSP and predict the resulting aggregate costs 
and benefits. NRCS describes this model as poorly suited for predicting actual 
participation rates, but rather, as a useful tool for comparing changes in policy design 
(USDA, CSP Benefit-Cost Assessment, 2005). For example, the BCA examines the 
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payments. The BCA does not examine the producer decision-making process for 
enhancement practices on an individual practice basis. Thus, the model is best used for 
predicting the direction of effects resulting from changes in policy design, rather than 
the actual magnitude of those effects.  
The BCA model uses 2002 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS) data to construct 6,105 farm types representing the 2.1 million farms in the 
United States (USDA, 2005). Each representative farm type is assigned potential 
payments, costs, on-site benefits, off-site environmental benefits, and appropriate 
resource concerns such as soil erosion. An expansion factor, or multiplier, is 
associated with each representative farm so that the model results can be expanded 
proportionately to accurately describe program costs and benefits in aggregate. The 
resource concerns of each representative farm are used as a proxy for identifying 
conservation practices that will be adopted. Therefore, the BCA lumps all practices 
relating to a single resource concern under the same decision making process. For 
example, the model does not distinguish between a producer’s decision-making 
process of conservation tillage, grass waterways, and buffer strips, because all 
practices are designed to address sediment runoff. The model assumes that if sediment 
runoff is an identified resource concern, then producers will implement 1.5 practices 
per acre for each particular resource concern. Practice costs, on-site benefits, and off-
site environmental benefits are all based on resource concern rather than individual 
practice and then are adjusted for the characteristics of each representative farm 
(USDA, 2005). 
The model simulates participation through a series of database queries 
designed to select likely participants based on expected net return to participation, the 
conservation participation history for a given farm type, and demographic data 
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use individual conservation practice payment rates and implementation costs, but 
rather average costs, based on addressing the resource concerns assigned to a 
particular representative farm. The average costs are estimated from EQIP contract 
data for 1996-2003 for each representative farm. Although there are on-site financial 
benefits to addressing many of the resource concerns, producers are assumed to 
recognize only 25% of the on-site benefits derived from the conservation practices, 
thus reducing expected participation rates if expected net returns are a significant 
factor in the decision making process. Although enhancement payment levels are 
designed so as to not to exceed a participants estimated cost of implementation or the 
expected environmental benefit value, for the purposes of the simulation model, 
NRCS assumes producer costs to be 25% of the payment levels for each of the 
enhancement conservation practices. Therefore, if a resource concern exists on a 
representative farm and the producer decides to participate in CSP based on total 
expected net return, demographic characteristics, and participation history, then the 
producer is assumed to maximize the number of enhancement practices until the 
enhancement payment cap is reached. With this construction, it can be seen that this 
model does not examine a producer’s decision to adopt a single conservation practice 
based on its particular costs and benefits (USDA, 2005). 
The BCA model then varies program design parameters to assess the aggregate 
effect of design changes, such as increasing the contract limits for enhancements and 
increasing the contract length, on participation and subsequently net benefits. The 
results can then be disaggregated in order to better understand the distribution effects 
of these policy changes on farm size, region, and resource concern. The simulation 
model examines only the sign-up decision and tier determination and thus does not 
allow for reduced participation or contract cancellation. 
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insights into methods for integrating biophysical and economic models, which are 
important for the study of adoption of conservation practices. Due to the 
heterogeneous characteristics of farms implementing conservation practices, 
simulating the biophysical effects simultaneously with the economic effects is helpful 
for better understanding of conservation program performance and environmental 
outcomes (Westra et al., 2004). Integrated biophysical and economic models can shed 
light upon likely environmental impacts of conservation programs such as a simulation 
model formulated by Tanaka and Wu (2004), who used an empirical benefit-cost 
model to predict farmers’ crop rotations, tillage practices, and participation in CRP. 
Their integrated biophysical model estimated the effect of policies on social costs due 
to reduced nitrogen loadings in the Mississippi River and for controlling hypoxia in 
the Gulf of Mexico (Tanaka and Wu, 2004).  
An ex ante simulation model of CSP in Westra et al., (2004) examined the 
relationship between conservation practices, fish communities, and farm income in 
two watersheds in Minnesota. The model used field-level biophysical information and 
production activities to estimate production costs and returns with CSP and CRP 
payments. They analyzed the potential effects of adoption of certain conservation 
practices intended to address resource concerns of sediment losses, such as buffer 
strips and resulting changes to fish populations. This analysis included cropping mix 
decisions and resulted in average measure of change in net farm income and a 
watershed level effect upon fish populations. Simulated results showed both lower 
costs and lower revenues with a net loss of approximately 1 percent and 3 percent in 
annual net farm income for the two watersheds examined. When participation in 
conservation programs was assumed to be profitable, all producers enrolled in CSP 
and CRP and received the appropriate payments. When both CSP and CRP 
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bodies—were included, estimated net farm incomes actually increased by 7-8 percent 
in both watersheds. However, this analysis did not include all relevant CSP payments, 
therefore it is not a reliable predictor of program success. Westra et al. did, however, 
demonstrate a method that successfully linked an economic model based on net farm 
income and a biophysical model of farm-level conservation practices to watershed 
level environmental benefits.  
Dobbs and Streff, (2005) also used an integrated biophysical and economic 
framework to examine the profitability of conservation crop rotation systems under 
CSP. This model used estimated cost and returns to various conservation crop 
rotations and estimated both government commodity payments and estimated CSP 
base payments. Significantly, however, the model did not specify actual enhancement 
payment rates but relied solely upon base payment rates. Without modeling 
enhancement payments, they were unable to include a large portion of CSP payments. 
Although not modeling the participation decision directly, Dobbs and Streff 
demonstrated a possible method for understanding the farmer decision-making process 
by explicitly representing the costs and benefits of participation in CSP or related 
conservation program.  
In summary, both econometric analysis and ex ante simulation methods are 
valuable methods for understanding participation decisions. However, it is important 
to note that contract cancellation, termination decisions, or disadoption behavior 
receives limited treatment in the previous econometric and ex ante simulation methods 
used to describe adoption or participation behavior related to conservation. 
Unexpected participation behavior, such as contract termination, is a dynamic 
phenomenon, which requires modeling the changes in perceived profitability over the 
length of a program contract and relaxing key assumptions embedded in the 
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perfect rationality. In addition, approaching the participation question using regression 
techniques, such as binary choice models, seem inadequate for supplying satisfactory 
answers to the questions regarding contract cancellation. Ex ante simulation models 
should capture the complex decision-making processes if they are to understand 
program performance. The unique characteristics and objectives of this research 
problem require an ex ante approach that can integrate biophysical and economic 
factors into a dynamic simulation model. System dynamics is a modeling method that 
meets these requirements. 
 
System Dynamics Overview 
System dynamics is an appropriate method for addressing ex ante participation 
behavior in the Conservation Security Program. Because system dynamics is a 
seldom-used tool in agricultural economics, it is beneficial to describe it at a level of 
detail greater than for more commonly used methods. Thus, this chapter provides an 
introduction to system dynamics as a method including both the technical modeling 
conventions of system dynamics and its broader principles of systems thinking. The 
objective of this research is to model the ex ante CSP participation decisions of a 
representative NY dairy farmer in order to gain insight and understanding for program 
design and implementation. In order to meet this objective, a modeling method must 
provide both the technical tools and modeling conventions, which provide pragmatic 
policy answers. A dynamic simulation model can explore the impacts of the 
interactions between biophysical dynamics, incentive structure, and alternative 
behavioral assumptions for participation decisions. Through parameter and structure 
testing, it can also analyze the impacts of specific policy alternatives, such as timing 
and amount of incentives, education of producers, and implementation procedures, on 
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  What is system dynamics? Such a question would result in many different 
answers depending, of course, on who was being asked and how much time was given 
for a response. George Richardson, a noted expert in the field of system dynamics and 
a Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the University of 
Albany, SUNY, provides a succinct answer: 
 
System dynamics is the use of computer simulation for policy 
analysis in complex systems.  Its big contribution is helping people to 
build progressively richer understandings of some dynamic problem, 
and anticipate weaknesses in policy initiatives that would develop over 
time… It gets a lot of its power from a 'feedback' perspective—the 
realization that tough dynamic problems arise in situations with lots of 
pressures and perceptions that interact to form loops of circular 
causality, rather than simple one-way causal chains. Humans are really 
good at thinking up all that interconnected complexity and really weak 
at inferring its implications without the support of simulation models 
(stewardshipmodeling.com, accessed June 2005). 
 
Richardson remarks on the need for greater understanding of dynamic 
problems specifically with regard to weaknesses in policy initiatives. These failures, or 
“policy resistance,” are where well-intentioned policies designed to solve complex 
problems are instead delayed, diluted, or defeated by unintended consequences 
(Sterman, 2000). This is not usually due to unexpected external shocks to the system, 
but rather to unforeseen reactions to the original policy intent. Policy-makers 
sometimes have difficulty understanding and predicting the outcomes of complex 
systems due to a flawed understanding of the system. Often, policy-makers construct 
too narrow of a boundary around the problem at hand by failing to include the breadth 
of interrelationships between actors and policies and the resulting behavior of the over 
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considered an example of policy-resistance. One potential reason for this unexpected 
behavior is the lack of dynamic participation models that consider the complexities of 
farmer decision-making. It is these dynamically complex problems in which a 
perspective grounded in system dynamics can assist policy-makers in developing 
robust policies. This perspective is often termed “systems thinking,” and although its 
meaning has been diluted by overuse, it continues to convey a holistic worldview 
where “everything is connected to everything else” and frequently one action leads to 
unintended consequences. 
System dynamics provides both a paradigm and a set of methods for learning 
about complex systems and providing practical insight for policy-makers. More 
specifically, system dynamics facilitates this learning through the building of formal 
simulation models. System dynamics modeling conventions inform practitioners on 
the modeling process, how to formulate mathematical relationships, which simplifying 
assumptions to use, and offers suggestions for interpreting and evaluating resulting 
model behavior. However, before describing these modeling conventions, it is useful 
to highlight two “systems thinking” perspectives that are foundational for formal 
system dynamics modeling.  
 
System Dynamics Paradigm 
 The system dynamics paradigm suggests specific ways to structure, organize, 
and filter information when modeling a problem behavior. Most importantly is a focus 
on the dynamic, rather than the detail, complexity of a problem. Detail complexity 
arises from systems with many variables resulting in large number of possible 
combinations. This combinatorial, or detail, complexity leads to a search for solutions 
that are “needle-in-the-haystack.” Such problems include the optimal scheduling of 
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however, can result from a low of number of variables that are interrelated, often 
nonlinearly, over time. Adding to this dynamic complexity are significant time delays 
inherent in many real-world systems, which are often overlooked or assumed away in 
traditional economic analysis.  
Dynamically complex systems can produce counterintuitive behavior with 
ambiguous causation. In simple systems, the cause of behavior is often closely related 
to the observed behavior. However, in complex systems causes can be far removed, 
both in time and space, from the observed effects (Forrester, 1989). These types of 
systems require a different set of tools and methodologies for developing 
understanding and insight. The system dynamics method often represents the dynamic 
complexity of a problem rather than including large amounts of detail. This 
perspective leads to practical modeling conventions such as using a high level of 
aggregation and keeping models simple and clear so that they can be used for testing 
policies and asking “what-if” questions. Additionally, system dynamics models often 
focus on providing an understanding of the causes of general tendencies of behavior of 
a system over time, rather than attempting to make specific point predictions for any 
particular variable. Thus, system dynamics models typically emphasize careful 
specification of the underlying “structure” of a system, rather than including only 
those elements for which (formal) numerical data are available. This is a significant 
departure from an econometric approach, which disregards most information not in the 
form of numerical data. This focus on structure, even when numerical data is limited, 
is relevant for this study because of the largely unobserved parameters, such as time to 
update expectations, which affect farmer decision-making. In fact, if the underlying 
structure is adequate, system dynamics models can often identify priority information 
needs such as parameter values. Where an analysis relying solely upon numerical data 
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provide an alternative understanding of behavior. Thus, many system dynamics 
models include “soft” variables, which are harder to quantify, but are important in the 
causation of the behavior of interest. 
A second viewpoint common to system dynamics modelers is a focus on 
endogenous rather than exogenous causes of behavior. Often, policy-makers and even 
researchers employ narrow model boundaries for their problems and assume 
exogenous, or external, forces are the cause of the behavior of interest. System 
dynamics models, on the other hand, seek explanations for phenomenon that are 
endogenous to the system (Sterman, 2000). Behavior is assumed to arise from a 
model’s internal causal structure, that is, the interconnected mathematical relationships 
between variables in the model, rather than external shocks. This endogenous behavior 
is often the result of feedback loops, stock and flow structure, and nonlinearities. A 
broad model boundary, which captures important feedback in the system, can often 
provide more insight into the causes of behavior, rather than modeling additional 
detail on individual components of the system (Sterman, 2000). 
 
System Dynamics Modeling 
Mathematically, system dynamics models are simply systems of ordinary 
differential equations that are solved using numerical integration. The origin of the 
field can be traced to the 1950’s when engineering concepts were applied to social 
systems. However, system dynamics modeling goes well beyond the computation of 
differential equations; indeed, system dynamics modeling conventions address the 
modeling process, techniques, archetypal behavior, notation, and the appropriate use 
of data sources. Stemming from a focus on dynamic complexity, rather than detail 
complexity, system dynamics models seek to explicitly represent feedback in complex 
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complex behavior of systems. These feedback effects are represented by causal loop 
diagrams, which indicate causation over time. An arrow, or link, represents causal 
relationship, a (+) signifying a positive relationship, that is, an increase in one leads to 
an increase in the other; and a (-) for a negative relationship, that is, an increase in one 
causes a decrease in the other. Combinations of causal linkages create feedback loops 









Figure 3.1 Examples of a Positive and Negative Feedback Loop 
It is a fundamental premise of system dynamics that dynamic behavior is the 
consequence of system structure (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). In general, most of this 
dynamic behavior results from the interaction of two types of feedback loops: positive 
or (self-reinforcing) loops, and negative (self-correcting) loops. The polarity of any 
given loop is often designated by a (+) or (-). Positive loops tend to amplify any 
disturbance and produce exponential growth, whereas negative loops tend to 
counteract any disturbances and to move the system towards an equilibrium point or 
goal (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). A model containing several positive and negative 
feedback loops can produce a wide variety of behaviors. However, even simple 
structure can create common modes of behavior such as exponential growth, goal 
seeking, or S-shaped growth. 
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problem of interest to get an initial sense of the dynamics at work, understand the 
scope of the problem, and identify the key variables in the system. Casual loop 
diagrams can also be a useful communication and discussion tool for policy-makers 
who do not want or need to understand the underlying mathematical simulation model. 
However, causal loop diagrams have many limitations due to their simplicity of 
relationships, lack of mathematical specificity, incapability of distinguishing between 
stocks and flows, and ultimately, an inability to predict complex behavior. 
Stock and flow diagrams are the central conceptual tools used in system 
dynamics simulation models. They allow for explicit representation of mathematical 
relationships in a graphical nature that is intuitive and easy to manipulate. A stock and 
flow diagram corresponds to a specific mathematical expression, that is, an integral 
equation. This notation conveys a sense of physical accumulations and flows, not 
surprising given that it was developed by an engineer. However, stock and flow 
diagrams are not limited to representing physical material, rather they can correspond 
to softer variables such as perceptions, beliefs, or attitudes. A rectangular box 
represents a stock or state in a system, while pipes with arrows represent inflows and 
outflows or rates in a system. Valves on the pipes represent the control of the flows. 
Finally, clouds at the beginning or ending of a pipe represent an unlimited source or 
sink respectively, denoting a boundary of the model (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). 
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d(Stock)/dt = NetChangeInStock = Inflow(t)−Outflow(t)
 
Source: Sterman (2000) 
Figure 3.2 Equivalent Stock and Flow Structure 
  The mathematical equivalents, as seen in Figure 3.2, demonstrate the 
specificity of stock and flow diagrams in representing the structure of a system. As 
seen in the integral equation, a stock accumulates, or integrates, its net flows from 
time (0) to time (t). Or correspondingly, as seen in the differential equation, a net 
change in the stock, that is, its derivative is equal to its inflow minus its outflow from 
time (0) to time (t). The concept of a stock is also important to system dynamics 
modeling because it denotes a delay in the system. A delay is simply a process where 
an output lags behind its input, and a stock represents the accumulated difference 
between these inputs and outputs (Sterman, 2000). Modeling information delays is 
important for the development of alternative behavioral assumptions, which is a 
common system dynamics modeling convention. For example, there is a significant 
delay between the actual effect of conservation practices on crop yields and a 
producer’s perception of those changes in yields. System dynamics can explicitly 
model those information delays between actual changes and perceived changes. The 
concept of using a stock to represent the perceptions or expectations of a decision-
maker is not common in traditional economic analyses. In short, system dynamics 
conventions suggest building descriptive rather than normative models of decision-
making. In doing so, system dynamics models attempt to recreate the decision-making 
 53   process as it would actually occur, with its delays, biases, shortcuts, less than perfect 
information, and varying degrees of rationality all explicitly modeled. Every decision 
rule can be thought of as an information processing procedure (Sterman, 2000). This 
mode of decision-making modeling follows from the work of Herbert Simon, the 
Nobel Prize winning economist, and his theory of “bounded rationality.” Later work in 
the fields of behavioral economics and behavioral decision theory all focus on the 
notion of an individual’s limitations as an “optimal” decision-maker. Often, this 
practical application of this research leads to another convention of system dynamics 
modeling which is to distinguish between actual and perceived conditions. Perceived 
conditions can differ from actual conditions due to delays in measurement and 
reporting or disturbances due to error, noise, or bias (Sterman, 2000). Many of these 
behavioral assumptions become key features in the perception and expectation sector 
of the participation decision-making model described in Chapter Four. 
 
Conclusion 
Pragmatic ex ante policy analysis should answer two questions: which policies 
work and why? In the absence of significant empirical evidence related to 
participation in the Conservation Security Program, several specific policy questions 
require attention and analysis. In particular, the decision to terminate participation in 
the program has been little studied by applied economists. This behavior can be 
difficult to explain due to the inherent complexities resulting from the biophysical 
characteristics of conservation practices, unique incentive structure of the CSP, and 
participation decision-making behavior of farmers. Modeling techniques typically 
used in applied economics research seem less suitable for constructing formal models 
of this behavior. The modeling approach of system dynamics can be successful 
employed in this case to bring insight and understanding to a complicated problem. 
 54   CHAPTER FOUR 
DYNAMIC PARTICIPATION DECISION MODEL 
Introduction 
  This chapter describes the simulation model constructed to analyze the 
participation behavior of a representative NY dairy farm enrolled in the Conservation 
Security Program. An overview of the model is presented, followed by detailed 
descriptions of the representative farm, and incentive, biophysical, expectation 
formation, and decision rule sectors of the model. Causal loop diagrams and stock and 
flow diagrams accompany descriptions of the model sectors where appropriate. 
Parameter values are listed in Appendix A. 
 
Overview of Model 
The objective of this model is to understand the participation decisions of a 
representative NY dairy farmer in order to gain insight for conservation program 
design and implementation. The complexities of producers’ decision-making 
processes suggest that a descriptive simulation model that considers additional 
relevant information will be useful. This simulation model includes four distinct 
sectors: CSP incentive structure, biophysical effects of enhancement practices, 
expectation formation, and decision rules. The model links these sectors together to 
illustrate possible connections between the biophysical effects and CSP payments on 
farm revenue, and the subsequent updating of expectations. The model is constructed 
with the goal of understanding the general dynamic tendencies of these interactions 
and resulting potential policy implications, rather than predicting specific termination 
dates. 
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Figure 4.1 Simplified Casual Loop Diagram of Dynamic Participation Decision Model 




Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the dynamic participation decision model 
in a simplified causal loop diagram. The above figure can be easily simplified by 
dividing it into two halves, each separated by the variable Net Revenue from CSP 
Contract. All elements of the diagram to the left of Net Revenue from CSP Contract 
are used as determinants of the actual net revenue derived from participating in the 
CSP. All elements to the right of Net Revenue from CSP Contract are used in the 
expectation formation and decision-making process. The purpose of this diagram is to 
provide a conceptual overview and thus does not portray the detailed structure or 
parameters actually used in the simulation model. 
Starting at Net Revenue from CSP Contract and backtracking through the 
causes of net revenue is the most straightforward method for systematically 
understanding the diagram. The determinants of Net Revenue from CSP Contract are 
structured much like a dynamic partial budget over a ten-year period. The 
determinants of net revenue considered in this model include CSP payments, costs of 
implementing CSP practices, and changes in corn silage yields due to the biophysical 
effects of conservation practices.  
Although the determination of net revenue is relatively straightforward, the 
biophysical effects are more complex. The biophysical effect consists of two 
reinforcing loops and one balancing loop. Reinforcing loop one (R1) illustrates the 
relationship between increased soil organic matter provided by the cover crop practice 
and cash crop production. A second reinforcing loop indicates a longer-term effect of 
increased soil organic matter on the capacity of soil to hold nutrients thus increasing 
cash crop production. Reinforcing loop two (R2) is thus marked with a hash mark to 
indicate a delay in the effect. Balancing loop number one (B1) exists between the 
nutrients available to cash crops and production, thus showing that more production reduces available nutrients. Several additional biophysical feedback loops, both 
balancing and reinforcing are present in this system (Magdoff and van Es, 2000), but 
are not explicitly modeled because that level of detail is not needed for the purposes of 
this study. However, the loops present should capture the essential effects that impact 
net revenue over the designated time horizon of ten years. 
The expectation and decision-making half of the diagram is to the right of Net 
Revenue from CSP Contract. In effect, the biophysical sector of the model is 
developed in order to provide an abstracted but realistic input to the subsequent 
expectation formation sector. It is the linking of these two sectors, the biophysical and 
expectation formation that the simulation model begins to provide insight into the 
complexities of the decision-making process. In its most basic form, the expectation 
formation sector allows for the introduction of several modifications to the traditional 
assumptions of perfect information and rationality in the decision-making processes. 
The assumptions used in the expectation formation sector are based upon nascent 
behavioral economic theory and the pragmatic modeling conventions of system 
dynamics.  
These additional assumptions are that producers make decisions based on 
information that is not perfect, and indeed can be significantly in error. In addition, a 
producer will have inherent delays in their ability to gather and utilize information 
concerning the financial implications of the biophysical processes resulting from a 
conservation practice. This simulation model attempts to formalize these decision-
making processes by assuming an expectation formation process and an initial error in 
the estimation of biophysical effects by the producer. This error, Biophysical 
Estimation Error, affects the initial value or starting point of the expectation formation 
process. The producer gradually learns about the actual economic effects of CSP 
participation and subsequently modifies his or her perceptions and expectations 
 58   concerning the net revenue that can be derived. The combination of significant error 
and expectation formation can produce considerably different short and long run 
expectations of net revenue, which is not predicted by traditional economic models 
assuming perfect information (USDA, Conservation Security Program Amendment to 
the Interim Final Rule Benefit Cost Assessment, 2005). These changing expectations 
can have subsequent effects on participation decisions.  
The expectation formation sector uses three balancing loops, all exponential 
smoothing processes of their respective inputs. This formulation of perceptions and 
expectations is a modified version of the TREND function, which is a sophisticated 
version of extrapolative expectations (Sterman, 1987, 2000). These calculations can 
then be used as inputs to several different formulations of decisions rules. These 
decision-rules, formulated as binary choice of participation are varied to better 




The Conservation Security Program enrolled 202 watersheds in its 2005 Sign-
Up. Among them is the Niagara River Watershed located at the western end of New 
State. It covers approximately 514,810 acres over five counties: Erie, Niagara, 
Genesee, Wyoming and a small part of Orleans. The watershed drains to Lake Ontario 
and also includes many small tributaries, which drain directly to the Niagara River, 
upstream of Niagara Falls. Eighty-three percent of the water flowing into Lake Ontario 
enters through the Niagara River (NRCS website—2005, 
<http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed>NRCS). 
The Niagara River is one of the U.S.-Canadian International Joint Commissions 42 
“Areas of Concern” throughout the Great Lakes Basin (NRCS website—2005, 
 59   <http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed>NRCS). 
Resource concerns center on water quality and soil erosion. The New York office of 
the Natural Resources Conservation Service states that non-point sources of pollution 
remain an area of concern and that nutrient, manure, and pest management 
conservation practices are particularly important in this watershed (NRCS website—
2005, http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed). The 
climate is moderate due to the close proximity of Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, which 
allows for the production of a diverse variety of crops. As of 2000, there were 994 
farms and 205,348 acres of farmland within the watershed. Important agricultural 
sectors include dairy, vegetable production, nursery stock, sod, greenhouse 
horticulture, vineyards and small fruit production (NRCS website—2005, 
<http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed).  
Respondents to the 2004 Dairy Farm Business Summary (DFBS) in the 
western and central plain region of New York, which includes the Niagara River 
Watershed, had an average herd size of 487 cows and average farm size of 1,135 
acres, of which, 1,001 were tillable. These dairy farms on average planted 414 acres of 
hay, 346 of corn silage, 87 of corn grain, put 17 acres into tillable pasture, and left 29 
acres idle (Knoblauch, et al 2005). This simulation model utilizes a representative 
dairy farm based on these averages from the western and central plain region of New 
York and thus assumes a dairy farm of 487 cows, 1,100 acres, 1000 of which are 
tillable, and cropping ratios that are consistent with the farms in the DFBS. Other 
pertinent details assumed about the representative farm will be clarified in the 
appropriate section of this chapter.  
 
 60   Incentive Sector 
  The CSP incentive sector consists of the annual payments made to the 
representative farmer under the 2005 CSP Sign-Up payment levels for the Niagara 
Watershed in western New York. The simulation will calculate annual net revenue 
from a CSP Contract based on four separate payments: the stewardship (base) 
payment, existing practice payment, and two enhancement payments. The model will 
include the enhancement payments for the installation of riparian buffers and for cover 
crops, two conservation practices used in the Niagara watershed and available through 
the New York CSP sign-up. The calculation of net revenue from a CSP contract will 
subtract out the costs of implementation of these enhancements. The model equation 
(1) for Net Revenue derived from a CSP contract is provided below. The units for 
used for this equation are dollars per year.  
(1)  Actual Net Revenue = Base Payment + Change in Net Revenue from 
Cover Crop Enhancement + Change in Net Revenue from Riparian 
Buffer  Enhancement           
       dollars/year 
The new practice payments components of CSP, which are similar in design to 
existing EQIP payments, are not be included because of their low use in the 2004 
Sign-Up and the expectation that the effects of their inclusion would be negligible. 
(USDA, 2005).  
The stewardship (base) payment is calculated based on total acreage, the 
assigned rental rate (stewardship rate), a tier reduction factor, and a multiplication 
factor of 25%, representing the existing practices on the farm. See Chapter Two for 
details on the calculation of existing practice payments.  
(2)  Base Payment= (Total Enrolled Acres*Farmland rental rate*Tier Level 
Multiplier)*(1+Existing Practice Payment Proportion)      
       dollars/year 
The stewardship rate is the estimated 2001 land rental rates calculated as a flat 
 61   rate for the entire watershed. See Chapter Two for details on calculation of the 
stewardship rate. It has been designated at $40 for cropland and $19 for pastureland in 
the Niagara River Watershed (NRCS website—2005, 
http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed). The tier 
reduction factor, or Tier Level Multiplier, is based on the tier level at which the 
participant enters into the CSP contract. The tier reduction factors are 1.25% for tier I, 
5% for tier II, and 11.25% for tier III.  
(3)  Tier Level Multiplier= Tier Multiplier fn (Tier Level)
1 dimensionless   
The base model will consider the representative farm at tier level III, but will test the 
impact of participation at tier level II. This ensures a ten-year contract for the entire 
acreage of the farm. Incidental land can be included in the stewardship payments, 
therefore the entire 1,100 acres will be considered eligible for stewardship payments.  
  The model will simulate two enhancement payments, riparian buffers and 
cover crops, for the entire length of the contract. For the riparian buffer enhancement 
payment rate, the model will use the published CSP rate authorized specifically for the 
2005 Niagara Watershed CSP Sign-up, that is, $100 for each acre of buffer created 
along water bodies or wetlands on the farm (NRCS website—2005, 
http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed). The cover crop 
enhancement payment authorized in the CSP Sign-up was too low to induce new 
practices. Specifically, the CSP payment was $3 per acre, however national cost data 
and New York cost data showed that implementing cover crops cost significantly 
more, e.g. the NY Field Office Technical Guide (2005) showed average costs of 
$13.50. Indeed, the EQIP payment rate for cover crops in Erie County, NY for 2005 
was $30 per ace. The low rate of payment can be attributed to lack of funding for CSP 
                                                 
1 The Tier Multiplier function allows the simulation of various tier levels of participation. The function 
has an output of: (1,1.25%), (2,5%), and (3,11.25%). 
 62   implementation (Knight—personal interview, 2006). Therefore, the model will not use 
actual CSP payment rates for cover crops, rather it will utilize the EQIP payment rate 
for the same practice in the same county. To receive this payment, a farm must protect 
100% of all water bodies and wetlands within the farm boundary with a riparian buffer 
composed of grass or trees that has a minimum width of 100 feet. The total acreage 
used for the riparian buffer is assumed to be 30 acres for the representative farm. This 
is calculated as approximately the amount of acreage needed to provide a 100-foot 
border on each side of a watercourse that runs straight through a 1000-acre square 
farm.  
The base model will use a flat payment rate for the enhancements as 
implemented in the 2004 Sign-Up.  It will also test the variable rate payment scheme 
designated for the 2005 Sign-Up. These variable rate payments begin at 150% of the 
enhancement payment in year one, then dropping each year to 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 
10%, and 0% respectively, for the remainder of the contract (NRCS, FY2005 CSP 
Sign-Up Announcement, 2005).  This variable rate payment scheme is represented in 
the model by using a function called Variable Payment Rate, a function that uses 
“time” as an input and has an output that decreases enhancement payments using the 
reduction formula above.  Finally, the model will respect all contract limitations 




The purpose of the biophysical sector is to demonstrate the dynamic 
biophysical effects of conservation practices, which are often over-simplified in 
economic analyses, as well as provide a realistic net revenue input for the expectation 
formation sector. The biophysical sector of the model consists of the on-farm effects 
 63   of both enhancement practices, that is, the riparian buffer and cover crop practice. 
There are many public benefits to these conservation practices such as increased water 
and air quality. Although some agricultural producers recognize these benefits, this 
model assumes that they are external, and thus not included in the calculus of the 
representative farmer’s determination of net revenue. However, several model 
scenarios allow farmers to continue participation at varying degrees of net revenue 
loss, which can be interpreted as farmers valuing non-farm benefits in their 
participation decision. In addition to public benefits, several conservation practices 
have significant on-farm effects including short and long term implications for 
cropland productivity, implementation and management costs, and constraining the 
future use of land resources. 
As initially conceived this research would analyze four separate conservation 
practices available for payments under the Conservation Security Program in the 
Niagara Watershed in the state of New York. These practices include 1) the 
development of a riparian buffer along all watercourses, 2) maintaining a cover crop 
(cereal rye), 3) adopting a conservation crop rotation, and 4) setting aside ten percent 
of crop acres in sixty foot strips for wildlife habitat. After initial modeling and 
consideration of the setting aside of crop acres for wildlife habitat, its effects were 
deemed similar to the practice of developing riparian buffers. Both practices take 
cropland out of production and yield effects on land not taken out of production were 
thought to be too minimal to include in this simulation model. Thus, both practices 
resulted in identical patterns of contract participation behavior. For this reason, the 
wildlife habitat practice is not simulated in this model.  
In addition, the relevance of the conservation crop rotation practice for this 
simulation model depends upon its overall effect on producer net revenue for the 
representative New York dairy farm.  If the financial impacts of a conservation crop 
 64   rotation are substantially negative, it is unlikely that the representative farm would 
seriously consider a CSP contract with this practice.  Thus, before development of a 
likely conservation crop rotation in the simulation model, a static partial budget 
exercise was carried out to examine the financial effects of this practice. In particular, 
the effect of a conservation crop rotation on the total nutrient needs of the 
representative dairy farm and the resulting change in cost of replacing lost nutrients 
was calculated. The resulting changes in net margin were considered too high for a 
hypothetical producer to consider switching to a conservation crop rotation, even in 
the presence of estimation error. However, this outcome should not be extrapolated to 
non-dairy crop producers, due to the unique nutrient needs of dairy producers, e.g. 
energy from corn silage. See Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of this 
partial budget exercise. Thus, the biophysical sector of this simulation model only 
considers two of the proposed conservation practices, which are: maintaining a cover 
crop of cereal rye and the development of riparian buffers.  
The biophysical sector of this model considers two separate consequences of 
implementing these two conservation practices. The first consequence is the additional 
costs associated with implementing each of enhancement practices. The second effect 
is a change in annual crop yield, assumed to be corn silage, due to increased soil 
quality or other effect from the implementation of the conservation practices. The 
model calculates the financial impact of each conservation practice separately in order 
to distinguish their individual effect on participation decisions. 
A riparian buffer is a strip of land covered in grass or trees adjacent to a body 
of water. Riparian is derived from the Latin word “ripa,” meaning “bank,” and 
generally describes something that is related to or situated on the bank of a river. A 
riparian buffer is a multi-purpose conservation practice designed to accomplish several 
objectives. Primarily, it is used as a strip that can filter out sediments, organic 
 65   material, and pollutants before they enter a watercourse. The additional trees, shrubs, 
or other vegetation can also reduce stream bank erosion and sedimentation. It can also 
provide a source of cover necessary for fish and wildlife and create shade to lower 
water temperatures, which improves habitat for aquatic animals (NRCS electronic 
Field Office Technical Guide—2005, http://efotg.nrcs.usda.gov).   
The riparian buffer enhancement is assumed to take 30 acres of cropland out of 
production from the 1000-acre representative farm, as explained above. This loss of 
productive land is the primary cost of implementing buffers and is the only one 
included in the model. Although riparian buffers have numerous environmental 
benefits, the biophysical effect on crop yields, for land not in riparian buffers, is 
considered negligible. There are no further additional costs or reductions to revenue. 
Therefore, for the purpose of the model, riparian buffers will have no other impact on 
net revenue other than the CSP enhancement payments for riparian buffers and the 
opportunity cost of the lost cropland, that is, the cost of replacing foregone corn silage.  
(4)  Change in Net Revenue from Riparian Buffer Enhancement = Program 
Payment for Riparian Buffer – Change in Costs from Riparian Buffer 
Enhancement       dollars/year 
(5)  Change in Costs from Riparian Buffer Enhancement= Riparian Buffer 
Cost Rate*Enrolled Riparian Buffer Acreage    dollars/year 
Thus, the riparian buffer conservation practice is treated in this model in a 
similar fashion to other cost-benefit analyses of conservation practices. That is, the 
yield effects are considered negligible, however the opportunity costs can be 
substantial. This makes the riparian buffer enhancement a well-suited baseline 
enhancement practice with which to compare a more complicated conservation 
practice such as cover crops. 
Growing a cover crop consists of growing a crop of grass, small grain, or 
legume primarily for seasonal protection and soil improvement (NRCS eFOTG—
 66   2005, http://efotg.nrcs.usda.gov). For the purpose of this model, cover crops can be 
understood as the crops grown on traditional cropland when production of cash crops, 
such as corn, is not feasible, mainly during the late fall and early spring. These cover 
crops are not harvested, but rather incorporated into the soil or killed on the surface 
before they reach maturity. Usually high in nitrogen, they decompose rapidly in the 
soil and can be a supply of nutrients to the following crop (Magdoff, and van Es, 
2000). Additionally, cover crops can have the effect of increasing organic matter, 
preventing erosion, suppressing weeds, breaking pest cycles, and increasing the water 
infiltration of the soil (NRCS eFOTG—2005, http://efotg.nrcs.usda.gov).    
Three distinct terms are used to describe crops grown specifically to maintain 
soil fertility and productivity. These include green manures, cover crops, and catch 
crops. (Magdoff and van Es, 2000). Although sometimes used interchangeably, as 
seen in the NRCS literature, each term has a specific function from a producer’s 
perspective. A “green manure” is usually grown to help maintain soil organic matter 
and increase nitrogen availability, thus implying the use of legumes such as hairy 
vetch or red clover. A “cover crop” is grown mainly to prevent soil erosion by 
covering the ground with living vegetation with roots that hold onto the soil and slow 
the action of moving water. A “catch crop,” such as cereal rye, is grown to retrieve 
available nutrients in the soil following an economic cash crop in order to prevent 
nutrient leaching in the winter, (Magdoff and van Es, 2000). Usually, a producer’s 
decision to grow a cover crop is based on accomplishing more than one of these 
objectives and therefore the term “cover crop” is often used to describe all three 
functions.  
There are three general planting strategies available for effectively using a 
cover crop. First, is to plant a cover crop for an entire season and lose a season of 
income generating crop. This can be useful for the regeneration of very poor soils. A 
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it before the cash crop is planted for the next season. However, in northern areas 
where the growing season is short, it can be a problem to allow the cover crop enough 
time to grow in the fall. Thus, a third strategy is to overseed the cover crop onto the 
cash crop after it is off to a good start (Magdoff and van Es, 2000).  
The model assumes that the representative farm’s manure supply exceeds the 
nutrient needs for the farm’s silage corn and hay rotation. In this situation, the 
producer would choose a cover crop that meets the following criteria: establishes itself 
effectively after a silage corn harvest, scavenges excess nitrogen in the fall, and 
provides additional organic material prior to planting in spring. For this scenario, 
cereal rye is an often recommended and commonly used cover crop (University of 
California SAREP: Cereal Rye—2005, http://www.sarep.ucdavis.edu/cgi-
bin/CCrop.exe/show_crop_12).  
Cereal or winter rye is very winter hardy and easy to establish. It germinates 
quickly and therefore can be planted later in the fall than most other species (Magdoff 
and van Es, 2000). Specific benefits of planting cereal rye include the tightening of the 
nutrient loop by scavenging and mining nutrients left over from the cash crop. Its deep 
root system and rapid growth promotes better drainage and reduced erosion. Cereal 
rye also provides plentiful organic matter. It can act as a natural weed suppressor by 
out competing light sensitive annuals and also through allelopathic (natural herbicide) 
effects (Managing Cover Crops Profitably, 1998).  
Several results pertinent for this model are found in a study of the long-term 
effects of cover crops, specifically cereal rye, on corn silage production. The study of 
interest was undertaken in 1987 through 1995, in the Pacific Northwest, with the 
cereal rye being seeded each year in late September or early October after the corn 
harvest and incorporated into the soil in late April or early May. Conclusions indicate 
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production; “after 9 years of winter cover cropping, the effect of the cover crops on 
corn growth resulted primarily from their influence on soil N availability” (Kuo and 
Jellum, 2000). 
Although cereal rye decreased corn silage yield in the short term, it increased 
soil organic nitrogen accumulation and gradually improved production over the long-
term. Cereal rye has a long-term positive impact on soil organic nitrogen accumulation 
when grown continuously. A short-term decline in yields occurs due to nitrogen 
immobilization by the cereal rye, which temporarily reduces nitrogen availability to 











Years of Continous Cover Cropping
Figure 4.2 Multiplier Effect of Continuous Cover Cropping on Corn Silage Yields  
Source: Kuo and Jellum, 2000 
The above graph represents the effect of winter cover cropping with cereal rye 
on relative corn silage production where the x-axis is the year of consecutive cover 
 69   cropping and the y-axis is the relative change in corn silage. This relationship provides 
an estimate of the initial negative yield effect due to nitrogen immobilization by the 
cereal rye. This effect, incidentally, provides some of the environmental benefits of 
using a cover crop, which is to tie up excess nutrients in the fall and winter. It also 
provides an estimate of the subsequent gradual increase in corn silage yield due to 
increased soil organic matter, which occurs slowly as the cover crop decomposes into 
states that are usable by the corn plants. The amount of nitrogen mineralized into the 
soil from cover crop depends on the Carbon and Nitrogen ratios of the cereal rye 
residue and environmental conditions such as temperature and soil water content. A 
further complexity is the effect of increased organic matter on the capacity of soil to 
hold nutrients (Magdoff and van Es, 2000). These factors contribute to the relatively 
low R-squared value of the correlation (Kuo and Jellum, 2000). For the purpose of this 
model, the complex yield effect is abstracted and assumed to be linear. As shown 
above, the yield effect begins with an initial decrease in relative yield and gradual 
improves yields to a point of an overall positive effect on corn silage yield between 
years four and five (Kuo and Jellum, 2000).  
This biophysical sector of the model uses this linear relationship as a proxy for 
the much more complex biophysical processes briefly described above. The model 
uses this relationship, known as the Organic Matter EFFECT, as estimated by Kuo and 
Jellum (2000), to simulate the Additional Crop Yield, that is, the increase in average 
corn silage yields, measured in tons, on the representative farm under continuous use 
of cover crops. The model also tests the assumption of the linear approximation of 
Organic Matter EFFECT by comparing it to the actual function from Kuo and Jellum 
(2000). The Additional Crop Yield equation, seen below, only calculates the marginal 
contribution of cover crops and therefore subtracts out the expected, or normal, crop 
yield. 
 70   (6)  Change in Crop Yield= Enrolled Cover Crop Acreage*(normal crop 
yield*Organic Matter EFFECT)-(normal crop yield*Established Cover 
Crop Acreage)        t n / y e a r   
The contribution to Actual Net Revenue from the cover cropping practice is 
calculated from the Change in Crop Yield as seen above, and the additional payments 
and costs of the cover crop enhancement. 
(7)  Change in Net Revenue from Cover Crop Enhancement= Change in 
Revenue due to Yields +Program Payment for Cover Crop – Change in 
Total Costs from Cover Crop Enhancement       
       dollars/year 
The change revenue from yields and payments are offset, however, by the operating 
costs of planting a cover crop such as machinery, labor, and seed costs. These costs 
are also included as inputs to the Actual Net Revenue from a CSP contract 
calculation seen in equation number one above. 
(8)  Change in Total Costs from Cover Crop Enhancement= Enrolled Cover 
Crop Acreage* Cover Crop Cost Rate     dollars/year 
Expectation Formation Sector Overview 
This research assumes that farmers make participation decisions based on their 
expected costs and benefits of implementing conservation practices. Thus, modeling 
the expectation formation process of farmers is critical to understanding and predicting 
contract termination decisions. The purpose of the expectation formation sector is to 
apply descriptive behavioral decision-making concepts to the participation termination 
decision-making process. Descriptive elements of this process will go beyond those 
assumptions considered in traditional economic analyses such as profit-maximization 
under perfect information and rationality. Rather, this model considers decision-
making processes that include assumptions of possible estimation error, learning, and 
adaptive expectations. 
Perceived revenue and expected revenue are beliefs concerning present and 
future revenue streams and are modeled separately from actual revenue in this 
 71   simulation model. Thus, the relaxation of the assumption of perfect information is a 
key aspect of this simulation model and leads to several non-trivial results. Perceptions 
and expectations are both modeled as adaptive processes that constantly update as new 
information is acquired, thus they are distinctly dynamic in nature.  
In this model, perceived revenue is treated as an exponential smooth of actual 
revenue, and expected net revenue is modeled either as an exponential smooth of 
perceived revenue, that is, adaptive expectations, or as an extrapolative expectation 
based on perceived net revenue.  
The expectation formation sector of this simulation model can be broken into 
four separate elements: biophysical estimation error, perception formation, expectation 
formulation, and extrapolative expectation formation. Although interconnected, each 
of these elements represents a distinct set of assumptions concerning the decision-
making processes of the farmer. Each element will be discussed in turn, and the 
formulation and justification for each element will be provided. The stock and flow 
structure of the expectation formation sector is especially important because it 
represents the central concept that perceptions, expectations, and beliefs can be 
modeled as stocks in a system.  












































Figure 4.3 Expectation Formation Stock and Flow Diagram 
Note: Dotted arrows indicate causal links for a stock’s initial value. 
 Expectation Formation Sector Conceptual Foundation  
Perceptions and expectations are represented as stocks because they are beliefs 
about the state of the system, in the farmer’s case, the net revenue received from their 
participation in CSP. This belief will tend to remain the same unless new information 
is received, which is different, thus providing a reason to change previously held 
beliefs. Under this formulation, a belief changes when it is in error, that is, when the 
actual state of affairs differs from the current perceived state of affairs. The 
perceptions of a farmer, or any decision-maker, do not change instantly, however, 
when confronted with new information (Sterman, 2000). Therefore, perceptions and 
expectations are smoothed to represent the gradual adjustment of beliefs. These delays 
take the form of exponential smoothing processes. 
An exponential smoothing process can be described mathematically and with 
the notation of system dynamics. For example, Figure 4.3 illustrates the stock and 
















Perceived Revenue = INTEG (Actual Revenue-Perceived Revenue)/Time to Perceive  
Figure 4.4 Exponential Smoothing Processes 
 
74 In this example, Perceived Revenue is a stock variable, which is the integral, 
(INTEG) of the Actual Revenue minus Perceived Revenue, that is, Change in 
Perceived Revenue, all divided by the Time to Perceive.  
If the currently held perceptions or expectations do not match the actual value, 
then they are gradually adjusted. The adjustment time, called Time to Perceive, 
determines how rapidly beliefs respond to error. The Perceived Revenue stock 
variable adjusts to the actual revenue in proportion to the size of the error between the 
two. Thus, the rate of change in the perception is proportional to the gap between the 
current actual value and the perceived value (Sterman, 2000). The rate at which errors 
in perceptions are corrected is formulated as the actual revenue minus the perceived 
revenue, divided by the adjustment time. Therefore, the adjustment rate is not 
constant; as the perceived state approaches the actual state, the remaining gap falls 
and therefore the adjustment rate is reduced (Sterman, 2000). 
Although similar in construction, there are significant differences between a 
farmer’s perception of a current situation, and his or her expectation about a future 
situation. Expectations introduce a second and distinct information delay into the 
decision-making process of the farmer. Expectations are formed based on 
accumulated perceptions of the current state of the system, or Perceived Net Revenue 
in this simulation model. The delay is the process of forming beliefs about the future 
from current perceptions. As such, expectations are often modeled in system 
dynamics as adaptive learning processes or adaptive expectations (Sterman, 2000). 
Adaptive expectations are consistently updated and changed as farmers receive new 
information.  
To illustrate the relevance of modeling adaptive expectations as an exponential 
smoothing process, it can be insightful to compare it to another commonly used 
estimate of expectations such as a moving average. It can be assumed that a moving 
 75   average is a simplistic but reasonable proxy for a decision maker’s expectation about 
the future (Sterman, 2000). For example, let us assume that a farmer uses a six-week 
moving average to generate expectations concerning revenue, which he or she then 
uses to make production decisions. In this case, each week’s data represents one-sixth 
of the total beliefs held about actual revenue. Suppose actual revenue was constant 
over the past seven weeks, but dropped by fifty percent in the eighth week, and stayed 
at that the level for the foreseeable future. Without any further information concerning 
what caused the drop in revenue, the new information would be given the same 
weight as information received five weeks ago. Thus a moving average model would 
produce a linear decline for five straight weeks before reaching the actual level of 
revenue. See Figure 4.4 below illustrating the farmer’s expectations under a moving 
average model. 
A more appropriate model of decision-making would assume that recent data 
is more important than data received several weeks ago. The exponential smoothing 
process described above is a moving average where the weights of importance for 
each piece of information decline exponentially. The most recent values receive the 
most weight, while the older values receive progressively less. Thus, using adaptive 
expectations, that is, a process of continuous exponential smoothing, the same 
scenario produces a curved change in expectations. After a fifty-percent drop in 
revenue in week eight, expected revenue drops quickly at first, taking into account the 
large difference between the actual revenue and the expected revenue. However, the 
change in expectation slows as the difference between the actual revenue and 
expected revenue becomes less. Thus, after the first week, the farmer has significantly 
larger drop in expected revenue, compared to the six-week moving average. The 
adaptive expectations formulation assumes a two-week adjustment time or time to 
form expectations. The exponential smoothing process of adaptive expectations 
 76   produces changes in expectations that are intuitively a more realistic representation of 
a farmer’s expectation formation process. See the comparison between the adaptive 
expectations process, which uses an exponential smoothing process, and a simple 
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Figure 4.5 Comparison Of Expectation Formation 
The modeling of perception and expectation formation as an exponential 
smoothing process is commonly used in system dynamics simulation models and is 
significantly buttressed by the research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(Sterman, 2000). Both Kahneman and Tversky have published much research on the 
subject of behavioral decision-making alternatives to neoclassical economic 
assumptions (Plous, 1993). One of their first and most widely replicated findings is an 
 77   effect called “anchoring and adjustment” (Sterman, 1987, 2000). This is the 
insufficient adjustment up or down from an original starting value or anchor. Tasks in 
which individuals must produce a numerical estimate are susceptible to an anchoring 
effect where the response is strongly biased toward any value, even if it is arbitrary, 
that the individual is induced to consider as a possible answer (Kanhneman, et al, 
2000). Kahneman and Tversky’s original study (1974) documented an experiment 
where participants were asked to estimate the number of African countries in the 
United Nations after receiving a random value as an “anchor.”  Significant differences 
were found between participants who were assigned higher versus lower anchors 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This research hypothesized that people often judge 
an unknown quantity by acknowledging a known reference point and then using 
additional information to adjust the base by some “stretch factor.” This cognitive 
heuristic has been replicated in the laboratory and has an intuitive appeal.  
The effects of anchoring are pervasive and extremely robust, even when 
provided significant incentives to get the estimate correct (Plous, 1993). A common 
disadvantage of using “anchoring and adjustment” is that it has the common tendency 
to under predict changes, that is, to revise prior judgments too little in the face of new 
data (Sterman, 1987). The exponential smoothing process is appropriate to formally 
model the effect of “anchoring and adjustment” on the relationship between an 
initially held perception or expectation and the subsequent adjustment of that belief 
(Sterman, 1987, 2000). The specific formulations of farmers’ perceptions and 
expectations in this model are detailed in individual sections below. 
 
Biophysical Estimation Error 
The Biophysical Estimation Error is a structure in the model that reflects a 
specific assumption regarding a farmer’s imperfect information about the biophysical 
 78   processes of conservation practices. Simply, it assumes that farmers have an initial 
error in estimating the biophysical effects of implementing conservation practice such 
as cover crops. This error leads to mistaken expectations regarding the revenue stream 
generated from participation in conservation programs such as CSP. 
The cause of an individual farmer’s Biophysical Estimation Error may be due 
to general lack of information, previous experience, heterogeneous farm 
characteristics, or externally introduced bias. The conceptual foundation for the 
Biophysical Estimation Error is grounded in the work of incomplete information in 
bidding games such as the “winner’s curse” (Capen et al, 1971). This phenomenon, 
which has occurred in auctions and reproduced in economic experiments, such as 
Charness and Levin, 2005, originally described the bidding outcomes of auctions for 
petroleum drilling rights in the Gulf of Mexico. Successful bidders fall victim to 
“winners curse” when the average bid for an item is below the true value but the 
winning bid exceeds the true value of the item. This implies lack of perfect 
information, particularly an error in the estimation of the expected value of the item. 
The “winners curse” phenomenon further assumes that bidders will make errors in 
estimating the value of an item within an unknown distribution with mean 0. The 
assumption that farmers do not accurately perceive the actual biophysical effects of 
conservation practices is found in the benefit-cost analysis of CSP produced by 
NRCS. The NRCS aggregate participation model assumed that farmers only 
accounted for 25% of the on-farm benefits of conservation practices. However, their 
model did not account for subsequent learning about those effects (USDA, 2005). 
The model assumes farmers have similarly distributed estimations of the 
economic benefits of conservation practices. These distributions are not known, 
however the model tests several levels of a representative decision-maker’s error. This 
ranges from no estimation error, which considers the full financial impact of 
 79   biophysical effects, to 100% error, which completely disregards financial impacts of 
biophysical effects. The estimation error is confined to the biophysical impacts of 
conservation practices on revenue because of their heterogeneous, dynamic, and often 
complex nature. The farmer is assumed to have full information concerning the costs 
of implementing each conservation practice and their respective enhancement 
payments made through CSP. Thus, if the Biophysical Estimation Error were zero, the 
farmer would begin the simulation perceiving the actual Net Revenue from CSP 
Contract. If error is 100%, then farmers will begin the simulation fully perceiving the 
costs of implementation, and CSP payments, but none of the financial impacts of the 
biophysical processes. Thus, the model equation for perceived revenue at the time of 
the CSP sign-up period can be written as:  
(9)    Perceived Revenue at Sign-Up= (Base Payment + Change in Net 
Revenue from Riparian Buffer Enhancement + Program Payment for 
Cover Crop - Change in Total Costs from Cover Crop 
Enhancement)+(1-Biophysical Information Uncertainty)*Change in 
Revenue due to Yields        dollars/year 
 
 The Biophysical Estimation Error serves only as an adjustment to the starting 
point, or initial value, of a farmer’s Perceived Net Revenue and Expected Net 
Revenue. The process of perception formation allows for subsequent learning that 
adjusts Perceived Net Revenue towards a more accurate accounting of the actual net 
revenue. 
 
Perceived Net Revenue Formation 
The second element of the expectation formation sector is a delay in the 
perception of the costs and benefits of CSP participation. This information delay 
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revenue from participation in CSP and the perception of those changes. This delay 
could take many real world forms, including: management delays in collecting 
information, delays in processing the information for into useful forms, or deliberate 
postponement of planning until certain seasons of the year.  
This delay is captured in an exponential smoothing process between the Net 
Revenue from CSP Contract and the stock variable Perceived Net Revenue. If the 
currently held perceptions do not match the actual value, then they are gradually 
adjusted. The adjustment time, called Time to Perceive, determines how rapidly 
beliefs respond to error. The Perceived Net Revenue adjusts to the actual input, in this 
case Net Revenue from CSP Contract, in proportion to the size of the error between 
the two. Mathematically, Perceived Net Revenue is a stock variable which is the 
integral, (INTEG) of the Change in Perceived Net Revenue, with an initial value of 
Perceived Revenue at Sign-Up 
(9)  Perceived Net Revenue= INTEG (Change in PNR, Perceived Revenue 
at  Sign-Up)       dollars/year 
(10)  Change in PNR= (Net Revenue from CSP Contract-Perceived Net 
Revenue)/Time to Perceive         (dollars/year)/year 
The Change in Perceived Net Revenue (PNR) is the difference between the 
Net Revenue from CSP Contract minus Perceived Net Revenue over the Time to 
Perceive. Thus, the rate of change in the perception is proportional to the gap between 
the current actual value and the perceived value (Sterman, 2000). This process of 
feedback and adjustment mimics a learning process where the farmer is continuously 
updating perceptions as new information becomes available. The farmer’s learning 
process concerning the actual financial impacts of biophysical effects versus the 
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smoothing structure. 
The adjustment time, or Time to Perceive, acts as a half-life for the time it 
takes a farmer to adjust his or her perceptions to a step change in actual net revenue. 
Therefore, after one adjustment time, 63% of the initial gap has been corrected, after 
two adjustment times, 86% of the gap is corrected, and after three adjustment times, 
the adjustment is 95% complete. Technically, the gap between perception and actual 
value is never fully closed. If there is constant growth or decline in net revenue from 
CSP participation, the formulation of this delay will create a steady state error 
between Perceived Net Revenue and the actual Net Revenue from CSP Contract 
(Sterman, 2000). This steady state error is easily represented graphically as Perceived 
Net Revenue will continue to lag Net Revenue from CSP Contract by a fixed amount. 
The average delay in perception, or Time to Perceive, for farmers is not known. 
However, a range of adjustment times are tested using different “types” of 
representative decision-makers who have differing rates at which they perceive 
changes in net revenue, which can represent management sophistication. 
 
Expected Net Revenue Formation 
In one set of scenarios, expected net revenue is modeled as adaptive 
expectations as illustrated in the overview to the expectation formation sector. 
Adaptive expectations are formally structured similarly to perceptions in the model, 
that is, as first-order exponential smoothing processes.  
 82   (11)  Adaptive Expected Net Revenue= INTEG (Change in ENR, Perceived 
Revenue  at  Sign-Up)        
  dollars/year  
(12)  Change in ENR= (Perceived Net Revenue-Expected Net 
Revenue)/Time to Change Expectations    (dollars/year)/year 
Mathematically, Adaptive Expected Net Revenue is a stock variable which is 
the integral, (INTEG) of the Change in Expected Net Revenue, with an initial value of 
Perceived Revenue at Sign-Up. The Change in Expected Net Revenue (ENR) is the 
difference between the Perceived Net Revenue minus Expected Net Revenue over the 
Time to Change Expectations. 
The mathematical structure of Adaptive Expected Net Revenue and Perceived 
Net Revenue are identical, although their respective inputs are different. Therefore, 
their properties are comparable. The delay between perception and expectation 
formation is captured in the exponential smoothing of Perceived Net Revenue into 
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue. Like perceptions, expectations will tend to remain 
the same unless new information is received. The resulting change is not 
instantaneous; rather it is a gradual correction of the error between the perceptions and 
expectations of net revenue. If the currently held expectations do not match the 
perceptions, then they are gradually adjusted. This formulation also leads to a steady 
state error between Adaptive Expected Net Revenue and Perceived Net Revenue 
when Perceived Net Revenue is growing or declining at a constant rate. The 
Extrapolative Expectation Formulation, however, will correct for this error as seen 
below. 
The adjustment time, Time to Form Expectations, determines how rapidly 
beliefs are updated. Also like perception formation, the adjustment rate is not 
constant; as Adaptive Expected Net Revenue approaches Perceived Net Revenue, the 
remaining gap falls and therefore the adjustment rate is reduced. The average delay in 
 83   forming expectations, or Time to Form Expectation, is not known. However, a range 
of adjustment times is tested using different “types” of representative decision-makers 
with various adjustment times representing how quickly they update their 
expectations of net revenue.  
Alternatively, Adaptive Net Revenue can be modeled using extrapolative 
expectations. This formulation addresses the limitation of adaptive expectations, 
specifically, that it fails to allow for decision-makers to correct their expectations over 
time when faced with persistent perceived trend. Under adaptive expectations, a 
steady state error occurs whenever the input is steadily growing, which means the 
output will never equal the input even after sufficient time for transient adjustments 
has passed (Sterman, 2000). 
By assuming extrapolative expectation behavior, the model allows farmers to 
correct their expectations for net revenue, if they are persistently different than 
perceived net revenue. Thus, where simple adaptive expectations will simply lag 
perceptions during linear growth, extrapolative expectations will perceive a trend and 
correct expectations to eventually coincide with perceptions.  
This situation is often formulated in system dynamics models by using a 
TREND function (Sterman, 1987). The TREND function generates the expected rate 
of change in the input variable, expressed as a fraction of the input variable per time 
unit. However, Sterman’s TREND formulation generates percentage growth as an 
output, which is not needed for the representative farmer’s more simplistic net 
revenue calculation. In addition, the TREND function has difficulty dealing with raw 
inputs that cross or come close to zero. These characteristics make the TREND 
function unsuitable for modeling the expectations of the representative farmer. 
However, the fundamental concept underlying the TREND function correct and it can 
be easily modified to correct these shortcomings and provide a suitable replacement.  
 84   Extrapolative expectations uses the absolute difference between the Perceived 
Net Revenue and Expected Net Revenue, that is, the Perception Expectation Gap, to 
represent the error in expectations relative to perceptions.  
(13)  Perception Expectation Gap= Perceived Net Revenue- Adaptive 
Expected  Net  Revenue         
       dollars/year 
This error can also be conceived of as a trend in Perceived Net Revenue. These errors 
are then exponential smoothed over an adjustment time, Time to Perceive Trend.  
(14)  Trend Change= (Expectation Gap-Perceived Trend)/Time to Perceive 
T r e n d         (dollars/year)/year 
Thus, the Perceived Trend is the exponentially smoothed accumulation of these past 
expectation errors.  
(15)  Perceived Trend= INTEG (Trend Change, 0)   dollars/year 
It is added back to the Adaptive Expected Net Revenue to create a corrected 
expectation called Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue.  
(16)  Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue= Adaptive Expected Net 
Revenue +Perceived Trend       
  dollars/year 
This formulation has significant behavioral implications. It improves adaptive 
expectations by adding a perceived trend that can correct the steady state error seen 
with a linearly growing input. However, adjusting the expectation by adding a 
perceived trend will also lead to expectations that overshoot turning points in an input. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the differences between modeling expectations as adaptive 
expectations, versus extrapolative expectations, given a situation where a producer’s 
revenue increases permanently by fifty percent at week eight. In this hypothetical 
scenario, the overshooting aspect of extrapolative expectations is clearly demonstrated 
as the extrapolative expectations assumption corrects more quickly than adaptive 
 85   expectations assumption, however it overshoots before correcting itself. Whereas, 
given the same inputs, adaptive expectations adjusts itself more gradually to the actual 
revenue without overshooting. 
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Figure 4.6 Expected Net Revenue With Adaptive Expectations  
Versus Extrapolative Expectations 
 
Decision Rule Sector 
  The model thus includes assumptions of perception and expectation 
formation, must consider decision-rules that are appropriately matched to these 
perception and expectation processes. A decision-rule is the standard, heuristic, or 
rule that a farmer will use to determine continuing participation in CSP. Applied 
economic research most often uses Net Present Value (NPV) as the decision criterion. 
 86   Indeed, many commonly used farm management textbooks identify NPV as the 
optimal rule for decision-making (Kay, et al, 2004). The decision-rule sector of the 
model tests ten decision-rules ranging from traditional net present value to more 
descriptive decision-rules based on expected net revenue. All decision rules tested in 
this simulation use either Net Revenue from CSP Contract, Perceived Net Revenue, 
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, or Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue as the sole 
input. 
To approach these questions, this analysis will begin with the assumptions that 
producers have perfect information and use calculations of net present value as a 
decision-rule. Subsequently, it will examine the effects of alternative behavioral 
assumptions stemming from an assumption that producers will have pressure to 
terminate their CSP contract when facing revenues less than acceptable revenues or 
greater than acceptable losses. The simulation model could produce several different 
versions of decision-rules to determine participation in CSP. This model assumes a 
several possible reasonable decision rules and explores their implications. 
Accordingly, this analysis will test ten different decision-rules in order to better 
understand the dynamics of the participation decision model and provide of range of 
behavior, which policy-makers might expect from farmers. A table summarizing these 
ten decision-rules is provided below. 
 87   Table 4.1 Decision Rules 
Name Description  Formulation  Reference 
Net Present Value with 
Perfect Information 
This optimal decision rule assumes decision 
makers have perfect information regarding the 
actual future net revenue 
=Net Revenue from CSP 
Contract/(1+Discount Rate)^Time 
Kay, et al. 
2004. 
Myopic Perceived B/C 
Rule 
Assumes decision makers do not have perfect 
information, but instead use a benefit cost rule 
based on current perceived net revenue 
= IF THEN ELSE (Perceived Net 
Revenue<0, 0, 1)    
Sterman, 2000 
Myopic Adaptive 
Expectations B/C Rule 
Assumes decision makers do not have perfect 
information, but instead use a benefit cost rule 
based on expected future net revenue 
=IF THEN ELSE (Expected Net 
Revenue<0, 0, 1)    
Sterman, 2000 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rule 
with $0 threshold 
Assumes decision makers do not have perfect 
information, but instead uses a benefit cost rule 
based on expected future net revenue adjusted with 
an extrapolated trend of the data 
= IF THEN ELSE (Extrapolative 
Expected Net Revenue<0, 0, 1) 
Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000. 
& Plous, 1993 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rule 
with $1,000 threshold 
Adds a $1,000 threshold to account for absolute 
monetary losses and possible values for positive 
externalities of conservation practices 
= IF THEN ELSE (Extrapolative 
Expected Net Revenue<-1000, 0, 1) 
Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000, 
& Plous, 1993 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rule 
with $5,000 threshold 
Increases the Extrapolative Expectation threshold 
up to $5,000 
= IF THEN ELSE (Extrapolative 




& Plous, 1993 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rule 
with $10,000 threshold 
Increases the Extrapolative Expectation threshold 
up to $10,000 
= IF THEN ELSE (Extrapolative 
Expected Net Revenue<-10000, 0, 1) 
Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2000, 
& Plous, 1993 
Relative Position Rule 
with $1,000 threshold 
Assumes that decision makers will terminate based 
on a relative loss of revenue compared to a 
previous expected level of revenue ($1,000) 
= IF THEN ELSE (Expectation 
Perception Gap<-1000, 0, 1) 
Thaler, 1991. 
Relative Position Rule 
with $5,000 threshold 
Increases the Relative Position threshold up to 
$5,000 
= IF THEN ELSE (Expectation 
Perception Gap<-5000, 0, 1) 
Thaler, 1991. 
Relative Position Rule 
with $10,000 threshold 
Increases the Relative Position threshold up to 
$10,000 
= IF THEN ELSE (Expectation 





 Net Present Value with Perfect Information: the representative decision-maker 
initiates CSP participation if the net present value (NPV) of Net Revenue from CSP 
Contract is positive over the ten-year contract period.  
(17)  Net Present Value= INTEG (Change in Actual Net Revenue,0)   
dollars/year 
(18)  Change in Actual Net Revenue =Net Revenue from CSP 
Contract/(1+Discount  Rate)^Time      
  (dollars/year)/year 
The NPV calculation assumes the representative decision-maker has perfect 
information regarding Net Revenue from CSP Contract. Therefore, termination of 
CSP participation is not an option for the decision-maker in this simulation model. 
The NPV calculation uses a 5% discount rate. NPV will be used as basis to compare 
other decision-rules using perceived and expected net revenue.  
The term “myopic” characterizes decision-rules that are made with imperfect 
information, that is, only information currently available to decision makers at the 
time a decision is made. Rather, these decision-rules use the perceived, adaptive 
expected, and extrapolative expected net revenue as inputs, which are continuously 
updated through learning processes. The following decision-rules must rely upon 
myopic perceptions and expectations and thus are not subject to a standard NPV 
decision rule.  
   Myopic Perceptions Benefit/Cost Rule: the representative decision-maker 
initiates CSP participation if Perceived Net Revenue is greater than zero at the start of 
the simulation. The decision-maker terminates participation if Perceived Net Revenue 
falls below zero at any point during the simulation.  
(19)  Myopic Perceptions Benefit/Cost Rule= IF THEN ELSE(Perceived Net 
Revenue<0,  0,  1)        Dimensionless 
If decision-makers are constantly updating their perceptions of the Net Revenue from 
 89  CSP Contract, then this decision-rule assumes that decision-makers use their perceived 
net revenue rather than forming expectation about future costs and benefits. 
  Myopic Adaptive Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule: the representative decision-
maker initiates CSP participation if Adaptive Expected Net Revenue is greater than 
zero at the start of the simulation. The decision-maker terminates participation if 
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue falls below zero at any point during the simulation.  
(20)  Myopic Expectations Benefit Cost Rule=IF THEN ELSE (Adaptive 
Expected Net Revenue<0, 0, 1)        
  Dimensionless 
Expectation formation acts as a second information delay beyond Perceived Net 
Revenue. If perceptions are steadily growing or declining, this formulation will create 
a steady state error between expectations and perceptions. 
  Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule: the representative 
decision-maker initiates CSP participation if Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue is 
greater than zero at the start of the simulation. The decision-maker terminates 
participation if Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue falls below zero at any point 
during the simulation.  
(21)  Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule= IF THEN 
ELSE (Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue<0, 0, 1)   
Dimensionless 
Extrapolative expectations correct the steady state error seen in simple adaptive 
expectations. However, this formulation creates the possibility of decision-makers 
overshooting expectations when faced with a turning point in net revenue. 
Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule with Threshold: the 
representative decision-maker initiates CSP participation if Extrapolative Expected 
Net Revenue is greater than zero. The decision-maker terminates participation if 
Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue falls below their threshold value at any point 
 90   during the simulation. Threshold values will be tested at negative $1,000, $5,000, and 
$10,000.  
(22)  Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule with $1,000 
Threshold= IF THEN ELSE(Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue<-
1000,  0,  1)       Dimensionless 
(23)  Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule with $5,000 
Threshold= IF THEN ELSE(Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue<-
5000,  0,  1)       Dimensionless 
(24)  Myopic Extrapolative Expectations Benefit/Cost Rule with $10,000 
Threshold= IF THEN ELSE(Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue<-
10000,  0,  1)         Dimensionless 
 
This decision-rule is designed in accordance with emerging behavioral 
theories, such as Prospect Theory, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (Plous, 1993). 
The threshold values allow the decision-maker to absorb a given amount of financial 
pressure before deciding to terminate participation. Although a break-even analysis is 
extremely useful as a normative rule, extrapolative expectations with varying 
thresholds might be a more accurate description of farmer decision-making. It can be 
instructive to understand the decision-making in terms of absolute monetary losses. 
The presence of threshold values can also indicate a decision-makers internalization of 
perceived positive externalities of conservation practices, that is, a conservation ethic 
or altruism. 
Relative Position Rule: the representative decision-maker initiates CSP 
participation if the Perception Expectation Gap is below a given threshold. The 
decision-maker terminates participation when the Perception Expectation Gap is 
greater than the same threshold value. Threshold values will be tested at $1000, 
$5,000, and $10,000.  
 91   (25)  Relative Position Decision Rule with $1,000 Threshold= IF THEN 
ELSE(Expectation Perception Gap<-1000, 0, 1)   Dimensionless 
(26)  Relative Position Decision Rule with $5,000 Threshold= IF THEN 
ELSE(Expectation Perception Gap<-5000, 0, 1)  Dimensionless 
(27)  Relative Position Decision Rule with $10,000 Threshold= IF THEN 
ELSE(Expectation Perception Gap<-10000, 0, 1)   Dimensionless 
This decision-rule is not predicted by traditional cost-benefit analysis, however 
it can be conceived as a realistic heuristic that could be used by farmers. Additionally, 
it is implied in the burgeoning literature on mental accounting and consumer choice 
that decision-makers might use this heuristic (Thaler, 1991). The relative position 
decision-rule does not reference the absolute value of the net revenue but rather the 
difference between the amount of revenue expected in a given year and the amount of 
revenue perceived. This decision rule provides for the real-world outcome of a farmer 
continuing to participate in CSP, even in a year that they expect to lose money. 
However, if the farmer perceives a greater loss than their threshold allows, a farmer 
might become disillusioned and seek to terminate participation. 
   
Representative Decision-Makers 
  To facilitate a clearer understanding of the significant effects of unknown 
parameters in the simulation model, the model utilizes six “types” of representative 
decision-makers in order to consolidate and summarize important parameters. Using 
representative decision-makers does not preclude extensive sensitivity testing for the 
same parameters. Of particular interest are the decision-making parameters that relate 
to estimation error, learning, and expectation formation. These parameters are not 
readily available and formal survey methods for obtaining these estimates are beyond 
the scope of this research. These parameters include the Biophysical Estimation Error, 
Time to Perceive, Time to Form Expectations, and Time to Form Trends. Various 
 92   combinations of the parameters are used to create six representative types of decision-
maker.  
Biophysical Estimation Error, designating the amount of knowledge a 
decision-maker has about the biophysical effects of the conservation practices, is 
distributed into three groups: 50%, 75%, and 100% error, labeled smart, average, and 
limited, respectively. No representative decision makers are given less than 50% error 
in estimating the biophysical effects because the model’s perception and expectation 
functions depend on an initial change, thus little or no initial estimation error would 
render model output limited and uninteresting. 
The second group of parameters represents the management characteristics of 
the decision-makers. Primarily, these parameters represent how quickly decision-
makers perceive net revenue, form expectations about that revenue, and perceive 
trends in the net revenue from their participation in CSP. These types of decision-
makers will be divided into two categories: sophisticated and naïve. These parameter 
settings for these two categories will affect Time to Perceive, Time to Form 
Expectations, and Time to Perceive Trend. These representative decision makers are 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
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A. Smart Sophisticated  50%  1  2  2 
B. Smart Naïve  50%  2  2  3 
C. Average Sophisticated  75%  1  2  2 
D. Average Naïve  75%  2  2  3 
E. Limited Sophisticated  100%  1  2  2 
F. Limited Naïve  100%  2  2  3 
 
Model Testing 
In order to build confidence in preparation for simulating the model, a battery 
of tests was conducted on the simulation model. This testing regime applied is 
summarized and recommended in Sterman (2000). A boundary adequacy test was 
conducted to determine the appropriateness of the model boundary including which 
models variables are included, considered exogenous inputs, or excluded from the 
model. For the stated purpose of informing policy-makers and practitioners of 
traditional applied economic models, the current model boundary is found to be 
appropriate. 
A structural assessment considers the information provided by several test 
inputs and seeks to understand the behavior of the model under various conditions. 
These test inputs demonstrated appropriate behavior by the model. However, the 
question of the level of aggregation was considered to be important. A higher level of 
aggregation, for example, at the watershed or state level would allow several 
additional effects to be modeled. Word-of-mouth dynamics and other information 
flows between participants are not included in this individual farmer model. However, 
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modeled at an appropriate level of aggregation. Aside from aggregation issues, several 
partial model tests show that the structure of the model performs adequately and as 
expected. These partial model tests include separate calculations of the actual net 
revenue formulation, and several tests involving the appropriateness of the delay and 
smoothing structure associated with the formation of perceptions, expectations, and 
extrapolative expectations.  
The model was tested for dimensional consistency. Except for calculations 
using time as an input, for example net present value, the model is dimensionally 
consistent. 
  A parameter assessment of this model highlights that fact that the parameters 
used in this model come from disparate sources have varying levels of accuracy and 
reliability. All parameters relating to the program payments, Tier Rates, and rental 
rates are the actual parameters used by the Natural Resources Conservation Service to 
determine the payments available to farmers located in the Niagara watershed near 
Buffalo, NY (NRCS website, April 2005). The key parameters in the expectation 
formation sector of the model including Time to Perceive, Time to Form Expectation, 
and Time to Form Trend, are educated guesses based on actual producer behavior. 
Extensive sensitivity testing, as shown in Chapter Five shows the ranges and 
associated behavior of these parameters.  
There are three extreme value tests in which this model performs poorly. These 
include changing any of the adjustment times in perception or expectation formation 
to zero. Conceptually, this is a concern, however behaviorally it is acceptable because 
a delay can always be an assumed, no matter how small. The model fails to produce 
appropriate behavior when these values are zero. Specifically, the model fails to 
produce any behavior. This is due to the formulation of the adjustment times as they 
 95   are the denominator of the flow structure. Thus, when these parameters go to zero the 
integration becomes incalculable. 
  Other extreme conditions tests of interest include changing Established Cover 
Crop, Normal Crop Yield, and Corn Silage Price. When each of these parameters goes 
to zero, the model responds appropriately. When Established Cover Crop goes to zero, 
the only revenue effect that remains is the base payment from CSP on the entire 
acreage of the farm. This could be a realistic situation if the farmer was performing 
other conservation practices and decided to drop out of only the cover crop practice 
but continue the others. When either the Normal Crop Yield or the Corn Silage Price 
goes to zero, the additional revenue generated by the cover crop goes to zero as well, 
however costs of implementing the practice are still modeled appropriately. 
The model was tested for integration error. The simulation is currently being 
run with a time step of .0625, a change of time step to .015625 or .25; do not 
significantly affect behavior of the system. 
 
Dynamic Participation Model Conclusion 
This chapter explored the individual sectors of the dynamic participation 
decision simulation model. Various assumptions, specifically those relating to 
alternative expectation formation and decision-making, were proposed. Initial 
parameters and exogenous inputs can be found in Appendix A. The next chapter will 
describe the results of the simulation model for each of the representative decision-
makers and various decision-rules. 
 
 96   CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE SIMULATIONS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the results of several simulations of the CSP decision-
making model. It begins with a description and comparison of the base run of the 
simulation model. The base run provides for the single enhancement of riparian 
buffers. Then, the model is modified to account for combined cover crop and riparian 
buffer enhancements. As noted previously, early contract termination decisions are 
modeled as arising from the combination of perceptions and expectations about the net 
revenue effects of implementing conservation practices and the decision rules that use 
those net revenue effects as key information inputs.  Four principal model variables 
will be used in the analyses throughout this chapter to illustrate the effects of changes 
in parameters on net revenue related variables. These revenue variables are Actual Net 
Revenue, Perceived Net Revenue, Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, and Extrapolative 
Expected Net Revenue. 
Multi-parametric sensitivity analysis of the Biophysical Estimation Error and 
three time constants provides additional information concerning model behavior and 
the effects of uncertain model parameters. Next, the representative decision-makers 
described in Chapter Four will be used to better understand probable termination times 
under various decision rules. Using multiple simultaneous simulation runs with 
randomly assigned behavioral characteristics for a group of farm decision makers 
provides insights about likely aggregate cumulative termination rates under various 
decision rules. These simulations will also help analyze several important 
assumptions, including the organic matter effect from continuous cover cropping, the 
number of acres enrolled in cover crops, and the declining payment rate schedule that 
 97   was implemented in the 2005 CSP sign-up, and potential policy “fixes” that can be 
used to improve participation. 
The parameters and constants used for these simulation runs replicate the 
actual 2005 CSP Final Interim Rule as implemented in the Niagara Watershed in New 
York. Notable exceptions to this principle are the base payment rates for cover crops 
and riparian buffers, which are modeled after actual EQIP rates for the Niagara 
Watershed. (See Chapter Four for additional details on the calculation of enhancement 
payment rates.)  
 
Base Model Results 
Simulation modeling in the system dynamics tradition usually employs an 
iterative “what if” scenario analysis. Using this convention allows a better 
understanding of the dynamics at work in each scenario and the individual effects of 
assumption and parameters on termination decisions. In this case, results from the base 
simulation will allow better understanding of subsequent changes and sensitivity 
analyses. A description of the parameters and assumptions of the base simulation is 
therefore appropriate. 
Key assumptions in the incentive sector of the simulation model are the 
agricultural producer’s tier of participation, and the declining enhancement payment 
rate. The base model will assume the agricultural producer is participating in Tier III 
of CSP and thus receives 11.25% of the annual estimated rental rate for the entire 
farm. Tier II participation would receive 5% of the estimated rental rate (NRCS, CSP 
Amendment to Interim Final Rule, 2005). The base model also assumes a flat, rather 
than declining payment rate for all enhancements. The declining enhancement 
payment schedule was instituted by the sign-up announcement in 2005 and was not in 
effect during the 2004 sign-up (NRCS, FY2005 CSP Sign-Up Announcement, 2005). 
 98   Its effect is tested extensively and its results on decision making is reported later in 
this chapter. 
In the biophysical sector of the model, the number of acres enrolled for each 
enhancement and the organic matter effect on corn yield are significant parameters. 
The base model will assume that four hundred acres of cover crops will be enrolled in 
CSP, corresponding to the assumed corn silage acreage on the eleven hundred acre 
farm. The riparian buffer enhancement will assume that thirty acres are enrolled. 
Chapter Four provides more details on the model formulation and assumptions for the 
enhancement practices. The base model will also use the linearized organic matter 
effect on corn yields, rather than the actual experimental results. The latter 
assumption, however, is tested later.  
As explained in detail in Chapter Four, the expectation formation sector has 
four significant behavioral parameters. Although each of these parameters will be 
analyzed and reported later in the chapter, the following assumptions are made for the 
base run of the simulation model: Biophysical Information Uncertainty uses a value of 
one, denoting 100% error in perceiving the initial effect of cover cops on corn yields. 
Additionally, Time to Perceive, Time to Form Expectations, and Time to Perceive 
Trend all use an adjustment time of one year. Because the base run of the model is for 
the purposes of an initial examination of model behavior, it will not examine or report 
the results of the decision rule sector. 
Four key model variables are useful for understanding the effects of changes in 
parameters on net revenue variables and termination decisions. These include Total 
Net Actual Revenue, Perceived Net Revenue, Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, and 
Extrapolative Net Revenue. Each of these variables represents the difference in actual, 
perceived, or expected revenue between participating in CSP under the assumed 
conditions and not participating in CSP. These variables are based on the behavioral 
 99   parameters discussed above, which reflect assumptions about how farmers respond to 
new information. Conveniently, these key variables can be graphed together in order 
to better demonstrate their interrelatedness and the general behavior of the simulation 
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Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue : base buffer 
Figure 5.1 Base Simulation of Actual, Perceived, Adaptive Expected, and 
Extrapolative Expected Revenue For Riparian Buffer 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, a producer enrolling in CSP with only a riparian 
buffer enhancement of 30 acres receives $7,237 net revenue per year for the length of 
the CSP contract. This net amount is calculated by adding CSP base payments, 
existing practice payments, riparian buffer enhancement payments, and subtracting the 
costs to implement the riparian buffer, including the costs associated with the shortfall 
l
dollars/yea 1 1 1 1 1 
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue : base buffer 
l
dollars/yea 2 2 2 2 2 
Perceived Net Revenue : base buffer 
l
dollars/yea 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Actual Net Revenue : base buffer 
l
dollars/yea 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 100   in corn silage production. Because this analysis assumes that the riparian buffer 
enhancement simply entails removing land from crop rotation, the producer faces no 
possibility of uncertainty in estimating that yield effect. This lack of estimation error 
leads to no initial difference between Actual Net Revenue and Perceived Net Revenue 
as is seen in Figure 5.1. Without this initial difference there is no correcting of 
perceptions or expectations, which leads to perceptions, adaptive expectations, and 
extrapolative expectations all track the Actual Net Revenue perfectly throughout the 
10-year contract. Under all decision rules considered in this model, this producer 
would enter into a CSP contract and remain a participant throughout the life of the ten-
year contract.  
In reality, however, a producer’s perception and expectation of the net revenue 
received from implementing a riparian buffer could vary from year to year and cause 
termination behavior. Causes of this variance include changes in the net revenue from 
corn silage production due to variation in yields or prices. Additionally, the on-farm 
demand for corn silage could change for the representative farm due to changes in 
livestock numbers, shifts in nutritional requirements, or both. Any of these exogenous 
changes could affect the farmer’s perceived or actual value for the riparian buffer 
practice, most notably through the shadow price of corn silage. Although this analysis 
does not include those possible effects, it is important to note that more dynamic 
behavior for actual, perceived, and expected revenue, and thus termination decisions, 
are possible from implementing the riparian buffer.  
Agreement to place 400 acres in the cover crop enhancement under a CSP 
contract results in dramatically different behavior of the key revenue variables. Figure 
5.2 shows the revenue variables combining both riparian buffers and the cover crop 
enhancement. 
 
















































Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue : base dollars/year 1111111
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue : base ollars/year d 222222
Perceived Net Revenue : base dollars/year 3333333
Actual Net Revenue : base dollars/year 44444444
 
Figure 5.2 Base Simulation of Actual, Perceived, Adaptive Expected, and 
Extrapolative Expected Revenue For Cover Crop and Riparian Buffer 
 
The figure shows Actual Net Revenue for the entire CSP contract (combined 
riparian buffer and cover crop enhancement) starting in year one at approximately 
negative $16,200. This negative return from participation in the CSP contract is due to 
the initial adverse effect of cover crops on yields. This yield impact is approximated at 
a 25 percent loss in year one, or 11.3 tons per acre compared to a normal yield of 15 
tons per acre. This yield reduction results in a loss of approximately $30,000 worth of 
corn silage in year one. In contrast, the simulation model calculates the total payment 
from the CSP contract to be a positive $13,800, which is more than offset by the loss 
in corn silage production. Notably, $13,800 is also the starting value of Perceived Net 
Revenue because the base run assumes that the farmer’s Biophysical Information 
 102   Uncertainty is 1, that is, the farmer initially perceives no yield affect from 
implementing cover crops. The base model shows Actual Net Revenue rising in a 
linear fashion due to the decreasing negative yield effect of crop crops. Actual Net 
Revenue crosses the break-even point at approximately 3.4 years after enrolling in 
CSP. The root cause of changes in the behavior of revenue expectations is changes in 
the yield effect from the cover crop enhancement.  
Perceived Net Revenue, as well as Adaptive and Extrapolative Expected Net 
Revenue, begin to fall rapidly after the start of the simulation in the fashion of an 
exponential smoothing process, which is explained in Chapter Four. Perceived Net 
Revenue crosses the break-even point after approximately 1.7 years, however it comes 
from the opposite direction as Actual Net Revenue. The real world implication of this 
result is that in the early years of a CSP contract this farmer’s perception of net 
revenue begins to decrease while the actual revenue is increasing. In short, the 
farmer’s perception of revenue starts high and decreases while the actual revenue 
starts low and increases. This does not change until Perceived Net Revenue crosses the 
Actual Net Revenue between years 2 and 3.  
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue consistently lags behind Perceived Net 
Revenue just as predicted and described in Chapter Four. Because there is constant 
growth in Perceived Net Revenue, the delay between Perceived and Adaptive 
Expected Revenue creates a steady state error. This gap is easily seen throughout the 
length of the simulation model. This steady state error, however, is corrected by the 
Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue, which identifies the magnitude of the gap and 
adjusts for the trend. Thus, it is easily seen that Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue 
decreases more quickly than Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, however it overshoots 
both Perceived and Adaptive Expected Net Revenue before correcting itself. This 
overshooting behavior is characteristic of Extrapolative Expected Revenue 
 103   formulation and can be quantified be comparing the relative minimums of each 
revenue formulation. Adaptive Expected Net Revenue reaches a minimum of 
approximately negative $2,000 at 3.8 years, while Extrapolative Expected Net 
Revenue reaches a minimum of negative $6,700 at 3.2 years. 
As seen in Figure 5.2, Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue does not correct 
for the steady state error that exists between Actual Net Revenue and Perceived Net 
Revenue. This gap represents the fixed amount of time that passes between the on-
farm change in actual net revenue from participation in CSP and the perception of 
those changes. This delay could take many real world forms, including: management 
delays in collecting information, delays in processing the information for into useful 
forms, or deliberate postponement of planning until certain seasons of the year.  
 
Parameter Sensitivity 
Participation termination is a function of the key model parameters that act as 
inputs to the ten participation decision rules. Understanding the sensitivity of key 
model parameters is helpful determining causes of termination and developing policy 
recommendations that reduce terminations. At present, the values of these four 
parameters are unknown; therefore sensitivity testing is needed to better understand 
how different values can affect farmers’ decision-making behavior. 
  The first of these parameters is the Biophysical Information Uncertainty 
parameter, which is used as an initial condition. This parameter indicates the degree to 
which producers initially perceive changes in corn yields. In the base run seen above, 
Biophysical Information Uncertainty takes a value of 1, implying 100% uncertainty 
about the biophysical effects. This implies that producers will ignore information 
about changes in revenue due to changes in yield when making their sign-up decision.  
Importantly however, producers begin to perceive information about the biophysical 
 104   effects on yields after the simulation begins.  The pattern of behavior is consistent with 
changing initial values. At the extreme values, zero and one, either no change in crop 
yields is perceived or all of the change in crop yields is perceived. Each series 
converges to the same numerical values, no matter the value of the initial error. 
A significant characteristic when examining changes to Biophysical 
Information Uncertainty is the downward-sloping behavior of perceptions and 
expectations in scenarios that have higher initial error values. It is this initial error that 
gives rise to the important dynamics in the extrapolative expectation graph. This 
sensitivity analysis provides one insight into a producer’s behavior. For example, if a 
producer uses any version of a myopic cost/benefit rule, where termination occurs 
whenever perceived or expected net revenue falls below zero, then uncertainty must be 
high enough at time zero, or the farmer will not sign up for the program. Practically, 
this means that a producer with a myopic benefit cost decision rule must have at least 
50% Biophysical Information Uncertainty or signing up for CSP is seen as 
unprofitable and thus an unattractive option.  
Sensitivity analysis is also relevant for the three constants used for adjustment 
times in the expectation formation sector. These include the Time to Perceive, Time to 
Form Expectations, and Time to Form Trend. Multi-parametric sensitivity analysis 
allows simultaneous varying of all three time constants. The constants are tested, using 
a range of 1 to 3, and assuming a random distribution with Biophysical Information 
Uncertainty held constant at 1. The variables of interest are Perceived Net Revenue, 
Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, and Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue. It is 
important to note the relationships between these parameters so as to better understand 
the dynamics at work. The Time to Perceive affects Perceived Net Revenue, however 
because Perceived Net Revenue is an input to both Expected Net Revenue and 
Extrapolative Net Revenue, Time to Perceive is important to their behavior as well. 
 105   However, Time to Form Expectations does not have the same relationship because it 
only affects Expectations and Extrapolative Expectations. Finally, Time to Form 
Trend does not affect either other variable except Extrapolative Expectations. It is in 
this way that the time constants build upon each other. Sensitivity analyses varied each 
of the time constants together at the same time in order to better understand their 
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Figure 5.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Adjustment Times on  
Extrapolated Expected Net Revenue 
 
Several outcomes are worth mentioning from the sensitivity analyses, of which 
Figure 5.3 is an example. First, for both perceived and expected revenue outputs, the 
basic pattern of behavior remains relatively constant. This behavior is characterized by 
sharply decreasing expectations until reaching a minimum and then increasing slowly 
to match the Actual Net Revenue.  
 106   In each of the sensitivity analyses, the upper and lower bounds of revenue 
expand at first and then contract significantly before expanding again. This “pinching” 
effect can be explained by the changing time of the inflection point, that is, the year 
when the minimum revenue is reached. When Time to Perceive, Time to Form 
Expectations, and Time to Form Trend are at relatively low adjustments times, e.g. 1, 
then the inflection point comes relatively soon in the lifespan of the simulation, that is 
3.2 years for Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue. However, when those same 
parameters are relatively large, e.g. 3, then the inflection point comes later, that is, at 
5.25 years. This is due to the adjustments happening more slowly and thus creating 
behavior that is more flat.  
In numerical terms, the sensitivity analysis shows a moderately large range of 
values that each of these variables can take by using different time constants. In 
contrast however, the results of the model are not very behaviorally sensitive to 
changes in the time constants. Taken alone, this implies that there will be a 
distribution of termination dates, rather than one for all farmers. Without knowing the 
decision-making characteristics (time constants) or decision rules of individual 
farmers, this model is less useful for making point predictions of perceptions of profit 
or loss, or of specific expected dates of termination for individual farmers. However, 
by assuming ranges of decision-making characteristics for the entire population of 
farmers, this model can provide information about likely aggregate termination rates 
and distributions of termination times.  
Viewed in this light, the model becomes a useful tool for illustrating potential 
termination decisions under various behavioral assumptions. Additionally, the model 
can predict the initial sign-up for CSP contracts that precede the termination decision. 
Because the goal of this research project is to demonstrate that termination could arise 
from conditions possible under CSP participation, not to make individual point 
 107   prediction of termination times, the large range of numeric values for individual 




This decision-making model assumes that producers do not have perfect 
information, nor is it assumed that they use a traditional net present value calculation 
when making participation decisions. However, it is useful to compare the termination 
behavior resulting from alternative decision rules with the outcomes when a net 
































Cumulative Discounted Actual Revenue : npv 0% dollars/year 1111
Cumulative Discounted Actual Revenue : npv 5% llars/year do 2222
Cumulative Discounted Actual Revenue : npv 10% dollars/year 33333
Figure 5.4 Varied Cumulative Discounted Net Revenues Under a CSP Contract 
Assuming varying discount rates, a producer implementing the riparian buffer 
and cover crop enhancement will realize total revenue with a present value of $53,353 
 108   after ten years with a ten percent discount rate, $81,540 with a five percent discount 
rate, and $125,382 with no discounting. Under each of these scenarios, a producer 
would choose to participate in the CSP contract because of an expected positive return 
at the end of the ten-year contract and there would be no termination. 
  When perfect information and an NPV decision rule are not assumed, a set of 
alternative decision rules is necessary. This analysis assumes that producers are 
“myopic” decision makers, that is, they use decision-rules that are made with 
imperfect information. This is the information that is only available to decision makers 
at the time a decision is made. Furthermore, decision-makers will use a standard 
benefit cost calculation to determine participation and termination in a CSP contract. 
Threshold values are provided for several decision rules which can be interpreted as a 
tolerance for unmet expectations, or more practically, non-monetary reasons for CSP 
participation that are not represented in this simulation model. The most obvious 
example of this non-monetary reason would be a producer’s stewardship or 
conservation ethic.  Table 5.1 displays simulated termination times, that is, the year in 
which a producer decides to terminate participation in CSP. This table utilizes the 
representative decision makers and examines nine separate decision rules (See Chapter 
Four for detailed descriptions of representative decision makers and decision rules.)  
  

















Myopic Perceived B/C 
Rule  NP* NP  1.38 1.78 1.72 2.88 
Myopic Adaptive 
Expectations B/C Rule  NP NP 2.88  4.38 NT NT 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rules  
•  With $0 threshold 
NP  NP  2.13 2.88 2.67 4.16 
•  With $1,000    
threshold 
NP  NP  2.25 3.19 2.78  NT 
•  With $5,000 
threshold 
2.13 3.06 3.09  NT  NT  NT 
•  With $10,000 
threshold 
NT NT NT NT NT NT 
Relative Position 
Decision Rules 
•  With $1,000 
threshold  1.09 1.16 1.06 1.09 1.06 1.09 
•  With $5,000 
threshold 
1.63 NT  1.31 1.72 1.22 1.44 
•  With $10,000 
threshold 
NT NT NT NT 1.53 NT 
Note: NP denotes that no participation occurs, NT denotes that no termination occurs 
 
There are several key observations from the representative decision-makers 
and decision-rules analysis (Table 5.1). First, decision makers that perceive 50% of the 
effect of cover crops, that is, those representative farmers categorized as “smart”, have 
zero termination time for the first four decision rules. This implies that these decision 
makers do not sign-up for a CSP contract using any decision-rule that has a threshold 
of $1,000 or less. This is predicted because the starting value for perceived, adaptive 
expected, and extrapolative expected is a negative $1,048. Therefore, producers who 
have a low threshold, and who are making a benefit cost calculation will not sign-up 
under this scenario. 
 110     A second key observation is that decision-makers with a $10,000 threshold for 
unmet expectations using extrapolative expectations do not terminate contracts under 
any scenario. Under a $5,000 threshold, decision-makers terminate contracts under 
half of the representative decision-maker assumptions. Specifically, the lower the 
estimation error, the more likely the producer is to terminate the CSP contract. As seen 
under the $1,000 threshold, only the decision maker with the highest error and the 
slowest updating did not terminate the CSP contract. 
  A third key observation is that the relative position decision rule results in 
different termination behavior than the other rules. Under a relative position decision 
rule, a producer decides to terminate their CSP contract when the gap between 
expected revenue becomes much larger than what is being perceived at the same time. 
Therefore, a producer might still have positive net revenue, but if it is significantly 
less than what was expected, the producer will terminate participation. The threshold 
values determine what value of difference is actually significant. The relative position 
decision rule, although unorthodox in neoclassical economics, provides insight into 
the decision making model. 
  As seen in Table 5.1, under a $1,000 threshold, the producer terminates 
participation under all scenarios after close to one year. However, under the $5,000 
threshold, the Smart Naïve representative decision-make does not terminate 
participation. It can therefore be understood that the Smart Naïve formulation creates 
the smallest gap between Perceived Net Revenue and Adaptive Expected Net 
Revenue. This is not surprising because the Smart Naïve representative decision-
maker has the least changes in expectations. This producer starts with low estimation 
error and updates perceptions and expectations relatively slowly. Alternatively, it 
should also be true that the opposite should produce a large gap between perceptions 
and expectations. This premise is confirmed by the termination of the Limited 
 111   Sophisticated decision-maker under the $10,000 threshold for the relative position 
decision rule. In this case, all decision makers do not terminate participation, except 
for the decision maker with the highest estimation error and the fastest updating of 
perceptions and expectations, the mirror opposite of the Smart Naïve decision maker.    
 
Aggregate Termination Rates 
The analysis using representative decision makers provides a perspective on 
the effect of assumptions concerning individual decision-makers’ unknown behavioral 
characteristics. An alternative analysis using aggregated decision-makers with 
randomly selected behavioral characteristics can provide a more robust foundation for 
determining policy implications and recommendations. In this analysis, 100 model 
simulations using farmers with randomly assigned behavioral characteristics were 
aggregated for each of the ten decision rules. (This aggregate analysis is analogous to 
agent-based models except for the lack of interaction among agents.) Other than 
behavioral characteristics, all other farm and CSP contract parameters were assumed 
to be the same for all farmers. The ranges in parameters for the behavioral 
characteristics ranges included: Biophysical Information Uncertainty, 50% to 100% 
error; Time to Perceive, 1 to 3 years; Time to Form Expectations, 1 to 3 years; and 
Time to Perceive Trend, 1 to 3 years. Figure 5.5 shows aggregate termination rates for 



















Figure 5.5 Cumulative Participation Rates for Aggregate Decision Makers  


















"Adaptive Expectations B/C Rule" : base run 1111
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule" : base run 22
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : base run 33
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($5,000)" : base run 44
"Relative Position Rule ($1,000)" : base run 555
"Relative Position Rule ($5,000)" : base run 666
 113   The starting position of each cumulative participation rate signifies the 
number, and, because the population of farmers is 100, also the percentage of farmers 
who initially sign-up for a CSP contract. For example, the Adaptive Expectation 
Benefit/Cost Rule begins with a participation rate of 95, that is, 5, or 5% of farmers do 
not expect that signing-up for a CSP contract is a profitable proposition. Each decision 
rule shows a cumulative decline of participation, or conversely an increase in 
terminations, until a point at which participation stabilizes and terminations cease. 
Thus, of those 95% of farmers who signed up for CSP under the Adaptive 
Expectations decision rule, 56% decided to terminate participation. Table 5.2 
summarizes the percentage of farmers not participating at sign-up, the cumulative 
termination rate, and termination ending time for each of the myopic decision rules. 
 
Table 5.2 Cumulative Termination Rates for Aggregate  









Myopic Perceived B/C Rule  5%  100%  3.09 
Myopic Adaptive Expectations B/C 
Rule  5% 56% 4.23 
Myopic Extrapolative Expectations 
B/C Rules  
With $0 threshold 
5% 97% 4.34 
With $1,000 threshold  1%  87%  4.3 
With $5,000 threshold  0%  20%  3.25 
With $10,000 threshold  0%  0%  N/A 
Relative Position Decision Rules 
With $1,000 threshold  0% 100%  1.19 
With $5,000 threshold  0%  71%  2.22 
With $10,000 threshold  0%  2%  1.97 
 114   The cumulative termination rates in the table show significantly different rates 
between decision rules, and between threshold levels within a decision rule category. 
The Perceived B/C rule, Extrapolative Expectations B/C ($0) rule, and Relative 
Position ($1,000) rule have the highest cumulative termination rates. This seems to 
suggest that a $0 to $1,000 threshold is not large enough to prevent terminations. An 
interesting exception is the Adaptive Expectations B/C rule, which uses an implicit 
threshold of $0. The threshold levels for each of these decision rules play a significant 
role in determining termination. A $10,000 threshold seems to be the upward bound 
for both Extrapolative Expectations B/C rule and for the Relative Position B/C rule as 
almost no farmers termination participation. Threshold values between $0 and $10,000 
seem to be in sensitive to changes in policy and change significantly in later policy 
analyses.  
 
Organic Matter Effect 
A significant factor driving the behavior of the decision-making model is the 
organic matter effect of continuous cover cropping on corn silage yields. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on these effects is exceedingly limited. The base 
model selected for this thesis uses a linearized version of a study conducted by Kuo 
and Jellum (See Chapter Four). Figure 5.6 illustrates the key variables of Actual Net 
Revenue, Adaptive Expected Net Revenue, and Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue 
under the actual, rather than linear yield relationship analyzed previously. This 
analysis is also illustrative of other impacts due to variations in crop and livestock 
production systems that are not explicitly modeled. 
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Adaptive Expected Net Revenue : base actual organic lars/year dol 2222222
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Figure 5.6 Actual, Adaptive Expected, and Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue 
Using the Actual Organic Matter Effect of Continuous Cover Crops 
Using the actual organic matter effect introduces much more variability into 
Actual Net Revenue. In this case, Actual Net Revenue is below zero in the first, 
second, and seventh year. Both Adaptive and Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue lag 
changes in Actual Net Revenue with Extrapolative Net Revenue characteristically 
overshooting the maximum and minimum points.  
By assuming varying discount rates and perfect information the actual organic 
matter effect can be compared to the net present value of the linearized effect. Under 
the actual organic effect a producer will realize $48,930 versus $53,353 total revenue 
under the linearized effect after ten years with a ten percent discount rate, $74,734 
versus $81,540 with a five percent discount rate, and $114,551 versus $125,382 with 
no discounting. Under each of these scenarios, a producer would choose to participate 
 116   in the CSP contract because of an expected positive return at the end of the ten-year 
contract. However, because of differences in the magnitude and timing of revenue 
received, the gains would be somewhat less under the actual organic effect than under 
the linear effect. Figure 5.7 shows the cumulative participation rates for the select 





















"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : base run 11111
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : actual organic effect 2222
"Relative Position Rule ($5,000)" : base run 333333
"Relative Position Rule ($5,000)" : actual organic effect 44444
Figure 5.7 Cumulative Participating Rates for Aggregate Decision Makers 
For Extrapolative Expectation ($1,000) And Relative Position ($5,000) Decision 
Rules Under Actual And Linear Organic Effect 
 
 117   The cumulative participation rates shown in Figure 5.7 show differing effects 
of assuming an actual organic matter effect compared to a linear effect. As shown in 
the figure, cumulative participation under the Extrapolative Expectations ($1,000) 
decision rule is significantly higher under the actual organic matter effect, whereas the 
participation for the Relative Position ($5,000) is somewhat lower. Thus, the impact of 
the actual organic matter effect (or variations in the effect more generally) differs in 
direction and magnitude under different decision rules.  
Table 5.3 shows the initial participation and cumulative termination rates for 
each of the decision rules and compares them to the linear organic matter effect 
assumed in the base simulation of the model. Notably, initial participation rates are 
higher under the actual organic effect because net revenue in year one is higher. 
Additionally, the actual organic matter effect significantly decreases terminations, or 
conversely increases participation, under the myopic perceived, adaptive, and 
extrapolative expected decision rules.  The opposite effect however is seen under the 
relative position decision rules, which increase termination rates. Causes of this 
behavior can be tracked to increased variability between perceptions and expectations 
under the actual organic matter effect. It is clear from the comparison of cumulative 
termination rates between the linear and actual organic effect that the assumptions 
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Table 5.3 Cumulative Termination Rates: Actual Versus Linear Organic Effect 












Myopic Perceived B/C Rule  0%  -5%  81%  -19% 
Myopic Adaptive Expectations 
B/C Rule  0% -5%  33%  -23% 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rules  
•  With $0 threshold 
0% -5%  65%  -32% 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% -1%  56%  -31% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0 9%  -11% 
•  With $10,000 threshold  0% 0 0% 0% 
Relative Position Decision 
Rules 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% 0  100%  0% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0  80%  +9% 
•  With $10,000 threshold  0% 0 6%  +4% 
 
Effect of CSP Contracts Design 
  The decision-making model makes four assumptions concerning the design 
and implementation of the CSP contract. These assumptions are that the producer 
participates at Tier III, enrolls 400 acres of cover crops annually, enrolls 30 acres of 
riparian buffer annually, and the enhancement payments are made on a flat rather than 
declining payment schedule. Of these assumptions, the tier level and the acres enrolled 
as a riparian buffer were tested and result in no changes in the dynamic behavior of the 
model. However, both assumptions affect the initial profitability of a CSP contract. 
Fewer acres in a riparian buffer and a shifting to a tier two contract would 
 119   substantially decrease the actual net revenue received from the CSP contract. 
However, aside from a downward shift for perceived and expected revenue, there is no 
other effect. 
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Figure 5.8 Changing Dynamics of Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue Due to 
Changes in Cover Crop Acreage 
 
In contrast, the number of acres enrolled in cover crops does have a substantial 
effect on the dynamic behavior of the net revenue variables in the model. An increase 
in cover crop acreage significantly increases the fluctuation in expectations, that is, it 
deepens the trough and raises the peak. Although more cover crop acreage eventually 
leads to greater cumulative net revenue, in the short term, decreased corn silage yields 
 120   create the conditions for higher termination rates under all myopic decision rules. 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the increased variability of Extrapolated Expected Net Revenue 
when cover crop acreage is increased and decreased by one hundred acres.  
The assumption of a flat versus declining payment schedule also significantly 
affects the dynamics of the decision-making model. As stated in Chapter Two, the 
declining payment schedule for enhancement payments was implemented for the 2005 
sign-up. It states that participants must take a variable payment rate for all 
enhancements. This rate begins at 150% of the enhancement payment in year one, then 
decreases each year to 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, and 0% respectively, for the 
remainder of the contract (NRCS, FY2005 CSP Sign-Up Announcement, 2005). The 
rationale for this variable payment rate, cited by NRCS, is to provide capacity to add 
additional enhancements in the out-years and to encourage participants to make 
continuous improvements to their operation by adding additional enhancements 
throughout the life of the contract. An unsaid, but often acknowledged factor in the 
declining payment scheme was federal budget constraints (See Chapter Three). 
A comparison of Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue under both scenarios is 
shown in Figure 5.12. Also displayed is the Actual Net Revenue under the declining 
payment scenario.  
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Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue : declining payment ars/year doll 22
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Figure 5.9 Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue Under Declining  
Versus Flat Payment Schedules 
Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue under the declining payment schedule 
scenario starts at a higher level of revenue, however expectations decline even more 
rapidly because Actual Net Revenue declines in the second year rather than increasing. 
This second year decline is creates a situation where expectations fall even more 
quickly than under a flat payment schedule. In addition, cumulative revenue is lower 
under the declining payment schedule, which not surprising since one of its purposes 
was to reduce government expenditures. The effect of the declining payment schedule 
would be to increase the initial sign-up rate by enhancing the attractiveness of CSP 
 122   contracts. However, perceptions and expectations of net revenue quickly fall under a 
declining payment rate scenario and drop below those in the flat payment schedule.  
An alternative analysis using aggregated decision-makers can provide a more 
robust policy analysis for better understanding the effect of the declining payment rate 
on termination decisions. Using the same simulation approach of 100 aggregated 
farmers possessing randomly selected behavioral characteristics, Figure 5.10 and 
Table 5.4 indicate the percentage of farmers not signing-up for CSP and the 
cumulative termination rate over the entire 10-year contract. Additionally, this is 
contrasted with the same calculations made for farmers using a flat payment schedule 
for enhancement payments. 
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Figure 5.10 Cumulative Participation Rates For Aggregate Farmers For Select 














"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : base run 11111
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : declining payments 2222
"Relative Position Rule ($5,000)" : base run 333333
"Relative Position Rule ($5,000)" : declining payments 44444
 124     This aggregate participation analysis of the Extrapolative Expectations 
($1,000) decision rule and the Relative Position ($5,000) decision rule show that the 
declining payment schedule produces significantly higher terminations under both 
scenarios. Table 5.4 shows the initial participation rates and cumulative termination 
rates for all decision rules and compares them to the flat payment schedule assumed in 
the base simulation run. Thus, the adjustments to the payment schedule made for the 
2005 sign-ups are likely to increase contract termination rates over what they would 
have been if the flat payment schedule used in 2004 were to be continued. 
 











Myopic Perceived B/C Rule  0%  -5%  90%  -10% 
Myopic Adaptive Expectations 
B/C Rule  0% -5%  48% -6% 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rules  
•  With $0 threshold 
0% -5%  100%  +3% 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% -1%  94% +7% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0  28%  +8% 
•  With $10,000 threshold  0% 0 0% 0% 
Relative Position Decision 
Rules 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% 0  100%  0% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0  76%  +5% 




 125   Payment Rate Policy Analysis 
A more instructive policy analysis of the termination decision needs to address 
alternatives for decreasing the rate at which producers terminate participation in CSP. 
Any policy “fix” should be robust over variations in behavioral characteristics and for 
multiple decision rules. For example, decreasing the Biophysical Information 
Uncertainty parameter, holding all other parameters constant, will decrease program 
termination under relative positions decision rules, however producers using the 
myopic cost benefit rules would continue to terminate and, fewer producers would 
sign-up. In addition, producers would increasingly not sign up for the program in the 
first place under myopic decision rules. Thus, alternative formulations for policy 
“fixes” must be explored. 
An administratively realistic approach would be to address the issue of 
payment levels. For example, a straightforward, but costly, policy of increasing the 
payment rate for cover crops from $30 per acre to $50 per acre would satisfy all of the 
myopic cost benefit analysis decision rules by substantially raising net revenue. In this 
case, the payment rates are increased so that even with the rapid downturn of 
expectations, a farmer would still not expect to take a loss or reach negative revenue in 
any given year. This policy fix however, still allows farmers who use a relative 
position decision rule to drop out at the same time as with a lower payment rate for 
cover crops. Thus, simply increasing payments rates may be an ineffective and costly 
mechanism for lowering termination rates, despite its intuitive appeal. 
A more robust policy solution would be to vary payment rates to compensate 
for the model-predicted downturn in farmer perceptions and expectations. Under this 
policy change, dynamic enhancement payment policy would provide a changing 
amount of money to farmers based on predicted average changes in crop yields based 
on the organic matter effect of cover crop practices. This, of course, is greatly limited 
 126   by the difficulty of “knowing” the heterogeneous nature of the organic effect on 
additional corn silage yields. This information would be very difficult to customize to 
each individual producer. However, such fine-tuning of payment rates might be 
possible on a watershed basis depending on the quality of soil information and the 
predictive value of corn yield models. 
In the case of cover crops, the payments would start at a higher level in the first 
two years to ensure that farmers are signing up for the program based on a correct cost 
benefit analysis of the program. Systemic evaluation of a number of dynamic payment 
schedules indicated that there are a variety of possible schedules that can increase 
initial participation rates and decrease termination rates. (A cost-minimizing payment 
schedule that also minimizes terminations could be derived, but was not undertaken 
for this analysis.) One such payment schedule would start enhancement payments high 
in the first year at $18,000 rather than $12,000, and then balloon payments to $27,000 
rather than $18,000 in the second year in order to compensate for the loss in yields. 
Payment rates would then slowly decrease to $0 in year six and beyond as yields 
return to normal and subsequently higher than normal levels. Thus, one reasonable 
dynamic payment rate scenario for the cover crop enhancement would look like the 
following schedule from year one through year ten: 150%, 225%, 150%, 100%, 50%, 
0%, 0%, 0%, 0%, 0%.  
Figure 5.11 shows the Actual Net Revenue and Extrapolative Expected Net 
Revenue for both the base simulation run and for a simulation assuming the dynamic 
payment described above. As illustrated, the significant increase of cover crop 
enhancement payments in year two keep expectations high until the positive yield 
effect becomes a significant positive influence on Actual Net Revenue. Also 
noteworthy is the cost savings achieved by the government illustrated by the 
difference between the base simulation and dynamic payment Actual Net Revenue in 
 127   years six through ten. This dynamic payment schedule for the cover crop enhancement 
changes government spending from $120,000 to $81,000, in effect saving $39,000 
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Figure 5.11 Actual and Extrapolative Expected Net Revenue  
Under Dynamic Enhancement Payments 
 
The dynamic enhancement payments increase participation through higher 
initial sign-ups and fewer terminations. The 50% increase in payments in year one 
provides a greater incentive for farmers to sign up in the first place for CSP. The 
significant increase in year two maintains perceived and expected revenue at a high 
level which prevents myopic benefit cost decision makers from dropping out, as well 
as increasing the likelihood that relative decision makers stay above their threshold 
 128   value. Figure 5.12 shows the effect of the dynamic payment rate on an aggregate 
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"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule" : dynamic payments 222
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($1,000)" : dynamic payments 33
"Extrapolative Expectations B/C Rule ($5,000)" : dynamic payments 444
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Figure 5.12 Cumulative Participation Rates for Aggregate Farmers Under Select 
Decision Rules Under Dynamic Enhancement Payments 
 
As seen in Figure 5.12 the Myopic Perceived, Adaptive, and Extrapolative 
Expected Revenue all have a termination rate of zero under the dynamic enhancement 
payment schedule. The relative position decision rules continue to show termination 
 129   decisions, but fewer than under the flat payment rate scenario as is shown in Table 5.5, 
except when the threshold is $1,000 which continues to terminate at a rate of 100%.  
 











Myopic Perceived B/C Rule  0%  -5%  0%  -100% 
Myopic Adaptive Expectations 
B/C Rule  0% -5% 0% -56% 
Myopic Extrapolative 
Expectations B/C Rules  
•  With $0 threshold 
0% -5% 0% -97% 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% -1% 0% -87% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0 0%  -20% 
•  With $10,000 threshold  0% 0 0% 0% 
Relative Position Decision 
Rules 
•  With $1,000 threshold  0% 0  100%  0% 
•  With $5,000 threshold  0% 0  19%  -52% 
•  With $10,000 threshold  0% 0 0%  -2% 
 
This policy remedies the situation faced by myopic decision makers but does 
not completely solve the problem of terminations by relative position decision-makers 
with relatively low thresholds. Thus, it is also necessary to find ways to reduce the 
Biophysical Information Uncertainty for farmers who make decisions based on their 
perceived versus actual relative financial positions. In this specific case, education 
concerning the dynamic nutrient effects of cover crops would decrease the farmer’s 
initial estimation error. Because this variable is actually a proxy for informed and 
 130   knowledgeable farmers, this could require educational programs through various 
governmental or quasi-governmental agencies. 
 
Conclusion 
  Chapter Five provides graphical and numerical results of several simulations of 
this CSP decision-making model. In this simulation model of a representative 
northeastern dairy farm, the riparian buffer enhancement alone does not create the 
conditions that would allow for termination. This result is due to the lack of 
unexpected changes in net revenue coming from implementation of a riparian buffer. 
In contrast, the cover crop enhancement has a biophysical effect on the corn yields 
over the life of the CSP contract. If this effect is unexpected, which implies that the 
farmer has an initial estimation error, then termination of the CSP contract becomes 
possible. Furthermore, using representative decision makers, Chapter Five explores 
the behavioral characteristics of decision making that make this termination decision 
more or less likely. 
Additionally, 100 aggregated decision-makers with randomly selected 
behavioral characteristics are used to provide a more robust analysis of policy and 
model assumptions. Although the total number of possible combinations of behavioral 
characteristics and policy scenarios is prohibitively high to simulate each, this analysis 
captures the general effects of each assumption and policy change. In particular, the 
threshold levels for each decision rule are a significant determinant of termination 
time and for cumulative termination rates. Additionally, the use of actual versus linear 
organic matter effect on corn yields due to continuous cover cropping had a significant 
effect on termination rates, although the direction of this effect differs depending on 
which decision rule is used. 
 131   A key policy implication is that the declining payment schedule for 
enhancement practices results in a higher sign-up rate but also a higher termination 
rate for many of the decision rules. A prescriptive policy change, which modifies the 
payment schedule, offsets declining perceptions and expectations of net revenue in 
situations where there is significant initial estimation error. This dynamic 
enhancement payment schedule increases participation at sign-up, eliminates 
termination for all but the relative position decision rules (although it reduces their 
rates of termination), and provides the opportunity to reduce government expenditures 
on the program. 
 
 
 132   CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overview and Summary 
The Conservation Security Program was authorized by Congress in the 2002 
Farm Bill and is hailed by many observers as the first true “green payments” program 
for working lands in the United States. Federal conservation programs are voluntary 
and often involve a multiyear commitment to install and operate conservation 
practices. These commitments typically contain few restrictions on terminating 
participation. Anecdotal evidence and previous analysis of similar agri-environmental 
programs for working lands shows that premature termination of contracts is a 
persistent issue. This type of producer behavior is not easily explained using the 
standard assumptions of neoclassical economics, that is, profit-maximization under 
perfect information and perfect rationality. Rather, this unexpected termination 
behavior demonstrates the need for analyses that take into account biophysical 
complexities and alternative decision-making assumptions. An alternative set of 
behavioral assumptions is explored in this research that employ descriptive rather than 
normative participation decision rules.  
Significant research efforts are focused on modeling the integrated biophysical 
and economic aspects of conservation programs (See Chapter Three). However, 
review of the accumulated research shows that there is far less focus on the complex 
processes of participation decisions in these programs. This research addresses that 
concern with the objective of exploring the impact of alternative behavioral 
assumptions and dynamic biophysical effects of conservation practices on the 
participation and termination decisions of New York dairy producers. A simulation 
model was constructed to represent the effects of selected biophysical processes on 
 133   farm profitability, producers’ ability to gather and utilize this information, and finally 
their decisions to participate in the program. The results of this model provide insights 




The results of the dynamic participation decision model indicate that premature 
termination of CSP contracts is possible and even probable under certain conditions. 
These conditions include the complex biophysical effects of conservation practices, 
behavioral characteristics of decision makers, and payment schedules of the 
Conservation Security Program. These are all significant factors affecting if and when 
farmers decide to terminate a CSP contract. 
Termination decisions, in this model, are posited to be a result of learning 
processes, that is, the farmer’s realization of new information concerning the 
profitability, or net revenue from participating in the Conservation Security Program. 
Further, this learning only occurs under specific circumstances, namely when 
conservation practices have complex biophysical impacts on crop yields. This study, 
centered on a single representative dairy farm in western New York, assumes, based 
on selected empirical evidence (Kuo and Jellum, 2000), that one of the prescribed 
conservation practices, continuous cover cropping, can have a deleterious effect on 
corn yields during the first few years of implementation. Specifically, cereal rye, when 
used as a cover crop, will absorb nutrients early in the first few years, which decreases 
yields. However, this effect is counterbalanced in later years by increasing organic 
matter, which increases corn yields. Nonetheless, if unexpected, this biophysical effect 
could substantially change a farmer’s realized net revenue after deciding to participate 
 134   in a CSP contract. It is this biophysical effect that is the impetus for learning 
processes. 
A useful illustration of this learning phenomenon is seen in a comparison of 
both enhancement practices—riparian buffers and cover crops—as simulated in this 
model. As discussed in Chapter Four, two additional enhancement practices, the 
wildlife habitat and conservation crop rotation, are not explicitly simulated in this 
model. It is shown that a producer entering into a CSP contract with only a riparian 
buffer enhancement will not experience a change in yields, and hence net revenue, due 
biophysical effects. In contrast however, the cover crop enhancement has a 
biophysical effect on corn yields over the life of the CSP contract. If the decision 
maker is unaware of this yield effect, that is, there is an initial estimation error, then it 
is possible that the farmer begins participation in a CSP contract expecting a higher 
level of net revenue than will actually occur. A farmer’s perceptions and expectations 
of net revenue begin to fall immediately after sign-up. The subsequent “learning” 
process in which the farmer perceives and comes to expect a lower level of net 
revenue might trigger a termination decision depending on the decision rule that is 
used by the farmer. Furthermore, a farmer’s expectations of net revenue, if the farmer 
uses an extrapolative expectation formation process, are likely to overshoot the actual 
net revenue. This phenomenon of overshooting can exacerbate the conditions under 
which termination decisions are made. 
The behavioral characteristics of the decision maker play a significant role in 
shaping the producer’s learning process and the formation of expectations of net 
revenue from the CSP contract. Most important is the magnitude of the farmer’s initial 
estimation error. A greater initial error estimating the biophysical effects of 
conservation practices on corn yields indicates a larger the gap between actual net 
revenue and expected net revenue. This results in greater learning over a shorter 
 135   amount of time. If the farmer uses a relative position decision rule that compares the 
current perceived revenue with the current expected revenue, then a larger initial 
estimation error could increase termination decisions.  
Three additional significant decision making characteristics modeled in this 
study assume that farmers have delays in updating their perceptions and expectations 
of net revenue, and thus determine a farmer’s adjustment times for perceiving new 
information and the incorporation of that learning into new expectations about net 
revenue. These adjustment times for perceiving, forming expectations, and forming 
trends also have a significant effect on the timing of a termination decision. The 
expectation formation process can further encourage farmers to terminate their CSP 
contracts by creating greater amounts of volatility in expectations. In addition, these 
adjustment times can create a greater or lesser magnitude of overshooting when 
extrapolative expectations are of concern. 
The type of decision rule used by the farmer is also of significance when 
determining if or when a farmer might terminate participation in CSP. This analysis 
examined ten alternative decision rules. The first decision rule was a benefit-cost rule 
using a net present value calculation that assumes perfect rationality and perfect 
information. Under this decision rule, 100% of farmers entered into a CSP contract 
and continued to participate without termination. The analysis also tested decision 
rules that only incorporated a farmer’s perceived net revenue or adaptive expected net 
revenue. Both of these decision rules assumed that farmers made myopic benefit cost 
decisions, that is, the farmers made decisions based on information that was only 
available to them at the time of the decision. If net revenue was above $0, then the 
farmer continued participation, if below, then the farmer terminated participation. In 
all cases, cumulative termination rates for farmers using an adaptive expectations 
decision rule were lower than for farmers using a perceptions decision rule. This effect 
 136   was a result of most farmers’ adaptive expectations of revenue being less volatile than 
their perceptions of revenue. 
The extrapolative expectations decision rule is an intuitively more realistic 
formulation of a decision rule for farmers. This decision rule, like the two mentioned 
above, used a myopic benefit-cost rule. However, the extrapolative expectations 
decision rule was tested at several thresholds, that is, $0, $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000. 
These thresholds provided leeway or tolerance for extrapolative expectations to drop 
below zero, and represent a farmer’s non-monetary reasons for participating in CSP, 
such as a conservation or stewardship ethic. These threshold values were significant in 
determining when and if farmers would terminate participation, generating 97%, 87%, 
20%, and 0% cumulative participation rates respectively. 
Relative position decision rules assume that farmers make participation 
decisions based on the difference between what net revenue is currently perceived and 
the net revenue that is expected. Farmers using these decision rules are particularly 
sensitive to fluctuations in changing net revenue. Thus, increased volatility in actual 
net revenue, either from using the actual observed organic matter effect of continuous 
cover cropping, or by introducing price and yield variation, creates higher levels of 
termination for these farmers. Threshold values for relative position decision rules are 
also of significance. The relative position threshold values were $1,000, $5,000, and 
$10,000, and had cumulative termination rates of 100%, 71%, and 2%, respectively.                               
Thus, a farmer’s participation decision rule, particularly the threshold value for 
that decision rule, are highly significant for determining when and if the farmer will 
terminate participation in the CSP contract. Although this simulation model 
demonstrates termination behavior under several different circumstances and under 
several decision rules, the exact nature and timing of these terminations are difficult to 
predict given high variability concerning actual biophysical processes, and uncertainty 




This analysis has several implications for pragmatic policy solutions to the 
problem of premature termination of CSP contracts. Policy makers who design 
incentive structures, that is, payment schedules and rates, for conservation programs, 
should look beyond typical cost/benefit models of decision-making. Assuming rational 
economic behavior, perfect information, and the use of a net present value calculation 
as a decision rule, is likely to lead to inefficient policy design. Taking into account 
alternative decision-making behavior, this research recommends an alternative 
payment schedule to what was implemented in the 2005 CSP sign-up. In addition, 
decreasing the initial estimation error of agricultural producers that is represented by 
the biophysical information uncertainty parameter in the simulation model can reduce 
termination rates for some types of decision makers. 
From a policy design perspective, schedules of payment rates can be an 
important leverage to either increase or decrease termination rates of program 
participants. An important example is the significantly different termination rates 
resulting from the current use of declining payment schedule for enhancements in CSP 
and the proposed dynamic payment rate (see Chapter Five).  
The declining enhancement payment schedule increases initial sign-up rates 
but significantly decreases final participation rates. All decision rules, except for those 
incorporating adaptive expectations and perceptions, show increased contract 
termination rates compared to a flat payment schedule. However, if the policy 
objective of implementing the declining payment schedule is simply to decrease 
government expenditures, then it has been successful, because the declining payment 
 138   schedule decreases cumulative farm-level revenue over the ten-year contract. 
  A more intriguing policy option, however, is one that decreases government 
expenditure and decreases cumulative termination rates at the same time. 
Correspondingly, a more robust policy would be to vary the payment rates to 
compensate for the expected downturn in farmer perceptions and expectations. Given 
the specific biophysical effects of cover crops, dynamic payments would start at a 
higher level in early years to ensure that farmers are signing up for the program based 
on a correct cost benefit analysis of the program. Payments would begin to decline in 
later years as the increased revenue from corn yields increase total revenue.  These 
dynamic payment rate schedules must be designed to compensate for dramatic 
changes in farmers’ perceived and expected revenue for specific enhancement 
practices. 
Evaluation of several dynamic payment schedules indicated that there are a 
variety of possible schedules that can increase initial sign-up rates, decrease 
termination rates, and decrease government expenditures simultaneously. The 
simulated dynamic payment schedule, described in Chapter Five, maintains 
participation rates at 100% for all but the relative position decision rules with $1,000 
and $5,000 thresholds. Additionally, the dynamic payment rates increase the initial 
sign-up to 100% for all decision rules. Finally, the dynamic payment rate significantly 
decreases government spending by 33% over the ten-year contract. This policy “fix” is 
robust over variations in behavioral characteristics and for multiple decision rules. 
However, a significant limitation of the dynamic payment schedule is the high 
level of information needed to construct such as payment. For example, policy 
designers must be able to identify the unique yield effects of each conservation 
practice on each producer’s agricultural operation. In this way, payment rates can be 
designed to compensate for the change in revenue. This information requirement is 
 139   high and but could be developed by implementing more sophisticated bio-economic 
soil and crop models. 
  Additional bio-economic soil and crop models, coupled with aggressive 
educational campaigns, can also be a useful mechanism for reducing the initial 
estimation error of producers regarding the biophysical effects of conservation 
practices. Improving the breadth and depth of education and technical assistance will 
also have the effect of shifting farmers’ decision rules from myopic expectations to 
ones more closely aligned with net present value calculations. Both of these 
dimensions are good reasons to improve and increase the educational components of 
conservation programs. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although this research is an initial exploration of hypotheses regarding 
termination decisions, there are numerous opportunities for future researchers to assess 
its underlying assumptions and extend its breadth and depth. It is important to 
distinguish, however, between limitations that prevent this research from producing 
realistic point predictions of termination rates and times and limitations that reduce the 
validity of the policy implications. Important limitations of this research are described 
below. These include: the lack of a reference data set for CSP contract terminations, 
limited representation of the biophysical effects of cover crops, inadequate 
differentiation between continuous and discrete timing of financial and biophysical 
events, uncertain behavioral characteristics of decision makers, and finally the narrow 
scope of the representative farm type and conservation practices modeled. Each of 
these shortcomings are elaborated on below. 
First, this research did not have access to a reference data set for available for 
comparison and verification of results. Ideally, termination rates for current CSP 
 140   contracts would be available to compare aggregate rates. Termination rates for specific 
practices or enhancements such as the cover crop enhancement would have allowed a 
direct comparison and of this model to actual data. Assuming that this model uses a 
correct formulation of the biophysical organic matter effect for cover crops, 
comparison of termination data would allow better specification of behavioral decision 
making characteristics and decision rules for participating producers. Thus, the model 
could provide a more general test of the underlying assumptions about the decision 
rules. 
The collection, analysis, and dissemination of conservation contract 
terminations could be a significant contribution to further research into termination 
decisions. By combining aggregate contract termination data with additional farm-
level economic and biophysical characteristics, results of this research could be 
evaluated. More importantly, the uncertain behavioral characteristics of decision 
makers, which are assessed with sensitivity analysis in this research, could be 
specifically calibrated with empirical data. 
Second, the biophysical effect of continuous cover cropping plays a critical 
role in the termination decision, regardless of behavioral assumptions or decision 
rules. This model uses a study of cereal rye on corn production in the Northwestern 
United States, which has a very different agronomic environment compared to that 
faced by New York farmers. It is conceivable that yield response could differ enough 
between the two regions to dramatically influence the results reported here. 
Additionally, this model assumes that farmers are not aware of the organic matter 
effect of cover cropping and thus do not proactively counter the nutrient depletion 
effect of cover crops with added fertilizer in the first few years. Studies of actual usage 
and practices regarding cover crops in the New York would significantly strengthen 
the credibility of the cover crop organic matter effect and its consequences for 
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critical role of the organic matter effect upon termination rates, this effect needs to be 
modeled more appropriately for the New York dairy farm environment.  
There is tremendous opportunity for the application of simulation models to 
the bio-economic effects of conservation practices. Integrated models, developed from 
a pragmatic policy design perspective, can be used educate practitioners and policy 
makers and ultimately be used to better design agri-environmental programs. There 
are several examples of integrated bio-economic modeling referenced in Chapter 
Three. These studies need to be expanded to a greater set of conservation practices and 
replicated for multiple regions of the country. The systematic development of 
integrated bio-economic models on a watershed basis could be successfully 
coordinated with current policy design efforts ongoing at the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service.  
Third, this model does not adequately distinguish between continuous and 
discrete timing of financial and biophysical events. Due to the mathematical 
formulation of this simulation model, in particular the use of differential equations to 
model perceptions and expectations of revenue, all inputs and calculations are based 
on continuous rather than discrete time periods. For example, CSP enhancement 
payments are modeled as being paid out to the farmer continuously over annual 
periods. In reality, however, a farmer would receive the enhancement payment once 
annually. This is true for all CSP payments, revenue received from crops, and costs of 
implementing the CSP contract. This modeling assumption has the most impact on 
events that increase or decline over time, for example the change in yields due to 
biophysical effect of cover crops and the declining enhancement payments. In these 
situations, the decline is modeled as a continuous linear function rather than a stepwise 
function at yearly intervals. In reality, all payments, revenue, and costs, would actually 
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actual, perceived, and expected net revenue. Although these increased variations 
would not change the general tendencies and behaviors described in Chapter Five, it is 
possible that the timing and rate of terminations could be significantly affected if 
decision rules were not properly adjusted to reflect the discrete nature of financial 
events. 
Fourth, uncertainty about which behavioral assumptions are appropriate 
lessens confidence in the model predictions. However, sensitivity analysis indicates 
that the policy conclusions, in particular, are robust across multiple values for 
behavioral characteristics and across decision rules. Experimental economics has 
made significant advances in behavioral decision making in the past thirty years. The 
construction of this dynamic participation decision model should be confirmed with 
well-developed experimental economics laboratory techniques and should examine the 
assumptions and parameters of initial estimation error, the adjustment times for 
forming perceptions and expectations, and the various decision rules that are or could 
have been used to represent farmers termination decisions. 
Simulation models that move away from net present value calculations and 
assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect information can provide insights that are 
useful for pragmatic policy analysis. Added practicality comes at the cost, however, of 
highly uncertain decision rules. Nine alternative decision rules were tested in this 
analysis. At present, little is known about the proportion of farmers who use these 
rules, or if there are other rules which should be examined.  If the general approach to 
modeling decision making in this research is appropriate, it is in principle possible to 
find combinations of dynamic payment schedules and educational efforts to modify 
the value of the biophysical information uncertainty that minimize termination rates 
for given aggregate government expenditures, regardless of the distribution of farmer 
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policy-makers, more research needs to be done in order to better understand the 
decision rules employed by individual farmers in a world where error, time lags, and 
learning are necessary processes. In particular, the specification of learning as 
additional information perceived by a decision maker after an initial estimation error 
could be validated using techniques of experimental economics and behavioral 
decision theory. The modeling conventions of system dynamics, which specify 
expectations as lagging perceptions, are also fertile ground for further research in the 
fields of experimental and behavioral economics. 
Lastly, the narrow scope of the representative farm type and conservation 
practices modeled limits the ability of the results to be generalized beyond the narrow 
confines of a New York Dairy Farm and for a limited number of conservation 
practices. The Conservation Security Program in applicable to a diverse range of 
agricultural systems including cropland, pasture, and rangeland in watersheds in every 
state of the United States. The range and number of enhancement practices available 
are determined individually by states, but range into the hundreds. Thus, the 
biophysical effects of conservation practices and resulting termination behavior should 
be examined for a much broader range of conservation practices across a diverse set of 
agronomic environments. Extensive research into these important biophysical effects 
and participation behaviors will allow more robust policy analysis and ultimately, 
more sound policy design for conservation programs in the future. 
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 MODEL PARAMETERS 
 
This appendix provides a complete list of parameters and exogenous inputs used in the 




Biophysical Estimation Error= 1.0, .75, .50 for “limited,” “average,” and “smart” 
representative farmers respectively.           
  Dimensionless 
 
BIU is variable underlying the assumption that farmer does not have perfect 
information of the biophysical processes of cover crops or other conservation 
practices. This parameter has no available data associated with it and will need 
extensive sensitivity testing. 
 
Corn  Silage  Price=  20         dollars/tn 
 
Corn silage can be valued in many different experts, Edwards suggests using a 
combination of relative corn grain prices, hay prices, and substitute feed costs. 
Others knowledgeable about the industry use a rule-of-thumb, which states that 
the price of corn silage is seven times the price of corn. 
Source: Personal Interview, William Joslin, August 16, 2005.  
 
 
Cover Crop Payment Rate= 30           dollars/acre/year 
 
Cover Crop payment rate is per acre/year amount of money assumed to be paid 
through the CSP for implementing Cover Crops in the Niagara Watershed. 




 145    
 
Cover  Crop  Cost  Rate=13.5       dollars/year/acre 
 
NY NRCS Field Office Technical Guide, ERS EQIP Northern Crescent Cost 
Estimates 
 
Discount  Rate=  0,  0.05,  0.1       Dimensionless 
 
Decision-maker’s internal discount rate as used in net present value 
calculation. This is a commonly used discount rate for relatively short-term 
decision-making. 
Source: Kay, et al, 2004. 
 
Enrolled  Riparian  Buffer  Acreage=  30       acre 
 
The total acreage needed to create a 100-ft riparian corridor on a 1000-acre 
representative farm with a straight watercourse running through it. 
 
Existing Practice Payment= 0.25           Dimensionless 
 
25% of the stewardship rate is the standard rate for all CSP contracts. 
Source: NRCS FY2005 Sign-Up Announcement, 2005. 
 
Farmland  rental  rate=  40         dollars/acre/year 
 
Each acre of farmland in a given watershed is given a base rental rate from 
which the base payments are derived. The $40 dollar payment rate is a 
combination of many factors ultimately determined by NRCS staff. 
Source: NRCS website-2005, 
http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/ CSP/niagarawatershed 
 
Riparian Buffer Cost Rate = 65          dollars/acre/year 
 
 146   The opportunity cost (average rental rate) for an acre of productive agricultural 
land in northwest NY state. Source: Knoblauch, et al. 2003. 
 
 
Riparian Buffer Payment Rate= 100          dollars/acre/year 
 




T i e r   L e v e l =   3          Dimensionless  
 
Participants are placed in a Tier at the start of their enrollment in CSP. The tier 
is determined by previous environmental performance and willingness to take 
on at least two additional conservation practices on the entire farm. 
Source: NRCS FY2005 Sign-Up Announcement, 2005. 
 
Time to Form Expectations= 1, 2, for “sophisticated” and “naïve” representative 
farmers  respectively.             year  
 
The parameter is the adjustment time for a farmer to form an expectation based 
on Perceived Net Revenue. This parameter has no available data associated 
with it and will need extensive sensitivity testing. 
 
Time to Perceive= 1, 2, “sophisticated” and “naïve” representative farmers 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .            year 
This parameter represents the adjustment time for a farmer to perceive 
information regarding the actual Net Revenue from CSP Contract. This 
parameter has no available data associated with it and will need extensive 
sensitivity testing. 
 
Time to Perceive Trend= 2, 3, for “sophisticated” and “naïve” representative farmers 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .            year  
 
The average adjustment time needed for a farmer to recognize a trend in the 
 147   Perceived Net Revenue. This parameter has no available data associated with it 
and will need extensive sensitivity testing. 
 
Total  Enrolled  Acres=  1100           acre 
 
The representative NY Dairy Farm is assumed to have 1000 eligible acres of 
cropland. The average dairy farm responding to the Dairy Farm Business 
Summary in the Western and Central Plain Region was 1,088 acres. 
Source: Knoblauch, et al. 2005. 
 
Variable Rate Enhancement Payments Switch= 1       Dimensionless 
 
This is a binary switch for activating the variable rate payment plan. The base 
simulation assumes that the variable rate payment plan is activated. 
 
Enrolled  Cover  Crop  Acreage=300          acre 
 
This is the assumed total amount of corn acreage put under cover crops for the 
duration of the CSP contract. Approximates the average acreage devoted to 
cropland in Dairy Farm Business Summary in the Western and Central Plain 
Region. 
Source: Knoblauch, et al. 2003.  
 
Normal  Crop  Yield=  15          tn/acre 
 
This is the corn silage yield for the average dairy farm responding to the Dairy 
Farm Business Summary in the Western and Central Plain Region. 
Source: Knoblauch, et al. 2005. 
 
Simulation Control Parameters 
 
F I N A L   T I M E     =   1 0           year 
The final time for the simulation. 
 
I N I T I A L   T I M E     =   0           year 
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S A V E   P E R   =   T I M E   S T E P          year 
 
TIME  STEP    =  0.03125         year  
 
 
Model Exogenous Inputs 
 
Organic Matter EFFECT= 0.8074+RAMP(0.0555, 0, 10)     Dimensionless 
 
This is the linear estimated effect of continuous cover cropping on corn silage 
average yields. This input is equivalent to a linear equation with a .8074 
intercept and .0555 slope. 
Source: Kuo and Jellum, 2000. 
 
 




This input is the equivalent of imposing the variable rate enhancement 
payment plan. 
Source: NRCS FY2005 Sign-Up Announcement, 2005. 
 
 Tier Multiplier fn( [(0,0)-(4,0.2)],(0,0),(1,0.0125),(2,0.05),(3,0.1125)) Dimensionless 
 
This input is equivalent to the tier multiplier and tier reduction factor applied to 
the stewardship payments. 
Source: NRCS FY2005 Sign-Up Announcement, 2005. 
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 COST ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATION CROP ROTATION 
 
The conservation crop rotation conservation enhancement was examined 
separately from the cover crop and riparian buffer enhancements, which were 
simulated using the dynamic participation decision model described in Chapter Four. 
A separate analysis was conducted to better understand the complexities of changing 
crop rotations and the subsequent cost effects on a rebalanced ration for a New York 
dairy farm. After an initial benefit/cost analysis using Cornell’s Net Carbohydrate 
model, the conservation crop rotation enhancement was found to be too costly to be 
considered practicable for a NY dairy producer was thus left out of the dynamic 
simulation modeling. The description below describes the conservation crop rotation 
and the benefit/cost analysis associated with the representative dairy operation’s 
additional nutrient needs. 
  As defined by the Natural Resources Conservation Service, a conservation 
crop rotation is practice means growing various crops on the same piece of land in a 
planned sequence. This sequence may involve growing high residue producing crops 
such as corn or wheat in rotation with low residue producing crops such as vegetables 
or soybeans. The rotation may also involve growing forage crops in rotation with 
various field crops. Benefits include reduced runoff and erosion, increased organic 
matter, improved pest management, and improved wildlife habitat. The CSP 
enhancement payment is $2 per acre annually for implementing a conservation crop 
rotation. Specifically, the CSP contracts requires that a farmer use a minimum of three 
different crops in rotation and never grow the same crop two years in row on the same 
acreage (NRCS website 2005, 
http://www.ny.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/programs/CSP/niagarawatershed).  
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Business Summary (Knoblauch, et al., 2005), as well a interviews with state and 
federal employees familiar with the area, indicate that many dairy farmers of the size 
of the representative farm use a crop rotation of three years of corn silage followed by 
three or four years of alfalfa hay. The alfalfa is valuable as forage for feeding purposes 
but also as a legume to replace soil nitrogen levels.  
This analysis is an attempt to understand the effects of changing from a 
traditional CCCAAA crop rotation to a CSP subsidized CO/AAAA conservation crop 
rotation on a 900 acre NY dairy farm. The objective is to examine the financial impact 
of changing the supply of nutrients to a dairy farm, assuming that the ration will need 
to be revised. This analysis assumes the current crop rotation and ration and then 
formulates a new ration based on the supply of nutrients from a conservation crop 
rotation. Lastly, an analysis of the net change in cost is performed.  
The representative farm used for this analysis has 900 tillable acres, 450 cows, 
and 277 heifers. The traditional ration was calculated using Cornell’s Net 
Carbohydrate Model, which was used to balance a ration that used most of the grown 
alfalfa and corn silage while reaching the same level of average milk production seen 
in the Dairy Farm Business Summary. A ration was produced for lactating cows, dry 
cows, and heifers. The total nutrient needs were adjusted for feeding losses and then 
compared to the supply of available on the farm. The supply of nutrients was 
calculated using average yields from the DFBS and adjusted for harvest and storage 
losses. All losses adjustments were taken from Knoblauch and Milligan (1977). The 
ration was balanced so as to use all of the supplied corn silage and alfalfa, however an 
additional 574 tons of soybean meal and 724 tons of corn grain are needed in order to 
balance the rations.  
 151   The supply of nutrients was then calculated based on the yields from a 
conservation crop rotation. This rotation resulted in more alfalfa, oat silage, and 
significantly less corn silage. The ration was then reformulated to reflect these 
changes. The ration was again balanced so as to use most of the supplied corn silage 
and alfalfa. Additionally, 524 tons of soybean meal and 1280 tons of corn grain are 
needed to balance the rations. Changing from a traditional crop rotation to a 
conservation crop rotation results in the following marginal changes: increase corn 
silage use by 6.92 tons, decrease alfalfa use by 217 tons, decrease purchased soybean 
meal by 49 tons, and increase purchased corn grain by 556 tons. 
New York NASS survey data was used to determine the marginal financial 
impact resulting from a change to a conservation crop rotation. This analysis shows 
that the representative farmer’s corn silage costs increase by $180, alfalfa revenues 
increase by $23,410, there is $9,843 in cost savings from soybean meal, and there is an 
additional cost of $49,647 for purchased corn grain. This results in a net loss of 
$16,573, but with $1800 from the CSP contract, that loss is reduced to $14,773 on 
average per year. Although this analysis uses ten-year average NY NASS prices, the 
outcomes are highly sensitive to the price of corn grain. Although this analysis does 
not account for fixed costs, such as machinery, it is likely that a farmer might do a 
similar estimate and determine that adopting a the conservation crop rotation 
enhancement is not in the financial interest of the dairy farm. Thus, the omission of the 
conservation crop rotation enhancement is justified in the previous dynamic 
participation decision model. 
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